eda41b4eba6747bf70b6cb95378bb03cde356373
15 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Paul Rastoin
|
76e144e85a |
Deprecate messageChannel messageFolder calendarChannel standard objects (#20836)
# Introduction Removing old standard objects `messageChannel` and `messageFolder` and `calendarChannel` --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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neo773
|
323e66433e |
lint: migrate prettier to oxfmt (#20783)
Most changes are `implements` being unwrapped this is not a oxfmt regression Prettier in 3.7 (we're on 3.1) changed this behaviour prettier blog [post](https://prettier.io/blog/2025/11/27/3.7.0#change-18094) This unifies our linting tooling --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions <github-actions@twenty.com> Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
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|
Paul Rastoin
|
3d49c17e34 |
[CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_BREAKING_CHANGE] Unify connected account permissions (#20732)
# Introduction This PR is a followup of https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/20673 It aims to unify the authentication/permissions layer with all the connectedAccount interactions across the application ## Deprecate - findAll - findById ## Email sync An user can only sync the message of his own connected account ## Workflow email - Related https://github.com/twentyhq/private-issues/issues/478 - Only reauthorize owned account |
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Paul Rastoin
|
57f13c9b92 |
[CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_BREAKING_CHANGE] Encrypt ConnectedAccount connectionParameters (#20673)
# Introduction Prevent any cross user `connectedAccount` `connectionParamaters` leak Also encrypt in db all `connectionParameters` password Never return any password through `DTO` anymore The settings now allow update mutation without providing the password in edition mode Verified all `connectionParameters.password` interaction ## Integration tests - Added more coverage for both failing and successful paths - Introduced a new env var that allow bypass the provider connection test ## Legacy connected Account decryption support Stop allowing non encrypted decryption on `accessToken` and `refreshToken`, only allow legacy decryption on refactored `connectionParameters` ## Upsert ownership Completely got rid of the connected workspace schema context which is legacy Also now a user can only upsert a connected account for him only.. ## New UI <img width="1770" height="1852" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55c1dc89-42ff-4084-95e2-cc5f9e23753b" /> If in edition the password is by default disabled It needs to be selected as being edited to be enabled ## Next - Refactor tool permissions flag not to include connected accounts - Remove the legacy connected standard object - Refactor and improve connected account resolver auth |
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|
Charles Bochet
|
e0b4c9918b |
feat(twenty-server): introduce ENCRYPTION_KEY env var with versioned envelope (#20528)
## Summary
- Adds `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (primary) and `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
(decrypt-only fallback for rotation) env vars to twenty-server, with
backward-compatible fallback to `APP_SECRET` when `ENCRYPTION_KEY` is
unset.
- Introduces a versioned ciphertext envelope `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`
using AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 derived per-context keys. The 8-hex
`keyId` fingerprint lets every row identify which physical key encrypted
it, so rotation routes directly to primary or fallback without trial
decryption; GCM's auth tag gives true integrity (legacy CTR has none).
- Migrates `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` to the new envelope
and plumbs `workspaceId` through every caller, so per-workspace HKDF
context binds each row to its tenant.
The remaining encryption sites (`jwt-key-manager`, `config-storage`,
`postgres-credentials`, `application-variable`, TOTP) stay on the legacy
unprefixed CTR path and will be migrated in follow-up PRs. The
operator-facing rotation runbook is out of scope here.
### Format details
`enc:v{N}:{keyId}:{base64}` — `N=2` is the only version produced by new
writes (`v1` exists for backward-compatible decryption of existing
connected-account rows). `keyId =
sha256(rawKey).slice(0,4).toString('hex')`. The CHECK constraint on
`core.connectedAccount.{accessToken,refreshToken}` is relaxed from `LIKE
'enc:v1:%'` to `LIKE 'enc:v_:%'` so both versions pass.
