de75be16e2d4e737075909e70f1bd84f260d22df
418 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Abdul Rahman
|
4ab36a630b |
remove nestjs-query from app-token and drop unused createOneAppToken mutation (#22765)
## What Migrates `app-token` off `@ptc-org/nestjs-query` and removes the auto-generated `createOneAppToken` mutation, which was unused dead API surface. ## Why The `createOneAppToken` mutation was reachable only from the schema — no frontend query, SDK caller, or test used it. It was also non-functional (its input couldn't set the token `value`), a leftover from nestjs-query's default `create.one` being left enabled. Real app tokens (refresh, password-reset, email-verification, invitation, OAuth, enterprise) are all created directly via the repository in ~14 services, none of which touched this mutation. ## Notes - ⚠️ This removes `AppToken`, `createOneAppToken`, `CreateAppTokenInput`, and `CreateOneAppTokenInput` from the `/metadata` schema, so the **api-breaking-changes check will flag it** <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22765?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> Co-authored-by: Weiko <corentin@twenty.com> |
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Raphaël Bosi
|
f06ba08b16 |
Fix onboarding locale reverting to English after signup (#22675)
During onboarding the UI reverted to English after email verification. The chosen locale was never stored on the user, so the workspace member seeded from it inherited `en`, and after workspace activation `loadCurrentUser` reactivated `en` and flipped the whole UI to English regardless of the browser language. Two changes: **Backend (the actual fix):** the `signUp` resolver received `signUpInput.locale` but only used it for the verification email, creating the user without it (so it defaulted to `en`). It now passes the locale into `signUpWithoutWorkspace`, and the SSO create-a-workspace path forwards `locale` as well. The user, and the workspace member created from it at activation, now keep the chosen locale, so the post-activation reactivation no longer forces English. **Frontend:** carry the active locale across the workspace subdomain redirect (in `useBuildSearchParamsFromUrlSyncedStates`) so the freshly loaded subdomain renders `/verify` in the right language before the current user loads, instead of briefly falling back to the browser default. Minor, only affects the case where the chosen locale differs from the browser language. |
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Raphaël Bosi
|
2c0e0b2eac |
Create billing customer at signup so onboarding rewards are credited (#22633)
## Problem Onboarding credit rewards (install apps, import contacts, invite team) were silently dropped. They credit the workspace balance via `billingCustomer.increment(...)`, but no `billingCustomer` row exists until the plan step (it's created lazily when the first subscription is set up, which is after those steps). So the increment affected 0 rows and the credit was lost. A user installing 3 apps saw only the trial grant, not the expected +1.5 credits. ## Fix Create the Stripe customer + `billingCustomer` row eagerly at signup via a new `BillingCreditService.ensureBillingCustomer`, called from `signUpOnNewWorkspace` after the workspace transaction commits. It is idempotent, guarded by `IS_BILLING_ENABLED`, and non-blocking (failures are logged, not thrown). The later subscription flow reuses this customer (no duplicate Stripe customer), and trial eligibility is unchanged since the customer has no subscriptions yet. <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22633?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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Paul Rastoin
|
6c40c7b91a |
Deterministic system field universal identifier (#22565)
# Introduction Close twentyhq/core-team-issues#2641 Auto-provisioned field metadata used to get its `universalIdentifier` from three unrelated sources: random `v4()` on the server when creating custom objects, hardcoded values in `STANDARD_OBJECTS`, and an ad-hoc `v5` derivation in the SDK manifest build. This PR unifies all of them behind the shared `getFieldUniversalIdentifier` derivation: ``` universalIdentifier = f(applicationUniversalIdentifier, objectUniversalIdentifier, fieldName) ``` ## Ownership model The rollout is built on an explicit split of who owns a field's universal identifier: - **The 8 system fields** (`id`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt`, `deletedAt`, `createdBy`, `updatedBy`, `position`, `searchVector`) are **server-owned**. Their universal identifiers are always the deterministic derivation, on **every** application (standard, workspace-custom, installed). Clients cannot provide custom values: a temporary check in `validateObjectMetadataSystemFieldsIntegrity` rejects any non-derived system field identifier at migration build time. This check stands in until system fields are generated exclusively server side by the metadata side-effect engine and stripped from client inputs — at which point it becomes structurally impossible to send one. - **`name` is a default field, not a system field**: it is auto-provisioned when absent (server side for custom objects, SDK side for application objects) but authors can define their own. It is only derived where it is guaranteed to be auto-provisioned. In particular, standard objects keep their **historical hardcoded** `name` identifiers: the standard app authors its `name` fields like any installed app would, and moving those identifiers would break every installed application referencing them (e.g. views on `opportunity.name`). - **User-created and author-provided fields** keep random / explicit identifiers, untouched. ## Server - `validateObjectMetadataSystemFieldsIntegrity` now validates, on top of the existing type/`isSystem` checks, that each system field's `universalIdentifier` equals the deterministic derivation. Runs for every object creation going through the migration orchestrator: app sync, custom object creation, standard provisioning - `build-default-flat-field-metadatas-for-custom-object.util.ts` derives the system field identifiers (and the auto-provisioned `name`) with `getFieldUniversalIdentifier` instead of `v4()` - `build-default-relation-flat-field-metadatas-for-custom-object.util.ts` derives both the forward and the reverse default relation field identifiers deterministically - `generateMorphOrRelationFlatFieldMetadataPair` accepts optional `sourceFieldUniversalIdentifier` / `targetFieldUniversalIdentifier` so callers can inject deterministic values; user-created relations still default to `v4()` ## twenty-shared - `STANDARD_OBJECTS` system field identifiers (the 8) are now computed at module load via `buildStandardObjectSystemFields`; `name` and every other identifier keep their hardcoded values - New