Commit Graph

17 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Parship Chowdhury 120793f69f fix: block self-impersonation in admin panel (#21130)
## Issue
- From Settings -> Admin Panel -> Workspace -> Members, impersonating
the currently logged-in user still issued an impersonation login token.
Token exchange produced invalid impersonation JWTs
(`impersonatorUserWorkspaceId === impersonatedUserWorkspaceId`). JWT
validation then failed with `User cannot impersonate themselves`,
leaving the app in an endless loading state until cookies were cleared.
- Closes #21086

## Approach
I was first thinking of to only hide the impersonate button for the
logged-in user in the admin, since they can not click what isn’t shown
(as I thought it was just a frontend issue).

But that was not enough:
- The `impersonate` mutation can still be called directly (GraphQL
client, scripts, devtools).
- Before this fix, the mutation could succeed and only fail later at JWT
validation, which led to invalid tokens and a broken session.

So the PR does both:
- Frontend: hide/disable self-impersonation in the UI and avoid
reloading on failed token exchange (UX).
- Backend: reject self-impersonation in `ImpersonationService` and at
token exchange (enforcement, fail fast before bad tokens).

Hiding the button is the right product behavior; the backend change is
what makes the rule real and safe.

## How to test
Manual:
- Log in as a user with admin impersonation.
- Go to Settings -> Admin panel -> Workspace -> open your workspace ->
members.
- Confirm your row has no Impersonate button; other members still do.
- Open Admin Panel -> User for yourself -> confirm no impersonate
button.
- Open Settings -> Members -> your own member profile -> confirm no
Impersonate action.
- Impersonate another member -> should work as before

Automated: `npx jest impersonation.service.spec`

### Before:
<img width="830" height="413" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-02 122224"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46f38a74-8bd6-4ffa-b749-500ce18314f1"
/>

### After:
<img width="795" height="369" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-02 122333"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/62ece4a8-d38b-4f91-817f-792ff49b146b"
/>

---------

Signed-off-by: Parship Chowdhury <parshipchowdhury@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Etienne <45695613+etiennejouan@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 13:15:44 +00:00
Paul Rastoin a159a68e2c [twenty-server] no floating promises lint rule (#20499)
## Introduction

That's an audit + RFC

## Fire-and-forget (`void`) -- Intentional, correct

These are telemetry, metrics, and audit logging in hot paths or
non-critical contexts. `void` is the right choice.

| File | What was voided |
|---|---|
| `sign-in-up.service.ts` | `metricsService.incrementCounter` (sign-up
metric) + `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` (workspace created) |
| `use-graphql-error-handler.hook.ts` | 5x
`metricsService.incrementCounter` (GraphQL operation metrics) |
| `bullmq.driver.ts` | 2x `metricsService.incrementCounter` (job
completed/failed metrics) |
| `call-webhook.job.ts` | 2x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` + 1x
`metricsService.incrementCounter` |
| `custom-domain-manager.service.ts` | `analytics.insertWorkspaceEvent`
(domain activation event) |
| `logic-function-executor.service.ts` |
`auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` (function execution) |
| `workflow-runner.workspace-service.ts` |
`metricsService.incrementCounter` (throttle metric) |
| `cleaner.workspace-service.ts` | `metricsService.incrementCounter`
(deleted workspace metric) |
| `stream-agent-chat.job.ts` | Detached IIFE for streaming chunks
(intentional concurrent pipeline) |
| `workspace-auth-context.middleware.ts` |
`withWorkspaceAuthContext(...)` (AsyncLocalStorage, returns void anyway)
|

## Top-level script entry points (`void bootstrap()`)

These are module-level calls where the promise has no consumer. `void`
makes the lint rule happy and documents the intent.

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `main.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `command.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `queue-worker.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `truncate-db.ts` | `void dropSchemasSequentially()` |
| `codegen/index.ts` | `void generateTests(forceArg)` |

## Now properly awaited -- Real bug fixes

These were floating promises that could silently fail, lose data, or
cause race conditions.

| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `billing-sync-plans-data.command.ts` | `meters.map(async ...)` wrapped
in `Promise.all` -- was returning before upserts finished |
| `cache-storage.service.ts` | `setAdd` and `setPop` had `.then()`
chains that weren't returned/awaited |
| `create-audit-log-from-internal-event.ts` | 4x
`auditService.createObjectEvent` now awaited inside a job |
| `cleaner.workspace-service.ts` | 2x `emailService.send(...)` now
awaited -- emails could silently fail |
| `agent-async-executor.service.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` +
`billNativeWebSearchUsage` in `finally` block now awaited |
| `repair-tool-call.util.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` now awaited |
| `agent-title-generation.service.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` now
awaited |
| `chat-execution.service.ts` | `billNativeWebSearchUsage` now awaited |
| `ai-generate-text.controller.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` in
`finally` block now awaited |
| `agent-turn.resolver.ts` | `messageQueueService.add(...)` now awaited
|
| `command.ts` | `app.close()` now awaited (was exiting before graceful
shutdown) |
| `i18n.service.ts` | `loadTranslations()` in `onModuleInit` now awaited
|
| `workspace-query-hook.explorer.ts` | `explore()` in `onModuleInit` now
awaited |
| `message-queue.explorer.ts` | `handleProcessorGroupCollection` in
`onModuleInit` now awaited |
| `ai-billing.service.spec.ts` | Test now properly `await`s the async
call |
| `messaging-messages-import.service.spec.ts` | `expect(...)` now
properly `await`ed for async assertion |
| `archive.finalize()` (3 files) | Voided -- promise resolution already
handled by `pipeline()` / `on('end')` |

## Impersonation & security audit trail -- Upgraded from `void` to
`await`

These were previously fire-and-forget but are
security/compliance-critical events that must be reliably persisted.

| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `impersonation.service.ts` | 4x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent`
now awaited (impersonation attempt, token generation
attempt/success/failure) |
| `auth.resolver.ts` | 5x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` now
awaited (impersonation token exchange attempt/success/failure at server
and workspace levels) |
| `auth.service.ts` | 2x `analytics.insertWorkspaceEvent` now awaited
(impersonation attempted/issued) |

## Billing audit -- Upgraded from `void` to `await`

Payment events should be reliably persisted for financial/compliance
reporting.

| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `billing-webhook-invoice.service.ts` |
`auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent(PAYMENT_RECEIVED_EVENT)` now awaited
inside Stripe webhook handler |

## Fire-and-forget with proper error handling -- Upgraded from bare
`void`

These remain non-blocking but now catch and log errors instead of
risking unhandled rejections.

| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `logic-function-executor.service.ts` |
`applicationLogsService.writeLogs` now uses `.catch()` instead of bare
`void` -- user-facing logs should surface errors |

## Systemic infrastructure fixes

| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `metrics.service.ts` | `incrementCounter`: Redis cache write
(`metricsCacheService.updateCounter`) now uses `.catch()` internally
instead of raw `await` -- prevents unhandled rejections across all `void
metricsService.incrementCounter(...)` call sites when Redis is unhealthy
|
| `audit.service.ts` | `preventIfDisabled`: made properly `async` with
`await` and consistent `Promise<{ success: boolean }>` return type.
Removed broken `catch` that returned an `AuditException` as a value
(wrong constructor args, unreachable dead code). Removed unused
`AuditException` import |

## Fixed in this session (beyond original PR)

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `telemetry.listener.ts` | Removed misleading `Promise.all` + `void`
combo; replaced with simple `for...of` + `void` |
| `message-queue.explorer.ts` | Changed from `void` to `await` so
startup crashes on registration failure |
2026-05-13 10:08:42 +00:00
Félix Malfait 459c64f642 Prevent non-admin users from impersonating admin users (#20412)
## Summary
- Adds a privilege check to workspace-level impersonation: non-admin
users can no longer impersonate users who have `canAccessFullAdminPanel`
or `canImpersonate` flags
- Adds the same check in JWT token validation as defense-in-depth
(invalidates existing impersonation sessions targeting admin users)
- Adds 3 unit tests covering: non-admin → admin blocked, non-admin →
canImpersonate blocked, admin → admin allowed

## Test plan
- [x] Unit tests pass (14/14 in `impersonation.service.spec.ts`)
- [x] Typecheck passes
- [ ] Verify workspace-level impersonation of regular users still works
normally
- [ ] Verify server-level impersonation by admins is unaffected

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 11:57:38 +02:00
Félix Malfait 012d819557 OAuth Client — Unified ApplicationRegistration, OAuth server, and frontend (#18267)
## Summary

Consolidates three separate PRs (#18260, #18261, #18262) into a single
unified branch with all review feedback addressed:

### New features
- **ApplicationRegistration entity** — server-level registration for
OAuth apps with encrypted server variables
- **OAuth 2.0 server** — authorization code, client credentials, refresh
token grants with PKCE support
- **OAuth discovery endpoint** —
`.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` metadata
- **Frontend UI** — app registration details page with credential
management, redirect URI editing, and server variable configuration
- **CLI integration** — `twenty dev` auto-registers apps and stores
OAuth credentials locally
- **Authorize consent screen** — OAuth consent page at `/authorize`
showing requested scopes