### Key resolution
| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_SECRET` | Encrypt
with | Decrypt try order |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| set | set | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary →
fallback |
| set | unset | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary |
| unset | set | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` →
fallback |
| unset | unset | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` |
| unset | unset | unset | startup error | n/a |
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx jest
'secret-encryption|connected-account-token-encryption|connected-account-refresh-tokens|encrypt-connected-account-tokens|connection-provider-oauth-flow'`
— 87 tests pass
- [x] New `secret-encryption.service.versioned.spec.ts` covers: key
resolution table (no-key error, APP_SECRET fallback, ENCRYPTION_KEY
precedence), v2 round-trip with/without workspaceId, GCM tamper
rejection, workspaceId-mismatch rejection, keyId-based primary→fallback
routing, missing-key error names the fingerprint, v1 legacy decryption,
no-prefix legacy decryption, malformed envelope rejection.
- [x] Updated `connected-account-token-encryption.service.spec.ts`
covers workspaceId binding and HKDF context isolation.
- [x] Updated slow instance command spec verifies workspaceId is
threaded through encryption and the relaxed `enc:v_:%` LIKE pattern
matches both v1 and v2.
- [ ] Manual E2E: connect a Gmail account on a freshly deployed instance
with `APP_SECRET` only → confirm `core.connectedAccount.accessToken` is
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: rotate — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` and
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<old APP_SECRET>`, restart, confirm
pre-rotation rows still decrypt and new rows carry the new `keyId`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: missing key — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` without the
fallback, confirm decrypt error names the old `keyId` so the operator
can identify the missing key.
|
||
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Paul Rastoin
|
6c18bacb93 |
Encrypt connected account accessToken and refreshToken (#20441)
# Introduction Encrypt the `connectedAccount` `accessToken` and `refreshToken` using `APP_SECRET` in order to mitigate potential data leak or `core` table compromise ## Decrypt Temporary allow already plain text stored token to be retrieve without decryption until the slow instance has been passed Will uncomment the invariant check in a patch when the instance slow has fully be run ## Standards - Token are encrypted as quickly as possible - A token cannot be written in database non encrypted by mistake using a custom constraint ( `enc:` prefix ) ## What's next We should standardize not managing secret as is in the the services and layer, they should be encrypted on the flight the earliest and should never be logged Will create a dedicated pattern afterwards for `applicationVariables` secrets too --------- Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charlesBochet@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
e3be1f4971 |
Make ConnectionProvider a true SyncableEntity (#20232)
## Summary PR #20181 left `ConnectionProvider` in the `SyncableEntity` enum but bypassing the standard sync pipeline — manifest sync called the bespoke `ApplicationOAuthProviderService.upsertManyFromManifest()` instead of going through the workspace-migration orchestrator like every other SyncableEntity. Anything that assumed *"all SyncableEntity values flow through the same pipeline"* (dev UI sync tracking, verification tooling) was wrong about ConnectionProvider — that's the inconsistency this PR closes. This PR follows the `.cursor/skills/syncable-entity-*` guides religiously, all six steps. ## What changes **Step 1 — Types & Constants** (`@syncable-entity-types-and-constants`) - Add `connectionProvider` to `ALL_METADATA_NAME` (twenty-shared) - Make `ApplicationOAuthProviderEntity` extend `SyncableEntity` (drops the ad-hoc columns since the base class provides them, adds `deletedAt`, drops the old `(applicationId, universalIdentifier)` unique in favour of SyncableEntity's `(workspaceId, universalIdentifier)`) - `FlatConnectionProvider`, `FlatConnectionProviderMaps`, `FLAT_CONNECTION_PROVIDER_EDITABLE_PROPERTIES`, `UniversalFlatConnectionProvider`, six action types - Register in **all** the central registries: `AllFlatEntityTypesByMetadataName`, `ALL_METADATA_ENTITY_BY_METADATA_NAME`, `ALL_ENTITY_PROPERTIES_CONFIGURATION`, `ALL_MANY_TO_ONE_*`, `ALL_ONE_TO_MANY_*`, `ALL_METADATA_REQUIRED_METADATA_FOR_VALIDATION`, `ALL_METADATA_SERIALIZED_RELATION`, `ALL_JSONB_PROPERTIES_WITH_SERIALIZED_RELATION`, `WORKSPACE_CACHE_KEYS_V2` (`flatConnectionProviderMaps`), `METADATA_EVENTS_TO_EMIT` - `case 