snapshot test pinning **every** universal identifier of `STANDARD_OBJECTS`: any identifier change now requires an explicit snapshot update and should ship with a coordinated backfill ## SDK (breaking, pre-GA) - `generateDefaultFieldUniversalIdentifier` delegates to `getFieldUniversalIdentifier` and now requires `applicationUniversalIdentifier` - Reverse default relation field identifiers are derived from the field's real coordinates (standard object UID + actual field name, e.g. `targetRocket` on `attachment`) instead of the legacy custom-object UID + synthetic `${fieldName}Inverse` hash input. Field *names* are unchanged - The manifest build threads the application universal identifier through default field injection (two-pass over object configs) - `twenty dev:add` now resolves the application universal identifier upfront and refuses to scaffold anything until `defineApplication` declares one — no more `fill-later` placeholder for the app UID in generated files ## Upgrade A 2.19 **workspace command** backfills existing `fieldMetadata.universalIdentifier` rows to the deterministic derivation. Coverage follows the ownership model: - **The 8 system fields**: taken over for **every application**, whatever value they currently hold. This is both safe and required now that sync rejects non-derived values — leaving a row unconverged would make its application unsyncable - **`name`**: workspace-custom app → always taken over (server-generated, no author to clobber); installed applications → only rows still carrying the legacy SDK derivation are recomputed, author-provided identifiers are never touched; standard app → never touched (hardcoded in `STANDARD_OBJECTS`) - **Default relation fields**: workspace-custom app → forward fields on custom objects and reverse fields on the standard relation objects; installed applications → legacy-derivation probe only All identifiers of a workspace are updated inside a single transaction, then the command flushes the field-metadata-related workspace caches and bumps the metadata version. Stored `applicationRegistration.manifest` snapshots are intentionally **not** rewritten: installs and upgrades always sync from the `manifest.json` inside the resolved package (npm/tarball), the stored column is only used for display/marketplace purposes. ## Breaking behavior for old packages (fail closed) Packages built with an older SDK carry legacy system field identifiers in their tarball `manifest.json`. Installing or upgrading such a package now fails with an explicit `INVALID_SYSTEM_FIELD` validation error ("universal identifier is not deterministic") instead of silently mismatching against the backfilled rows and triggering a destructive delete+create. The remediation is to rebuild the package with the new SDK; the backfill has already converged the installed rows, so the rebuilt manifest syncs cleanly. ## Test plan - [x] `twenty-sdk` unit tests (526 tests) and typecheck - [x] `twenty-shared` unit tests (1635 tests) including the `STANDARD_OBJECTS` snapshot; `name` identifiers verified byte-for-byte identical to `main` - [x] Lint and typecheck clean on all touched packages - [x] Integration: create a custom object and verify system + default relation field identifiers match the deterministic derivation (`create-one-object-metadata-deterministic-field-universal-identifiers`, 13 assertions passing) - [x] Integration: `failing-sync-application-object-system-fields` extended with a non-derived system field identifier case; all identifiers in the spec pinned deterministically so snapshots embedding expected/actual values are stable across runs (verified with a double run) - [x] Integration: all application sync suites pass with the derived system field identifiers now required by the `buildDefaultObjectManifest` test helper (9 suites, 20 tests) - [x] Full test-database reset: standard app provisioning and seeded workspaces pass the new validation - [x] SDK manifest build verified on the postcard example app: all auto-generated default field identifiers match the derivation - [ ] Run `upgrade:2-19:backfill-deterministic-field-universal-identifiers` (dry-run then real) on a seeded workspace and verify identifier convergence with a rebuilt app manifest |
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martmull
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1a85b88d38 |
feat(files): direct-to-storage upload endpoints with pending file lifecycle (#22449)
<img width="1484" height="404" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2d363bf-d9e1-49fb-9811-8cc98041aa79" /> ## Context Uploading large files currently OOMs the server: every upload resolver buffers the whole file in memory (`streamToBuffer`) before writing it to storage. This PR is the first of a series introducing direct client-to-storage uploads. It adds the server-side endpoints and driver support only — it is non-breaking and nothing consumes the new flow yet. Follow-up PRs will migrate the frontend upload paths, add a stale-pending-file cleanup cron, and cap the legacy buffered resolvers. ## What it does **New upload flow (initiate → PUT → confirm):** - `createFileUpload(filename, size, fileFolder, fieldMetadataId?)` validates the request (folder allowlist: `FilesField`/`Workflow`, max size, extension-derived mime type), creates the file record in a new `PENDING` status, and returns an upload target: - **S3 with presign enabled** → a presigned PUT URL with `Content-Type`/`Content-Length` pinned in the signature, so the client uploads straight to the bucket; - **local storage, or S3 without presign** → a token-authenticated streaming endpoint on the server (`PUT /file-upload/:id?token=…`, new `FILE_UPLOAD` JWT type) that pipes the request body to the storage driver with constant memory usage and a declared-size cap. - `completeFileUpload(fileId)` verifies the bytes actually landed in storage (HEAD + size match against the declared size) and flips the record to `UPLOADED`. Idempotent. **Pending lifecycle safety:** - New `status` column on `core.file` (`PENDING`/`UPLOADED`, default `UPLOADED` so all existing rows and the legacy upload path are unaffected) + fast instance command. - Files are refused by the serving endpoints and by FILES-field sync while `PENDING`. **Driver support (both drivers):** - `getPresignedUploadUrl` (S3: presigned PUT; local: `null` → server-endpoint fallback) - `writeFileStream` (local: `fs` pipeline with the existing symlink/containment hardening, partial-file cleanup on error; S3: `@aws-sdk/lib-storage` `Upload` for bounded-memory streaming) - `getFileMetadata` (HEAD/stat for confirm-time verification) ## Tests - `file-upload.service.spec.ts`: initiate validation (folder allowlist, size), presigned vs fallback target, confirm verification (missing object, size mismatch, happy path, idempotency) - `local.driver.spec.ts`: `writeFileStream` (content, symlink rejection, partial-file cleanup on stream error), `getFileMetadata` - `s3.driver.spec.ts`: `getPresignedUploadUrl` (disabled → null, PUT command with signed content-type/content-length) - `direct-file-upload.integration-spec.ts`: full end-to-end flow against the local driver (initiate → PUT → complete → download), plus error paths (complete without upload, oversized PUT → 413, invalid token → 403, unsupported folder, size above max) ## Notes for reviewers - The upload-size ceiling for direct uploads is `settings.storage.maxDirectUploadFileSize` (1GB), separate from the 10MB `maxFileSize` used for pictures. - Since content can't be sniffed before it reaches storage, the mime type is derived from the file extension (with the existing `TWENTY_MIME_POLICY` override) and unknown extensions fall back to `application/octet-stream`; the serving path already forces `Content-Disposition: attachment` for anything not on the inline-safe allowlist. - Self-hosters using S3 presign will need a bucket CORS policy allowing `PUT` from the frontend origin (config variable description updated). https://claude.ai/code/session_015UH8KWmsB9zdYaog8MFG1d --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_015UH8KWmsB9zdYaog8MFG1d)_ <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22449?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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Raphaël Bosi
|
2e6077383b |
Add install your first apps onboarding V2 step (#22347)
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5326d48f-1842-4db1-bc7c-94852145c035 <img width="838" height="754" alt="CleanShot 2026-06-30 at 16 25 05@2x" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5c7d53d7-4d65-4e35-aed1-edf0c104e140" /> Adds an "Install your first apps" step to the V2 onboarding, shown right after import-contacts. It lets users opt into installing marketplace apps (Call recorder and People Data Labs for now) during onboarding. - New backend `OnboardingStatus.APPS_INSTALLATION` (between SYNC_EMAIL and PROFILE_CREATION); V1 auto-skips it. - The primary button sends the selected app ids to the server via `triggerInstallAppsOnboardingStep`, which enqueues a dedicated job that installs them asynchronously so onboarding isn't blocked. Skip continues without installing. - The workspace is credited per app on successful installation. Credits are env-driven via `ONBOARDING_INSTALL_APPS_CREDITS_REWARD_PER_APP`, shown as "Earn +N free credits (1 per tool)". <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22347?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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Raphaël Bosi
|
aea6c3832a |
Credit workspaces for onboarding invite-team signups (#22309)
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6591cbb0-2b60-4f25-8b03-26b0da73f0d8 After the invite has been accepted: <img width="1606" height="286" alt="CleanShot 2026-06-30 at 11 24 47@2x" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7becf8a5-04dc-4512-ac7f-951a77e4c0ac" /> Adds a dedicated `ONBOARDING_INVITATION_TOKEN` app-token type so invitations sent during the onboarding invite-team step are distinguished from regular invites. When an invited person actually signs up, the inviting workspace is credited 0.5 credits. Reward eligibility is derived entirely server-side, with no public API parameter: an invitation is reward-eligible only while the workspace is in the onboarding invite-team step (`ONBOARDING_INVITE_TEAM_PENDING`), a flag set once at workspace creation that no public mutation can re-arm. Both token types stay valid invitations everywhere via a shared `INVITATION_APP_TOKEN_TYPES`, so invitees still join normally and appear in invite lists. Crediting is a best-effort direct call to `BillingCreditService.creditWorkspaceBalance` from the sign-in-up flow: it no-ops when billing is disabled and never blocks signup, and is bounded by a 10-invite-per-workspace cap. No DB migration needed: `appToken.type` is a text column. <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22309?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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Raphaël Bosi
|
82516d65e4 |
Credit the import-contacts onboarding reward on account connection (#22354)
Onboarding V2 shows a credit reward for connecting an email account, but the reward was only ever a frontend localStorage counter, never granted server-side. This applies it for real. When the connect-account step is actually completed via a Google or Microsoft connection, the workspace is credited `ONBOARDING_IMPORT_CONTACTS_CREDITS_REWARD`. Eligibility is derived server-side from the `ONBOARDING_CONNECT_ACCOUNT_PENDING` flag (set once at workspace creation), so the reward is one-time and is not granted when the step is skipped. Crediting is best-effort: it never blocks the OAuth flow and no-ops when billing is disabled. The invite-team reward is handled separately in #22309. The upgrade reward needs no grant: it is applied structurally through the trial resource-usage cap, so an explicit grant would double-count it. <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22354?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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Félix Malfait
|
538b180824 |
feat(dpa): self-serve Data Processing Agreement generator (#22243)
## What
A single, region-aware DPA that serves all customers, generated
automatically from the customer's deployment. Two layers:
1. **Click-through DPA** — recorded at signup (acceptance = execution),
resolving merge fields from the deployment region. Cloud only.
2. **In-app signed-PDF generator** — Settings → Legal → Generate DPA:
preview the agreement, enter legal entity + authorized signatory,
download a PDF pre-signed by Twenty, and store the executed copy against
the workspace with its template version + timestamp. Deep-linkable at
`/dpa` (login-gated) for `twenty.com/dpa`.
## How it resolves
A typed variable matrix (`dpa-region-config.constant.ts`) maps the
deployment region to the contracting Processor entity and terms:
- **EU (default)** → Twenty.com SAS, hosting EU/Frankfurt, governing law
France, SCC section dormant.
- **US (custom)** → Twenty, Inc., hosting US, SCC section active.
Region is a deployment-wide setting (`DPA_DEPLOYMENT_REGION`, default
EU) behind a `DpaRegionService` seam so it can later become
per-workspace without touching callers. The legal text is verbatim from
the template (generated into `dpa-template.constant.ts` directly from
the source `.docx`); only the 6 merge fields are filled and the SCC
sections (7.2–7.5) stay in the document for every region per the spec —
only field values branch. Sub-processors are deferred to
trust.twenty.com (not enumerated). Billing stays decoupled (Twenty, Inc.
remains merchant of record regardless of Processor).