### Review feedback addressed

**Renames (PR #18260):**
- `appRegistration` → `applicationRegistration` (entity, tables, files,
imports, GraphQL types)
- `appRegistrationVariable` → `applicationRegistrationVariable`
- `clientId` → `oAuthClientId`, `clientSecretHash` →
`oAuthClientSecretHash`, `redirectUris` → `oAuthRedirectUris`, `scopes`
→ `oAuthScopes`

**Security fixes (PR #18261):**
- Fixed redirect URI validation bypass when `oAuthRedirectUris` is an
empty array
- Fixed workspace isolation in `clientCredentialsGrant` — now uses
`find()` with explicit handling for multiple installations
- Added error logging in refresh token `catch` block instead of silently
swallowing

**Code quality (PR #18262):**
- Split `VersionDistributionEntry` into its own file (one export per
file)
- Split GraphQL queries and mutations into individual files with a
shared fragment
- Removed unused `OAuth` entry from `AuthProviderEnum`
- Added loading state to `handleRotateSecret`
- Removed 27 narration-style comments from test files
- Added proper guards (`PublicEndpointGuard`, `NoPermissionGuard`) to
controllers and resolvers

## Test plan

- [ ] Verify `twenty dev` registers an app and stores OAuth credentials
- [ ] Test OAuth authorization code flow end-to-end (authorize → token →
API call)
- [ ] Test client credentials grant
- [ ] Verify redirect URI validation rejects requests when no URIs are
registered
- [ ] Verify app registration detail page renders correctly
- [ ] Test secret rotation with loading state
- [ ] Verify server variable editing and saving
- [ ] Run `npx nx database:reset twenty-server` to validate migration

Closes #18260, #18261, #18262


Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)

---------

Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-28 14:07:49 +01:00
Baptiste Devessier cfad24da48 Fix empty user id clickhouse (#18238)
- Fixes:
- Make Workspace User select work; previously, it didn't work as we were
not fetching the workspace users correctly
  - Send Object Events with valid record id and object id

## Audit logs demo


https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/92437037-d253-4810-a138-7c709550755d
2026-02-27 16:58:44 +01:00
Charles Bochet 9e21e55db4 Prevent leak between /metadata and /graphql GQL schemas (#17845)
## Fix resolver schema leaking between `/metadata` and `/graphql`
endpoints

### Summary
- Patch `@nestjs/graphql` to support a `resolverSchemaScope` option that
filters resolvers at both schema generation and runtime, preventing
cross-endpoint leaking
- Introduce `@CoreResolver()` and `@MetadataResolver()` decorators to
explicitly scope each resolver to its endpoint
- Move most resolvers (auth, billing, workspace, user, etc.) to the
metadata schema where the frontend expects them; only workflow and
timeline calendar/messaging resolvers remain on `/graphql`
- Fix frontend `SSEQuerySubscribeEffect` to use the default (metadata)
Apollo client instead of the core client

### Problem
NestJS GraphQL's module-based resolver discovery traverses transitive
imports, causing resolvers from `/metadata` modules to leak into the
`/graphql` schema and vice versa. This made the schemas unpredictable
and tightly coupled to module import order.

### Approach
- Added `resolverSchemaScope` to `GqlModuleOptions` via a patch on
`@nestjs/graphql`, filtering in both `filterResolvers()` (runtime
binding) and `getAllCtors()` (schema generation)
- Each resolver is explicitly decorated with `@CoreResolver()` or
`@MetadataResolver()`
- Organized decorator, constant, and type files under `graphql-config/`
following project conventions


Core GQL Schema: (see: no more fields!)
<img width="827" height="894" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/668f3f0f-485e-43f0-92be-4345aeccacb6"
/>

Metadata GQL Schema (see no more getTimelineCalendarEventsFromCompany)
<img width="827" height="894" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/443913db-e5fe-4161-b0e7-4a971cc80a71"
/>
2026-02-11 10:05:24 +00:00
Félix Malfait 177cae8c53 feat: audit Logs (#17660) 2026-02-04 13:30:55 +01:00
martmull 7f1e69740a 1895 extensibility v1 application tokens (#16365)
First PR to implement application tokens
- add new application role in twenty-server
- move duplicated constants and types to twenty-shared
- will  add role configuration utils into twenty-sdk in another PR
2025-12-08 10:42:46 +01:00
Félix Malfait 1f9a6b067a fix: make impersonation audit logging non-blocking (#16390)
## Summary

This PR makes the Clickhouse audit logging in the impersonation flow
**non-blocking** (fire-and-forget).