'connectionProvider':` in seven discriminated-union switches (`derive-metadata-events-*`, `optimistically-apply-*`, `enrich-create-*`) **Step 2 — Cache & Transform** (`@syncable-entity-cache-and-transform`) - `WorkspaceFlatConnectionProviderMapCacheService` (extends `WorkspaceCacheProvider`, decorated with `@WorkspaceCache`, soft-delete-aware) - `fromConnectionProviderEntityToFlatConnectionProvider` util - `fromConnectionProviderManifestToUniversalFlatConnectionProvider` util - `FlatConnectionProviderModule` wires the cache service - Wired the manifest converter into `compute-application-manifest-all-universal-flat-entity-maps` **Step 3 — Builder & Validation** (`@syncable-entity-builder-and-validation`) - `FlatConnectionProviderValidatorService` — never throws, returns error arrays; uses indexed `byUniversalIdentifier` for the (name, applicationUniversalIdentifier) uniqueness check (no `Object.values().find()` on the hot path) - `WorkspaceMigrationConnectionProviderActionsBuilderService` - Registered in both validators-module + builder-module - **Wired into the orchestrator** (the most-commonly-forgotten step per the rule) — constructor inject, destructure `flatConnectionProviderMaps`, `validateAndBuild`, append actions to the final migration **Step 4 — Runner & Actions** (`@syncable-entity-runner-and-actions`) - Three handlers (create / update / delete) using the canonical `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerActionHandler` mixin - Registered in `WorkspaceSchemaMigrationRunnerActionHandlersModule` **Step 5 — Integration** (`@syncable-entity-integration`) - Delete the `upsertManyFromManifest` bypass on `ApplicationOAuthProviderService` - Remove the bypass call from `ApplicationSyncService` — manifest sync now flows through the standard pipeline - Drop `ApplicationOAuthProviderModule` from `ApplicationManifestModule` (no longer needed) - Import `FlatConnectionProviderModule` from `ApplicationOAuthProviderModule` to keep the cache discoverable - 3 new exception codes: `INVALID_CONNECTION_PROVIDER_INPUT`, `CONNECTION_PROVIDER_NOT_FOUND`, `CONNECTION_PROVIDER_NAME_ALREADY_EXISTS` **Migration** - Generated via `database:migrate:generate` (instance command `1777896012579`): drops the old `(applicationId, universalIdentifier)` unique constraint, adds `deletedAt` column, adds the `(workspaceId, universalIdentifier)` unique index that `SyncableEntity` requires. - Verified clean — a second `migrate:generate` pass produces zero drift. **Step 6 — Tests** (`@syncable-entity-testing`) - 3 new specs for the manifest converter (defaults, optional fields, all-fields) - All 32 existing OAuth-provider tests still pass - ConnectionProvider has no end-user GraphQL CRUD (it's manifest-driven only), so the GraphQL integration suite that other SyncableEntities ship doesn't apply here **Codegen** - Regenerated GraphQL artifacts (twenty-front + twenty-client-sdk) against the live schema ## Why this matters Before: - `ConnectionProvider` claimed to be a `SyncableEntity` (in the enum) - But the entity didn't extend `SyncableEntity` - And the manifest sync bypassed the standard pipeline - → Verification tooling, dev UI sync tracking, anything iterating over `ALL_METADATA_NAME` got inconsistent behaviour After: - `ConnectionProvider` is a `SyncableEntity` end-to-end - Single sync path through the workspace-migration orchestrator (same as `agent`, `skill`, `frontComponent`, `webhook`, …) - One mental model ## Out of scope (deliberate) - **Renaming the table** from `applicationOAuthProvider` to `connectionProvider` — the `metadataName` is `connectionProvider` (what consumers see in code); the table name is internal. A rename would balloon this PR with mechanical churn unrelated to the sync-pipeline wiring. Worth doing as a follow-up. - **`applicationVariable` SyncableEntity conversion** — the other manifest-sync holdout. Tracked in #20215. ## Test plan - [ ] Migration up/down clean against fresh DB - [ ] Install an app whose manifest declares connection providers — providers appear in the workspace - [ ] Re-deploy the app with one provider added, one removed, one renamed → all reconciled correctly via the sync pipeline - [ ] Verify the dev-UI sync-tracking page shows ConnectionProvider entries the same way it shows agents/skills/etc - [ ] OAuth flow still works (existing connections, new connections, reconnect, list/get from SDK) — should be unchanged since the runtime code path didn't move 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
9e94045fa5 |
feat(apps): generic OAuth provider support for app SDK (#20181)
## Summary
App developers can now declare third-party OAuth integrations (GitHub,
Linear, Slack, etc.) in their manifest and the platform handles the full
authorize → callback → token-exchange → refresh → injection lifecycle.