## UI
Standard list + create-page pattern (mirrors API keys / webhooks): a
list of executed copies (with re-download) — or the agreement preview
when none exists — and a top-right blue **Generate DPA** CTA opening a
standard create page. The "Legal" item is intentionally **not** in the
settings menu; the page is reached via the `/dpa` deep link.
## Notable implementation details
- **PDF** is rendered server-side with `@react-pdf/renderer`. The
built-in standard-14 fonts only encode ASCII and crash on the template's
curly quotes / em–en dashes / accented Latin, so Liberation Sans (OFL)
is **subset to a Latin glyph set and embedded as base64 data: URLs** —
no font files to ship or resolve at runtime (works in dev, prod-Docker
and CI).
- New `core.dpaAgreement` table via a fast instance command (FK hash
reproduced to match TypeORM).
- Self-hosted deployments (billing disabled) skip click-through
recording and stamp a prominent "not a valid agreement" banner on the
preview and PDF.
## Tests
- Unit: resolver (per-region entity/law/SCC state, EU default, no
unresolved `{{ }}`, SCC sections present in both regions, self-hosted
notice) and HTML renderer.
- Integration (`test/integration/graphql/suites/dpa`): preview has no
unresolved fields; `generateSignedDpa` renders + persists + returns a
downloadable PDF (asserted with accented input to guard the font
regression); list re-download.
## ⚠ Needs legal input before go-live (marked `TODO_CONFIRM` in
`dpa-region-config.constant.ts`)
- Registered-office addresses for Twenty.com SAS and Twenty, Inc.
- US deployment governing law (the template only specifies France).
- DPO name and the Twenty pre-signed authorized signatory name/title.
## Out of scope (flagged per spec)
Intra-group legal agreement and any Stripe/billing-entity changes. A
future e-sign provider would plug in at `DpaService.generateSignedDpa` +
the signatory input.
> Draft until the integration test passes in CI and the legal
`TODO_CONFIRM` values are supplied.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ahjydxx6J1souz1s1NeA9a
---
_Generated by [Claude
Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ahjydxx6J1souz1s1NeA9a)_
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Félix Malfait
|
0e22ae0521 |
feat: create calendar events on Google and Microsoft accounts (#22231)
## Context Twenty can import calendar events and send emails, but cannot create calendar events. This adds calendar event creation on connected **Google** and **Microsoft** accounts, mirroring the existing email-send architecture (`message-outbound-manager`). ## What it adds The capability is exposed three ways, all backed by the same composer → driver → persist pipeline: - **GraphQL mutation** `createCalendarEvent` (metadata API) - **AI agent tool** `create_calendar_event` (flows to MCP automatically), gated by a new `CREATE_CALENDAR_EVENT_TOOL` permission flag - **Workflow builder node** "Create Calendar Event" in the **Core** section, with a full settings form (variable interpolation supported) CalDAV/IMAP is intentionally out of scope for now (different long pole). ## Design notes - **Reuse over reinvention** — the created event is run through the existing inbound formatters (`formatGoogleCalendarEvents` / `formatMicrosoftCalendarEvents`) and persisted immediately via the existing `CalendarSaveEventsService`, so it appears in Twenty right away and is reconciled by the next provider sync (dedup on external id). Persistence is best-effort. - **OAuth scopes** — Google already requests `calendar.events` (read+write), so no change there. Microsoft moves `Calendars.Read` → `Calendars.ReadWrite`; existing Microsoft accounts must re-consent (surfaced as a clear "reconnect" error via a missing-scope check). - **Deliberate invitation semantics** — `sendInvitations` is off by default. When off, the event is created with **no attendees** on either provider, so creating an event never silently emails external people. When on, attendees are attached and notified (Google `sendUpdates: all`, Microsoft's default). This sidesteps Microsoft Graph having no per-request suppression. - **Timezone correctness** — Microsoft Graph interprets `dateTime` as wall-clock in the supplied `timeZone` and ignores the offset, so the absolute instant is converted to its wall-clock form before sending (Google honors the offset directly). Both providers end up scheduling the same instant. - **Conferencing** — optional Google Meet (`conferenceData.createRequest`, with a follow-up `events.get` to resolve the async link) / Microsoft Teams (`isOnlineMeeting`). - Attendees are a comma-separated string everywhere (tool input, GraphQL DTO, workflow input), consistent with `send_email` recipients; the composer parses to its internal list. ## Test plan - **Unit**: 45 tests covering the composer (validation, all-day boundaries, offset enforcement, timezone, scope checks, default-account resolution), both provider drivers, the dispatcher, and the workflow step-log builder. - **Integration**: `createCalendarEvent` on the `/metadata` API fails closed with a structured error for a non-existent account (the auth/ownership/validation path that doesn't require provider mocking). - **Manual**: verified the workflow node appears in the Core section, the settings form renders and round-trips (edit → autosave → reload), and the live mutation returns a structured failure for a bogus account. ## Open question for reviewers The metadata mutation `createCalendarEvent` shares a name with the core schema's auto-generated `createCalendarEvent(data:)` CRUD mutation for the CalendarEvent object — they live on different endpoints (`/metadata` vs `/graphql`) so there's no runtime conflict, but it's a potential point of confusion for API consumers. Happy to rename (e.g. `createCalendarEventOnConnectedAccount`) if preferred. ## Out of scope / follow-ups - CalDAV/IMAP support - Event update/delete and recurrence - Existing Microsoft accounts need re-consent for the widened scope <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/22231?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> --------- Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com> |
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Félix Malfait