## Problem

When the Clickhouse server is unavailable or slow, the impersonation
feature becomes blocked because all audit logging calls use `await`,
causing the entire impersonation flow to hang.

## Solution

Remove the `await` keyword from all audit logging calls in the
impersonation flow. The `ClickHouseService.insert()` method already
handles errors internally (catches and logs them), so there's no risk of
unhandled promise rejections.

## Changes

- **`impersonation.service.ts`**: 4 audit calls made non-blocking
- **`auth.resolver.ts`**: 5 audit calls made non-blocking  
- **`auth.service.ts`**: 2 audit calls made non-blocking

## Testing

- Impersonation flow continues to work when Clickhouse is available
- Impersonation flow no longer blocks when Clickhouse is unavailable
2025-12-08 08:48:44 +00:00
Félix Malfait cff17db6cb Enhance role-check system with stricter checks (#15392)
## Overview

This PR strengthens our permission system by introducing more granular
role-based access control across the platform.

## Changes

### New Permissions Added
- **Applications** - Control who can install and manage applications
- **Layouts** - Control who can customize page layouts and UI structure
- **AI** - Control access to AI features and agents
- **Upload File** - Separate permission for file uploads
- **Download File** - Separate permission for file downloads (frontend
visibility)

### Security Enhancements
- Implemented whitelist-based validation for workspace field updates
- Added explicit permission guards to core entity resolvers
- Enhanced ESLint rule to enforce permission checks on all mutations
- Created `CustomPermissionGuard` and `NoPermissionGuard` for better
code documentation

### Affected Components
- Core entity resolvers: webhooks, files, domains, applications,
layouts, postgres credentials
- Workspace update mutations now use whitelist validation
- Settings UI updated with new permission controls

### Developer Experience
- ESLint now catches missing permission guards during development
- Explicit guard markers make permission requirements clear in code
review
- Comprehensive test coverage for new permission logic

## Testing
-  All TypeScript type checks pass
-  ESLint validation passes
-  New permission guards properly enforced
-  Frontend UI displays new permissions correctly

## Migration Notes
Existing workspaces will need to assign the new permissions to roles as
needed. By default, all new permissions are set to `false` for non-admin
roles.
2025-11-07 15:37:17 +01:00
Félix Malfait c5564d9bd0 [BREAKING CHANGE] refactor: Add Entity suffix to TypeORM entity classes (#15239)
## Summary

This PR refactors all TypeORM entity classes in the Twenty codebase to
include an 'Entity' suffix (e.g., User → UserEntity, Workspace →
WorkspaceEntity) to improve code clarity and follow TypeORM naming
conventions.

## Changes

### Entity Renaming
-  Renamed **57 core TypeORM entities** with 'Entity' suffix
-  Updated all related imports, decorators, and type references
-  Fixed Repository<T>, @InjectRepository(), and
TypeOrmModule.forFeature() patterns
-  Fixed @ManyToOne/@OneToMany/@OneToOne decorator references

### Backward Compatibility
-  Preserved GraphQL schema names using @ObjectType('OriginalName')
decorators
-  **No breaking changes** to GraphQL API
-  **No database migrations** required
-  File names unchanged (user.entity.ts remains as-is)

### Code Quality
-  Fixed **497 TypeScript errors** (82% reduction from 606 to 109)
-  **All linter checks passing**
-  Improved type safety across the codebase

## Entities Renamed

```
User → UserEntity
Workspace → WorkspaceEntity
ApiKey → ApiKeyEntity
AppToken → AppTokenEntity
UserWorkspace → UserWorkspaceEntity
Webhook → WebhookEntity
FeatureFlag → FeatureFlagEntity
ApprovedAccessDomain → ApprovedAccessDomainEntity
TwoFactorAuthenticationMethod → TwoFactorAuthenticationMethodEntity
WorkspaceSSOIdentityProvider → WorkspaceSSOIdentityProviderEntity
EmailingDomain → EmailingDomainEntity
KeyValuePair → KeyValuePairEntity
PublicDomain → PublicDomainEntity
PostgresCredentials → PostgresCredentialsEntity
...and 43 more entities
```

## Impact

### Files Changed
- **400 files** modified
- **2,575 insertions**, **2,191 deletions**

### Progress
-  **82% complete** (497/606 errors fixed)
- ⚠️ **109 TypeScript errors** remain (18% of original)

## Remaining Work

The 109 remaining TypeScript errors are primarily:

1. **Function signature mismatches** (~15 errors) - Test mocks with
incorrect parameter counts
2. **Entity type mismatches** (~25 errors) - UserEntity vs
UserWorkspaceEntity confusion
3. **Pre-existing issues** (~50 errors) - Null safety and DTO
compatibility (unrelated to refactoring)
4. **Import type issues** (~10 errors) - Entities imported with 'import
type' but used as values
5. **Minor decorator issues** (~9 errors) - onDelete property
configurations

These can be addressed in follow-up PRs without blocking this
refactoring.