The dev writes ~10 lines of config and reads tokens via
`useOAuth('linear')` inside any logic function.
```ts
// app/src/oauth-providers/linear.ts
export default defineOAuthProvider({
universalIdentifier: '...',
name: 'linear',
displayName: 'Linear',
authorizationEndpoint: 'https://linear.app/oauth/authorize',
tokenEndpoint: 'https://api.linear.app/oauth/token',
scopes: ['read', 'write'],
connectionMode: 'per-user',
clientIdVariable: 'LINEAR_CLIENT_ID',
clientSecretVariable: 'LINEAR_CLIENT_SECRET',
tokenRequestContentType: 'form-urlencoded',
});
// app/src/logic-functions/handlers/...
const { accessToken } = useOAuth('linear'); // throws OAuthNotConnectedError if missing
```
## Architecture
- **Storage**: extends the existing `connectedAccount` table — new
nullable `applicationOAuthProviderId` FK + new `app` value on the
`ConnectedAccountProvider` enum. Existing Google/Microsoft flows are
untouched.
- **OAuth flow**: a single `/apps/oauth/authorize` +
`/apps/oauth/callback` controller pair handles every app provider. State
travels in a JWT signed via the existing `JwtWrapperService` (new
`APP_OAUTH_STATE` token type).
- **Token exchange**: goes through
`SecureHttpClientService.createSsrfSafeFetch()` (so an installed app
can't point `tokenEndpoint` at internal hosts).
- **Refresh**: piggybacks on the existing
`ConnectedAccountRefreshTokensService` dispatch — Google/Microsoft
drivers untouched, new app driver lives engine-side under
`application-oauth-provider/refresh/`.
- **Injection**: the executor injects refreshed tokens as env vars
(`OAUTH_<NAME>_ACCESS_TOKEN`, `_HANDLE`, `_SCOPES`, `_CONNECTED`); the
SDK helpers `useOAuth` / `useOptionalOAuth` read them.
- **Frontend**: auto-rendered "OAuth Connections" section under each
app's settings tab (no custom front component needed). App-managed
connections are filtered out of `/settings/accounts` so the
email/calendar page stays focused.
- **Disconnect**: best-effort revoke against the manifest's
`revokeEndpoint` before deleting the row.
## Reference app
`packages/twenty-apps/internal/twenty-linear/` exercises the full
pipeline:
- `defineOAuthProvider` for Linear
- `POST /linear/create-issue` and `GET /linear/teams` HTTP-route logic
functions
- Vitest tests for the handlers
## Tests
- 14 server-side Jest tests: token-exchange util (form-urlencoded vs
JSON, PKCE, error paths), flow service (authorize URL shape, state
binding, ConnectedAccount upsert on first/reconnect, per-workspace mode,
invalid state)
- 8 app-level Vitest tests: handler error paths, GraphQL request shape,
Linear error propagation
- All 4 packages clean: `npx nx lint:diff-with-main` and `npx tsc
--noEmit`
## Test plan
- [ ] Apply migration on a dev DB: `npx nx run
twenty-server:database:migrate:prod`
- [ ] Regenerate frontend types: `npx nx run
twenty-front:graphql:generate --configuration=metadata`
- [ ] Create a Linear OAuth app at
https://linear.app/settings/api/applications/new with redirect URI
`<SERVER_URL>/apps/oauth/callback`
- [ ] Deploy + install `twenty-linear` on a workspace, paste the Linear
client id/secret into the app's variables
- [ ] Click "Connect Linear" in the app's settings tab → complete OAuth
→ verify `connectedAccount` row created with `provider = 'app'`
- [ ] Trigger `POST /linear/create-issue` with a valid teamId → verify
issue lands in Linear
- [ ] Disconnect → verify the row is deleted and (if Linear's revoke
endpoint is configured in the manifest) the revoke call fires
- [ ] Verify `/settings/accounts` does NOT show the Linear connection —
it appears only under the Linear app's settings tab
## Out of scope (deliberately)
- **Cron + per-user providers**: a cron-triggered function with a
per-user OAuth provider currently returns `CONNECTED=false` (no user
context). The follow-up design is `useOAuthForUser(name,
userWorkspaceId)` paired with a `POST /apps/oauth/connection-token`
endpoint, deferred to keep this PR focused.