|
40c9a11f43 |
feat(onboarding): always show the Create Profile step (#21823)
The Create Profile step was skipped whenever the user already had a first or last name (e.g. provided during sign-up or via SSO), because the create-profile-pending flag was only set when both were empty. Always set it so the step is presented during onboarding and the user can review/confirm their profile; submitting it still clears the flag and advances. <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/21823?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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Félix Malfait
|
6a1b28bc12 |
feat(auth): collect the workspace logo on the sign-up creation step (#21723)
## What & why A single, consistent **workspace-creation step** for both multi-workspace and single-workspace self-host — collecting **name + logo** (and the **subdomain** in multi-workspace) — which **removes the duplicate name/logo prompt** that previously reappeared on the workspace subdomain (reported after #21641). ## Changes **One creation form for both modes** - With 0 workspaces, both multi-workspace and single-workspace route to the shared `SignInUpWorkspaceCreationForm`; `SignInUp` renders it for the `WorkspaceCreation` step regardless of domain/scope. - The subdomain field shows only in multi-workspace; single-workspace keeps its fixed address. **Logo on the creation step** - New scoped `uploadNewWorkspaceLogo(workspaceId, file)` mutation: the creator sets a logo on their just-created `PENDING_CREATION` workspace via the workspace-agnostic token (membership enforced — only the creator is a member at that point), reusing `uploadWorkspacePicture`. Upload size is capped via `settings.storage.maxFileSize` (also applied to the existing logo / profile-picture uploads). - The picked file is held locally (object-URL preview, revoked on unmount) and uploaded right after creation (non-fatal on failure). **Onboarding step → pure activation loader** - The old "Create your workspace" form (name + logo) is removed. The onboarding step now activates the pending workspace on mount and shows the loader, with a **Retry** action on failure. ## Testing - typecheck (front + server) ✅; oxlint + oxfmt clean on changed files ✅ - Unit tests: `auth.resolver.spec`, `useWorkspaceSubdomainField`, `SignInUpWorkspaceCreationForm` (multi + single-workspace), `useAuth` ✅ - Metadata GraphQL + `twenty-client-sdk` schema regenerated. Follow-up to #21641. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xw37hR5seiCyWnppG9z4op --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Paul Rastoin
|
e7e99247e8 |
Centralize and standardize impersonation validation rules (#21717)
# Introduction Followup https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/21707 ## Behavioral change worth calling out Server-level impersonation now requires verified 2FA outside development at every checkpoint (generation, exchange, and per-request). In main the 2FA gate only existed in ImpersonationService. This is the right tightening, but it means existing server-admin impersonation sessions in production for admins without verified 2FA will now be rejected on the next request, not just at token creation. cc @s0yd4RK <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/21717?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> --------- Co-authored-by: s0yd4RK <285671363+s0yd4RK@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
eeed998c9e |
Let users pick their workspace subdomain during sign-up (#21641)
## What & why
During onboarding the workspace subdomain was auto-generated at sign-up
and only editable later in Settings. This adds a subdomain picker to the
workspace-creation flow, with **live availability checking** and
**name-driven auto-fill**.
The subdomain is chosen **on the central sign-up domain, before the
redirect onto the workspace subdomain** — so there's no mid-onboarding
domain switch (which would otherwise force a re-auth, like the Settings
"this logs everyone out" flow). It works uniformly for credentials and
SSO, since workspace creation is a post-auth mutation.
## Flow
Authenticate → **Create a workspace** → new step (workspace name +
address with live availability + auto-fill, seeded from the work email)
→ workspace is created with the chosen subdomain → the single redirect
lands on the final subdomain → onboarding modal (name pre-filled).
## Changes
**twenty-shared**
- `getSubdomainSlugFromDisplayName` — friendly slug from a display name,
built on the existing `transliteration` package (also transliterates
non-Latin names, e.g. 日本語 → `ri-ben-yu`).
**twenty-server**
- `checkWorkspaceSubdomainAvailability(subdomain)` query
(workspace-agnostic, `UserAuthGuard`) → `{ isValid, available,
suggestedSubdomain }`.
- `SubdomainManagerService`: availability + suggestion logic with
friendly numbered suffixes (`acme`, `acme-2`, …) instead of random hex;
`generateSubdomain` reuses it.
- `signUpInNewWorkspace` accepts an optional `{ displayName, subdomain
}` input (validated; falls back to auto-generation when omitted —
backward compatible, so existing callers are unaffected). Concurrent
same-subdomain sign-ups return a clear "already taken" error instead of
a generic DB error.
**twenty-front**
- New `SignInUpStep.WorkspaceCreation` step +
`useWorkspaceSubdomainField` hook (debounced, stale-response-safe;
auto-fills from the name until the user edits it, with a one-click "use
suggested" when taken; ignores Enter during IME composition; surfaces a
clear error if the availability check fails).
- Onboarding modal name pre-filled from the chosen name.
## Testing
- Unit tests: shared slug util, the `useWorkspaceSubdomainField` hook
(real auto-fill/availability flows via `MockedProvider`), and the
workspace-creation component; existing sign-up tests still pass.
- Typecheck, lint, and format green across twenty-shared / twenty-server
/ twenty-front.
## Notes / out of scope
- No DB migration — the `subdomain` column already existed.
- Self-hosted single-workspace sign-up is unchanged; the step is gated
to multi-workspace (global scope).