## Testing Checklist

- [x] Linter passing
- [ ] Unit tests should be run (CI will verify)
- [ ] Integration tests should be run (CI will verify)
- [ ] Manual testing recommended for critical user flows

## Breaking Changes

**None** - This is a pure refactoring with full backward compatibility:
- GraphQL API unchanged (uses original entity names)
- Database schema unchanged
- External APIs unchanged

## Notes

- Created comprehensive `REFACTORING_STATUS.md` documenting the entire
process
- All temporary scripts have been cleaned up
- Branch: `refactor/add-entity-suffix-to-typeorm-entities`

## Reviewers

Please review especially:
- Entity renaming patterns
- GraphQL backward compatibility
- Any areas where entity types are confused (UserEntity vs
UserWorkspaceEntity)

---------

Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
2025-10-22 09:55:20 +02:00
Naineel Soyantar 26e432d8e2 fix: Add reserved subdomains constant and update validation on generateSubdomain (#15217)
## Description

Fixes #15160 

- Moved the reserved subdomains to a separate shared constant file:
`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/workspace/constants/reserved-subdomains.constant.ts`
- Updated the validation while generating subdomain to check if the
extracted subdomain (from email or display name) is reserved
- When a reserved subdomain is detected, the server will automatically
fall back to a random subdomain

---------

Co-authored-by: Naineel Soyantar <naineelsoyantar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
2025-10-21 16:53:48 +02:00
twill-hq[bot] dd4cc98b8a Update Error Handling for 2FA Requirements in Impersonation (#14963)
# Fix 2FA Error Handling in Impersonation

**Related Task:** https://twill.ai/twentyhq/ENG/tasks/2

## Summary

This PR improves error handling for two-factor authentication (2FA)
requirements during user impersonation by enhancing the GraphQL error
utilities.

## Changes Made

- Enhanced GraphQL error handling utilities to properly manage 2FA
requirement errors
- Added improved error messaging and handling for impersonation
scenarios where 2FA is required

## Why This Change?

Fixes #14962 - Users were experiencing unclear error messages when
attempting impersonation without proper 2FA setup. This update ensures
more descriptive error handling and better user experience during the
impersonation flow.

Co-authored-by: Twill <agent@twill.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-07 22:45:20 +02:00
Etienne c1671c6ff6 fix server level impersonation (#14909) 2025-10-06 14:18:20 +02:00
Félix Malfait 4a4777ef78 Enforce 2FA for server-level impersonation (#14842)
Better for security
2025-10-02 16:20:36 +02:00
Etienne 7b16796a20 Fix server level impersonation (#14831)
Tested : 
- server level ok
- workspace level ok
- server level without canImpersonate or without allow impersonation -
fail ok
- workspace level without permission - fail ok
2025-10-02 10:46:59 +02:00
Harshit Singh 09dd49d6d6 feat: Added workspace-level impersonation module and functionality (#14360)
## Description

- This PR is focused on issue
https://github.com/twentyhq/core-team-issues/issues/1421
- Added workspace-level impersonation apart from current
server-level-impersonation
- Introduced WorkspaceImpersonationModule, including service and
resolver for user impersonation within workspaces.
- Enhanced AdminPanelService and AdminPanelResolver to support
impersonation logic, including authentication checks and token
generation.
- added Member Management Interface in settings/members table
- added GraphQL mutation for workspace-level impersonation



## Visual Proof

<img width="919" height="444" alt="Screenshot 2025-09-09 at 1 29 22 AM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a361c6eb-03de-48db-b68a-7d3a489fafde"
/>


https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/454bc1aa-8b8f-4de1-9304-7c147da71dd4


## Impersontion Cookie

<img width="1792" height="297" alt="Screenshot 2025-09-11 at 9 44 06 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a8a37d5e-d38d-4472-94a7-4e4b36fba14e"
/>



<img width="1235" height="1041" alt="Screenshot 2025-09-19 at 1 24
09 AM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/875e8f9c-e0cb-404b-8291-8fadc6c2a163"
/>

---------

Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix@twenty.com>
Co-authored-by: etiennejouan <jouan.etienne@gmail.com>
2025-09-23 18:07:53 +02:00