- **Token encryption at rest**: tokens stored as plain `varchar`
matching the existing Google/Microsoft pattern. Worth a separate
cross-cutting PR.
- **Manifest endpoint pinning**: a malicious app upgrade could change
`tokenEndpoint` silently. Same trust model as logic-function source code
(which already runs arbitrary server-side); worth tightening across the
whole upgrade pipeline rather than just OAuth.
- **CLI helpers** (`twenty oauth show-callback-url`, `twenty oauth
connect`): manual setup for v1.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
neo773
|
1e908e5f0f | fix: SendEmail workflow ConnectedAccount query (#19484) | ||
|
neo773
|
b23d2b4e73 |
messaging post migration cleanup (#19365)
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
||
|
neo773
|
d3f0162cf5 |
Remove connected account feature flag (#19286)
Co-authored-by: martmull <martmull@hotmail.fr> Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: github-actions <github-actions@twenty.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
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neo773
|
2fccd29ec6 | messaging cleanup (#19124) | ||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
4ea2e32366 |
Refactor twenty client sdk provisioning for logic function and front-component (#18544)
## 1. The `twenty-client-sdk` Package (Source of Truth)
The monorepo package at `packages/twenty-client-sdk` ships with:
- A **pre-built metadata client** (static, generated from a fixed
schema)
- A **stub core client** that throws at runtime (`CoreApiClient was not
generated...`)
- Both ESM (`.mjs`) and CJS (`.cjs`) bundles in `dist/`
- A `package.json` with proper `exports` map for
`twenty-client-sdk/core`, `twenty-client-sdk/metadata`, and
`twenty-client-sdk/generate`
## 2. Generation & Upload (Server-Side, at Migration Time)
**When**: `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.run()` executes after a
metadata schema change.
**What happens in `SdkClientGenerationService.generateAndStore()`**:
1. Copies the stub `twenty-client-sdk` package from the server's assets
(resolved via `SDK_CLIENT_PACKAGE_DIRNAME` — from
`dist/assets/twenty-client-sdk/` in production, or from `node_modules`
in dev)
2. Filters out `node_modules/` and `src/` during copy — only
`package.json` + `dist/` are kept (like an npm publish)
3. Calls `replaceCoreClient()` which uses `@genql/cli` to introspect the
**application-scoped** GraphQL schema and generates a real
`CoreApiClient`, then compiles it to ESM+CJS and overwrites
`dist/core.mjs` and `dist/core.cjs`
4. Archives the **entire package** (with `package.json` + `dist/`) into
`twenty-client-sdk.zip`
5. Uploads the single archive to S3 under
`FileFolder.GeneratedSdkClient`
6. Sets `isSdkLayerStale = true` on the `ApplicationEntity` in the
database
## 3. Invalidation Signal
The `isSdkLayerStale` boolean column on `ApplicationEntity` is the
invalidation mechanism:
- **Set to `true`** by `generateAndStore()` after uploading a new client
archive
- **Checked** by both logic function drivers before execution — if
`true`, they rebuild their local layer
- **Set back to `false`** by `markSdkLayerFresh()` after the driver has
successfully consumed the new archive
Default is `false` so existing applications without a generated client
aren't affected.