- Low-priority follow-ups: length bounds on the subdomain / displayName
inputs, and an integration test for the availability query.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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|
Félix Malfait
|
35c2a24afb |
perf(onboarding): compute invite suggestions on-demand (#21696)
## Summary Follow-up to #21640. In production, invite suggestions took ~1 minute to appear because `FetchOnboardingInviteSuggestionsJob` ran on the shared `calendarQueue` behind heavy calendar-sync jobs. - **Drop the background job entirely.** `getInviteSuggestions` now resolves the connected account from the authenticated `@AuthUserWorkspaceId()` and computes suggestions on demand: cache-first, with a bounded calendar fetch + cache write on a miss. Removes the Google/Microsoft enqueues, the `shouldComputeInviteSuggestions` threading through the auth controllers, and the now-unused `shouldComputeInviteSuggestionsOnConnect` / `isOnboardingConnectAccountPending` helpers. - **Prefetch one step earlier.** New `usePrefetchInviteSuggestions` hook fires the query from `CreateProfile` so the server cache is warm by the time the invite step renders. `InviteTeam` switches from `network-only` → `cache-first`. If the profile step is skipped, the invite step still computes on-demand (~1–3s, no queue) — no more minute-long waits. No GraphQL schema change. ## Test plan - [ ] Connect Google calendar in onboarding → invite step renders prefilled teammates with no perceivable wait - [ ] Connect Microsoft calendar in onboarding → same - [ ] Onboard with workspace name already set so profile step is skipped → invite step still prefills (just with a brief on-demand fetch instead of 1 min) - [ ] Connect a non-work-email account → invite step renders empty form (no suggestions) - [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` ✅ - [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` ✅ - [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-front` ✅ (changed files clean) - [ ] `google-apis.service.spec.ts` + `microsoft-apis.service.spec.ts` pass https://claude.ai/code/session_019MyY3bfAEij4AwSXMCLtWY --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_019MyY3bfAEij4AwSXMCLtWY)_ <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/21696?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
neo773
|
b076c35848 |
fix(messaging): pin Google OAuth2 client to native fetch (#21668)
/closes TWENTY-SERVER-HFH <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/21668?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
61309c45e6 |
feat(onboarding): prefill the invite step with teammates from the connected calendar (#21640)
## What & why Implements core-team-issues#1414: move the calendar/email connection earlier in onboarding and use the freshly connected calendar to prefill the **Invite your team** step with likely teammates, so users don't start from an empty form. ## Approach Everything is behind the feature flag `IS_ONBOARDING_INVITE_SUGGESTIONS_ENABLED` (off by default). **Reorder** — onboarding becomes `Workspace activation → Connect account → Create profile → Invite team`. Connecting before profile gives the calendar sync a head start; connecting *before* the workspace exists isn't possible (a connected account requires an activated workspace + workspace member + OAuth transient token). Gated in both `OnboardingService.getOnboardingStatus` (backend) and `useSetNextOnboardingStatus` (frontend) so the two agree. **Fast teammate lookup** — on Google/Microsoft connect *during onboarding*, a background job (`FetchOnboardingInviteSuggestionsJob`) runs a single bounded calendar fetch (recent events, attendees inline), keeps same-work-email-domain colleagues (excludes self + aliases; personal mailboxes yield nothing), ranks by meeting frequency, and caches the top 5. The invite step reads the cache via a new `getInviteSuggestions` query and prefills the form — polling briefly while the cache warms, and never overwriting input the user has already typed. Providers: **Google** (Calendar `events.list`) and **Microsoft** (Graph `calendarView`), routed by a `CalendarAttendeesService` dispatcher (mirrors the existing `CalendarGetCalendarEventsService`). Any fetch failure (missing scope, API error) degrades to today's empty form via the orchestrator's best-effort catch. ## How to enable Turn on `IS_ONBOARDING_INVITE_SUGGESTIONS_ENABLED` for a workspace (admin panel). ## Notes - New-workspace creators only (invitees never see the connect/invite steps). Skipping the connect step, or signing up with a personal email, falls back to the current empty form. - The "We found teammates from your calendar" subtitle only shows once suggestions are actually prefilled. - i18n: the new `<Trans>` strings are extracted on merge to `main` by the existing Crowdin workflow. ## Testing - Frontend unit tests for the reorder state machine (both flag states). - `npx nx typecheck` and `npx nx lint:diff-with-main` green for `twenty-front` and `twenty-server`. - Server boots with the new DI wiring (no circular dependency); `getInviteSuggestions` / `InviteSuggestion` present in the live metadata schema. - Not exercised in CI: live Google/Microsoft OAuth end-to-end (requires real accounts + calendar data). https://claude.ai/code/session_019MyY3bfAEij4AwSXMCLtWY --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_019MyY3bfAEij4AwSXMCLtWY)_ <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/21640?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> --------- Co-authored-by: neo773 <62795688+neo773@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
neo773
|
5d892bdfd0 |
[WIP] Feat/marketing emails (#21173)
Marketing/campaign emails on top of the emailing-domain (SES) feature:
send a broadcast to a hand-picked list, with per-customer-domain
unsubscribe links and opt-out-only **unsubscribe topics**.
## Model
Standard objects (workspace schema, flat-metadata):
- `messageCampaign` — a campaign send (subject, body template, from
address, status, list, optional unsubscribe topic).
- `messageList` + `messageListMember` — the hand-picked audience (person
↔ list join). A campaign's recipients are its list's members; everyone
is sendable unless suppressed.
Core entities (`core` schema, workspace-scoped — readable by the public
unsubscribe flow without a workspace context):
- `unsubscribeTopic` — an opt-out-only category (name, description,
visibility). There is no opt-in subscription state.
- `messageSuppression` — the single consent store: a row with
`unsubscribeTopicId` NULL is a global block; a row with an
`unsubscribeTopicId` and reason `UNSUBSCRIBE` is a per-topic opt-out.
Two partial unique indexes dedupe global vs per-topic rows (Postgres
treats NULLs as distinct).
- `emailingDomain` — the workspace's SES sending domain,
auto-provisioned when an email channel is added (and cleaned up when its
last channel is removed), with verification status + DNS records.
Campaign messages reuse the existing `message` / `messageThread` /
`messageParticipant` model — one outbound `message` per recipient with a
`deliveryStatus` state machine.
## Sending
- `sendMessageCampaign` resolves the audience **under the caller's
permissions**, creates the campaign, and enqueues a single fan-out job
(the request never materializes per-recipient rows or jobs).
- The fan-out job materializes one QUEUED message per recipient
(deterministic ids → idempotent re-runs, reconciles crash-orphaned rows)
and fans out per-recipient send jobs carrying **only ids**.
- Each send job renders per-recipient `{{variable}}` merge fields and
sends via `EmailingDomainSenderService`, which applies suppression
(global + per-topic) and the unsubscribe footer/headers. Suppressed
recipients are recorded `SKIPPED`.
- The campaign finalizes `SENT`, or `SENT_WITH_ERRORS` if any recipient
terminally failed.
- `previewMessageCampaignAudience` returns a pre-send breakdown (total /
without-email / duplicate / globally-unsubscribed / topic-unsubscribed /
sendable), shown as a hint under the composer pickers.
## Unsubscribe
- Encrypted (AES-256-GCM) token carrying workspaceId, address, optional
`unsubscribeTopicId`, `issuedAt`, and a `preview` flag.
- One-click POST (RFC 8058) + `mailto:` — topic-scoped when the token
carries a topic, global otherwise.
- Preferences page: a checkbox per visible topic (checked = still
receiving); submitting creates per-topic opt-outs for unchecked topics
and lifts re-checked ones (UNSUBSCRIBE only — never
`BOUNCE`/`COMPLAINT`, never a global block).
- A **Preview** action in settings opens the live page via a
preview-claim token; opt-out POSTs are no-ops for preview tokens, so
previewing never mutates state.
- SES webhooks: inbound unsubscribe + outbound bounce/complaint →
suppression (race-safe against at-least-once delivery, with reason
escalation that never downgrades).
- Per-customer unsubscribe hostname (Cloudflare DNS); sends are gated on
it being active, except in LOG/demo mode.
## Architecture
Campaign orchestration, suppression, the sender, the unsubscribe
controller, and the SES webhook handlers live in `src/modules/emailing`
+ `src/modules/messaging-webhooks` (the workspace-feature layer).
`core-modules/emailing-domain` keeps the SES driver, domain
provisioning, the `unsubscribeTopic` / `messageSuppression` core
entities, and the unsubscribe token/hostname plumbing. Domain creation
is validated (`CreateEmailingDomainInput` — domain-format regex,
lowercased) before any value reaches SES or the unsubscribe hostname.
## Frontend
- Campaign composer side panel (from / list / unsubscribe topic /
subject / body) with a live audience-preview hint.
- Email settings: email channels each showing their auto-provisioned
sending domain in a single section (status + DNS records + a "Check
verification" action), plus an **Unsubscribe Topics** section to
create/manage topics and preview the recipient page. A demo-mode banner
is shown when the LOG driver is active.
---------
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix@twenty.com>
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
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|
Félix Malfait
|
06d68f665d |
fix(auth): additional workspace and identity validation in auth flows (#21347)
## What Adds validation across three auth flows so that a session or reset link is consistently scoped to a workspace the authenticated principal belongs to, and to a verified identity. - **Access token** (`jwt.auth.strategy.ts`): when resolving the request's user context, the token's `userWorkspaceId` must belong to the token's `workspaceId` — the same check the application-token path already performs. - **OIDC** (`oidc.auth.strategy.ts`): reject sign-in when the identity provider explicitly reports `email_verified: false`. - **Password reset** (`reset-password.service.ts`): a supplied `workspaceId` is only used when the user is a member of it; otherwise it falls back to the user's own first password-auth-enabled workspace. ## Tests - `jwt.auth.strategy.spec.ts`: rejects an access token whose user workspace belongs to a different workspace than the token; existing mocks updated to carry the cached `workspaceId`. - `oidc.auth.strategy.spec.ts` (new): rejects unverified email; accepts verified and absent-claim cases. - `reset-password.service.spec.ts`: falls back when the supplied `workspaceId` is not one the user belongs to. `tsgo`, `oxlint` and `oxfmt` all clean on the changed files. |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
20ccc52424 |
fix(auth): align workspace resolution across SSO and OTP sign-in flows (#21346)
## What
Makes workspace resolution consistent across the SSO, OTP and
login-token sign-in flows — the target workspace is derived from the
authenticated principal rather than from separate request-supplied
values.
- **SSO callback** (`sso-auth.controller.ts`): validates the resolved
workspace against the authenticating identity provider's own workspace,
so every SSO session is scoped to the provider that issued it. The
`workspaceInviteHash` is request-controlled and shouldn't select a
different workspace than the provider.
- **`getAuthTokensFromOTP`** (`auth.resolver.ts`): reuses the shared
`validateWorkspaceAccess` helper already used by
`getAuthTokensFromLoginToken`, so the login token and the
origin-resolved workspace are checked the same way in both flows.
- **SSO enablement** (`auth.service.ts`, `workspace.validate.ts`): SSO
sign-in now checks the workspace operates an active SSO identity
provider, matching how the other providers gate on their per-workspace
settings, instead of treating SSO as unconditionally enabled.
## Tests
- `auth.service.spec.ts`: SSO sign-in throws when the workspace has no
active SSO identity provider; proceeds when it does.
The controller and resolver spec additions were dropped from this PR;
the behaviours below cover them via manual testing on `main`.
`tsgo`, `oxlint` and `oxfmt` all clean on the changed files.
## How to test on main
Check out this branch on top of `main` and exercise each flow against a
multi-workspace setup (workspace **A** and workspace **B**, each on its
own domain).
**1. SSO callback is scoped to the issuing provider**
(`sso-auth.controller.ts`)
- Configure an SSO identity provider (SAML or OIDC) on workspace **A**
and set it to **Active**.
- Start an SSO sign-in for workspace **A**, but tamper with the callback
so the resolved workspace points at **B** (e.g. supply a
`workspaceInviteHash` belonging to **B**).
- Expected: the callback is rejected with `OAUTH_ACCESS_DENIED`
("Identity provider does not belong to this workspace"). A clean
callback that resolves to **A** still completes sign-in.
**2. Inactive SSO provider blocks sign-in** (`auth.service.ts` /
`workspace.validate.ts`)
- Take workspace **A**'s SSO identity provider and set its status to
something other than `Active` (e.g. inactive/draft).
- Attempt SSO sign-in for **A**.
- Expected: sign-in is denied with `OAUTH_ACCESS_DENIED` ("Identity
provider not found"). Flipping the provider back to `Active` lets
sign-in proceed.