## 4a. Logic Functions — Local Driver
**`ensureSdkLayer()`** is called before every execution:
1. Checks if the local SDK layer directory exists AND `isSdkLayerStale`
is `false` → early return
2. Otherwise, cleans the local layer directory
3. Calls `downloadAndExtractToPackage()` which streams the zip from S3
directly to disk and extracts the full package into
`<tmpdir>/sdk/<workspaceId>-<appId>/node_modules/twenty-client-sdk/`
4. Calls `markSdkLayerFresh()` to set `isSdkLayerStale = false`
**At execution time**, `assembleNodeModules()` symlinks everything from
the deps layer's `node_modules/` **except** `twenty-client-sdk`, which
is symlinked from the SDK layer instead. This ensures the logic
function's `import ... from 'twenty-client-sdk/core'` resolves to the
generated client.
## 4b. Logic Functions — Lambda Driver
**`ensureSdkLayer()`** is called during `build()`:
1. Checks if `isSdkLayerStale` is `false` and an existing Lambda layer
ARN exists → early return
2. Otherwise, deletes all existing layer versions for this SDK layer
name
3. Calls `downloadArchiveBuffer()` to get the raw zip from S3 (no disk
extraction)
4. Calls `reprefixZipEntries()` which streams the zip entries into a
**new zip** with the path prefix
`nodejs/node_modules/twenty-client-sdk/` — this is the Lambda layer
convention path. All done in memory, no disk round-trip
5. Publishes the re-prefixed zip as a new Lambda layer via
`publishLayer()`
6. Calls `markSdkLayerFresh()`
**At function creation**, the Lambda is created with **two layers**:
`[depsLayerArn, sdkLayerArn]`. The SDK layer is listed last so it
overwrites the stub `twenty-client-sdk` from the deps layer (later
layers take precedence in Lambda's `/opt` merge).
## 5. Front Components
Front components are built by `app:build` with `twenty-client-sdk/core`
and `twenty-client-sdk/metadata` as **esbuild externals**. The stored
`.mjs` in S3 has unresolved bare import specifiers like `import {
CoreApiClient } from 'twenty-client-sdk/core'`.
SDK import resolution is split between the **frontend host** (fetching &
caching SDK modules) and the **Web Worker** (rewriting imports):
**Server endpoints**:
- `GET /rest/front-components/:id` —
`FrontComponentService.getBuiltComponentStream()` returns the **raw
`.mjs`** directly from file storage. No bundling, no SDK injection.
- `GET /rest/sdk-client/:applicationId/:moduleName` —
`SdkClientController` reads a single file (e.g. `dist/core.mjs`) from
the generated SDK archive via
`SdkClientGenerationService.readFileFromArchive()` and serves it as
JavaScript.
**Frontend host** (`FrontComponentRenderer` in `twenty-front`):
1. Queries `FindOneFrontComponent` which returns `applicationId`,
`builtComponentChecksum`, `usesSdkClient`, and `applicationTokenPair`
2. If `usesSdkClient` is `true`, renders
`FrontComponentRendererWithSdkClient` which calls the
`useApplicationSdkClient` hook
3. `useApplicationSdkClient({ applicationId, accessToken })` checks the
Jotai atom family cache for existing blob URLs. On cache miss, fetches
both SDK modules from `GET /rest/sdk-client/:applicationId/core` and
`/metadata`, creates **blob URLs** for each, and stores them in the atom
family
4. Once the blob URLs are cached, passes them as `sdkClientUrls`
(already blob URLs, not server URLs) to `SharedFrontComponentRenderer` →
`FrontComponentWorkerEffect` → worker's `render()` call via
`HostToWorkerRenderContext`
**Worker** (`remote-worker.ts` in `twenty-sdk`):
1. Fetches the raw component `.mjs` source as text
2. If `sdkClientUrls` are provided and the source contains SDK import
specifiers (`twenty-client-sdk/core`, `twenty-client-sdk/metadata`),
**rewrites** the bare specifiers to the blob URLs received from the host
(e.g. `'twenty-client-sdk/core'` → `'blob:...'`)
3. Creates a blob URL for the rewritten source and `import()`s it
4. Revokes only the component blob URL after the module is loaded — the
SDK blob URLs are owned and managed by the host's Jotai cache
This approach eliminates server-side esbuild bundling on every request,
caches SDK modules per application in the frontend, and keeps the
worker's job to a simple string rewrite.
## Summary Diagram
```
app:build (SDK)
└─ twenty-client-sdk stub (metadata=real, core=stub)
│
▼
WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.run()
└─ SdkClientGenerationService.generateAndStore()
├─ Copy stub package (package.json + dist/)
├─ replaceCoreClient() → regenerate core.mjs/core.cjs
├─ Zip entire package → upload to S3
└─ Set isSdkLayerStale = true
│
┌────────┴────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
Logic Functions Front Components
│ │
├─ Local Driver ├─ GET /rest/sdk-client/:appId/core
│ └─ downloadAndExtract │ → core.mjs from archive
│ → symlink into │
│ node_modules ├─ Host (useApplicationSdkClient)
│ │ ├─ Fetch SDK modules
└─ Lambda Driver │ ├─ Create blob URLs
└─ downloadArchiveBuffer │ └─ Cache in Jotai atom family
→ reprefixZipEntries │
→ publish as Lambda ├─ GET /rest/front-components/:id
layer │ → raw .mjs (no bundling)
│
└─ Worker (browser)
├─ Fetch component .mjs
├─ Rewrite imports → blob URLs
└─ import() rewritten source
```
## Next PR
- Estimate perf improvement by implementing a redis caching for front
component client storage ( we don't even cache front comp initially )
- Implem frontent blob invalidation sse event from server
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charlesBochet@users.noreply.github.com>
|
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Charles Bochet
|
9cb21e71fa |
feat: secure and user-scope metadata resolvers for messaging infrastructure (#18787)
## Summary Builds on the messaging infrastructure migration (#18784) by securing and user-scoping all 4 metadata resolvers: ### DTOs secured - **ConnectedAccountDTO**: `@HideField()` on `accessToken`, `refreshToken`, `connectionParameters`, `oidcTokenClaims` - **MessageChannelDTO / CalendarChannelDTO**: `@HideField()` on `syncCursor` - **MessageFolderDTO**: `@HideField()` on `syncCursor`, `externalId` - **UpdateMessageFolderInputUpdates**: stripped to only `isSynced` (removed `name`, `syncCursor`, `pendingSyncAction`) ### Resolvers user-scoped via `@AuthUserWorkspaceId()` - `myConnectedAccounts` — returns only the calling user's accounts (no permission guard) - `myMessageChannels(connectedAccountId?)` — returns channels for the user's connected accounts - `myCalendarChannels(connectedAccountId?)` — same pattern - `myMessageFolders(messageChannelId?)` — returns folders through the ownership chain ### Admin-only listing with permission guard - `connectedAccounts` query retained with `SettingsPermissionGuard(CONNECTED_ACCOUNTS)` for admin listing of all workspace accounts ### Unsafe mutations removed - Removed `createConnectedAccount`, `updateConnectedAccount` (OAuth/IMAP flows create/refresh tokens server-side) - Removed `create*`/`delete*` mutations from MessageChannel, CalendarChannel, MessageFolder (managed by sync engine) ### Update mutations restricted with ownership verification - `deleteConnectedAccount(id)` — verifies `entity.userWorkspaceId === currentUserWorkspaceId` - `updateMessageChannel` / `updateCalendarChannel` / `updateMessageFolder` — verify ownership through connected account chain - New `OWNERSHIP_VIOLATION` exception codes map to `ForbiddenError` in GraphQL ### `@AuthUserWorkspaceId` decorator hardened - Added `allowUndefined` option (default: `false`) — throws `ForbiddenException` if `userWorkspaceId` is undefined (e.g. API key auth) - Existing callers updated to `@AuthUserWorkspaceId({ allowUndefined: true })` where needed - New user-scoped resolvers enforce non-undefined `userWorkspaceId` at decorator level ### Exception handler chaining - `MessageFolderGraphqlApiExceptionInterceptor`, `MessageChannelGraphqlApiExceptionInterceptor`, `CalendarChannelGraphqlApiExceptionInterceptor` chain upstream exception handling (ConnectedAccountException, MessageChannelException) for correct `ForbiddenError` propagation ### Metadata services enhanced - `findByUserWorkspaceId()`, `getUserConnectedAccountIds()`, `findByConnectedAccountIds()`, `findByMessageChannelIds()` - `findBy*ForUser()` methods encapsulate ownership checks before querying - `verifyOwnership()` on all 4 services with proper chain validation - Named parameters throughout for clarity ### Dev seeds for both schemas - Added JANE to connected account, message channel, calendar channel workspace seeds - Created message folder workspace seeds (TIM, JONY, JANE) - New `seed-metadata-entities.util.ts` seeds core schema tables (connectedAccount, messageChannel, calendarChannel, messageFolder) with same IDs as workspace seeds, mapping `accountOwnerId` → `userWorkspaceId` ### Integration tests (using seeds, not raw SQL) - 4 test suites (`connected-account`, `message-channel`, `calendar-channel`, `message-folder`) - Tests use seeded data IDs from seed constants — no raw SQL inserts/deletes - Tests read via GraphQL resolvers - Tests cover: user scoping, admin permission checks, sensitive field exclusion, ownership enforcement on mutations ### Frontend migration - Feature-flag-gated hooks (`useMyConnectedAccounts`, `useMyMessageChannels`, `useMyCalendarChannels`, `useMyMessageFolders`) - When `IS_CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_MIGRATED` is on: hooks use metadata API (`POST /metadata`) - When flag is off: hooks use existing workspace API (`POST /graphql`, current behavior) - Settings account pages updated to use new hooks - `useEffect` extracted to `SettingsAccountsSelectedMessageChannelEffect` component per project conventions - Error messages translated with Lingui ## Test plan - [x] Server typecheck passes - [x] Server lint passes - [x] Server unit tests pass (477 suites, 4269 tests) - [x] Frontend typecheck passes - [x] Frontend lint passes - [x] Integration tests verify user-scoping, ownership enforcement, hidden fields - [ ] CI green --------- Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com> |
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Charles Bochet
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cee4cf6452 |
feat: migrate ConnectedAccount infrastructure entities to metadata schema (#18784)
## Summary - Migrates 4 entities (`connectedAccount`, `messageChannel`, `calendarChannel`, `messageFolder`) from per-workspace schemas to the shared `core` metadata schema - Introduces a `IS_CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_MIGRATED` feature flag to control the migration: when enabled, reads come from core metadata and all writes are dual-written to both workspace and core - Extracts 12 enums from workspace entity files to `twenty-shared` for reuse across frontend and backend - Creates new TypeORM entities, metadata services, GraphQL resolvers/DTOs, and exception interceptors per entity - Each entity owns its own data access module (`ConnectedAccountDataAccessModule`, `MessageChannelDataAccessModule`, `CalendarChannelDataAccessModule`, `MessageFolderDataAccessModule`) — no umbrella infrastructure module - Adds a 1.20 upgrade command that backfills data from workspace schemas to core (preserving UUIDs) and enables the feature flag - Replaces direct repository access with data access service calls across ~50 files in messaging, calendar, and connected-account modules - Adds `lastSignedInAt` and `oidcTokenClaims` fields to the new `ConnectedAccountEntity` - Drops unused `lastSyncHistoryId` field from the migrated connected account entity ## Test plan - [x] Lint passes (`npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server`) - [x] Typecheck passes (`npx nx typecheck twenty-server`) - [x] All unit tests pass (477 suites, 4267 tests, 0 failures) - [ ] Manual test: verify messaging sync works with feature flag disabled (existing behavior) - [ ] Manual test: run upgrade command on a workspace, verify data backfilled to core tables - [ ] Manual test: verify messaging/calendar sync works with feature flag enabled (dual-write path) - [ ] Manual test: verify GraphQL metadata resolvers return correct data when flag enabled |