**3. OTP login token must match the origin workspace**
(`getAuthTokensFromOTP` in `auth.resolver.ts`)
- Enable two-factor authentication for a user who belongs to workspace
**A**.
- Sign in to obtain a login token scoped to **A**, then call
`getAuthTokensFromOTP` (submit the OTP) from workspace **B**'s
origin/domain.
- Expected: the request is rejected with `FORBIDDEN_EXCEPTION` ("Token
is not valid for this workspace") and no tokens are issued. Submitting
the OTP from **A**'s origin issues tokens as before.
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
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|
Félix Malfait
|
91f2f08995 |
feat(server): unify workspace-event ingestion behind one EventSink pipeline (#21197)
## Why The five event-log streams (`workspaceEvent`, `pageview`, `objectEvent`, `usageEvent`, `applicationLog`) each wrote to ClickHouse through their own fire-and-forget writer (`AuditService`, `UsageEventWriterService`, and the `application-logs` driver), with the per-type knowledge (table names, normalization, access rules) spread across several modules. Three of them reimplemented the same ClickHouse insert, and the read side, the live stream, and the producers lived in different modules under two different names. This consolidates them into one `core-modules/event-logs/` subsystem (emit, write, live, read), with the per-type config in a single registry so adding an event type is roughly one file. The base Logs settings tab and free application logs shipped separately in #21180 (merged). This PR adds the unified backend, the registry, and the viewer's live mode and entitlement gating. ## Pipeline ```mermaid flowchart TB subgraph PROD["Producers"] A["auth, billing, impersonation,<br/>webhook, custom-domain"] U["usage listener"] F["logic-function executor (app logs)"] R["record CRUD (entity events)"] end EM["EventLogEmitterService<br/>createContext().insert* / dispatch()"] EQ(["entityEventsToDbQueue<br/>(existing, shared with timeline)"]) CIE["CreateEventLogFromInternalEvent"] SINK["WorkspaceEventSinkService.ingest()"] C1["ClickHouseEventSink"] C2["ConsoleEventSink"] LIVE["EventLogLiveService.publishWatched()<br/>(presence-gated)"] CH[("ClickHouse, 5 tables, async_insert")] CHAN(["WORKSPACE_EVENTS_CHANNEL"]) RS["EventLogsService (registry-driven read)"] LR["EventLogsLiveResolver"] UI["Settings > Logs"] A --> EM U --> EM F --> EM EM -->|direct| SINK R --> EQ --> CIE -->|ingest| SINK SINK --> C1 --> CH SINK --> C2 SINK --> LIVE -.->|if a viewer is watching| CHAN --> LR --> UI CH --> RS --> UI ``` ## What it does - Producers call `EventLogEmitterService.createContext().insert*()`, which builds a typed `WorkspaceEventEnvelope` and writes it through `WorkspaceEventSinkService` to the configured sinks (ClickHouse, Console) plus a presence-gated live fan-out. Record/CRUD events reach the same sink through the existing `entityEventsToDbQueue`. There is no dedicated queue; ClickHouse `async_insert` batches server-side. Writes are best-effort, as on main today. - `EVENT_LOG_TYPES[table]` is the per-type source of truth: the ClickHouse table, the required entitlement, the free-text filter column, and the row-to-GraphQL mapping. Read row shapes derive from the write rows. - Four modules along their dependency boundaries: `EventLogEmitterModule` (producer API), `EventLogIngestionModule` (sink layer), `EventLogLiveModule` (fan-out), and `EventLogsViewerModule` (the entitlement-gated GraphQL read, which is where billing/enterprise/permissions stay so producers stay light). - Logs viewer: per-table columns, filters (text, date, record), live mode, and an upgrade card that points to Billing on Cloud or the Admin Panel on self-hosted. Application logs are free on every plan; the other four require the `AUDIT_LOGS` entitlement (with a `NO_ENTITLEMENT` fallback to the upgrade card). - Renames `AuditService` to `EventLogEmitterService`, and the generic `Monitoring` event to a typed `Impersonation` event (`level` + `action`). - Removes `UsageEventWriterService`, the `application-logs` driver/module, and `AuditService`'s direct inserts. ## Durability Writes are best-effort, the same as main today (the old writers were fire-and-forget). A dedicated queue was tried mid-PR and removed: `async_insert` already batches server-side, so the queue only added durability, which isn't a requirement right now. The `EventSink` seam keeps a durable transport (e.g. a Redis-Streams buffer) easy to add later without touching producers. ## Out of scope S3 peer sink (seam only), Postgres or any second read path, `ReplicatedMergeTree`, ClickHouse table-schema changes, and the record-data `EVENT_STREAM_CHANNEL` (unchanged, separate concern). ## Testing Unit tests cover the registry definitions and row normalization, the entitlement gating, the envelope builders, and the producers. Integration tests cover the write paths (record create produces an `objectEvent`; the track mutation produces a `workspaceEvent`) and the read/query path across all five tables. Verified with typecheck, lint, a server boot, and GraphQL/SDK codegen. |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
c3dd6b25a6 |
fix: use canonical oxlint rule id in lint-disable directives (#21253)
## What Many `oxlint-disable` / `eslint-disable` directives across the repo carry a corrupted rule id — `@typescripttypescript/<rule>` — most likely a find-and-replace accident that mangled the eslint-era `@typescript-eslint/` prefix. oxlint matches disable directives **loosely by rule name**, so these still suppress in practice (not a silent no-op), but the id is malformed and misleading. ## Change Replace them with the **canonical oxlint id** `typescript/<rule>` — matching the plugin name and rule keys declared in `.oxlintrc.json` — **127 files, 262 directives**: | rule | count | | --- | ----- | | `typescript/no-explicit-any` | 250 | | `typescript/ban-ts-comment` | 6 | | `typescript/no-misused-promises` | 4 | | `typescript/no-empty-object-type` | 2 | - `twenty-server`: 122 files - `twenty-front`: 5 files Comment-only — no code or runtime changes. ## Verification `oxlint --type-aware -c .oxlintrc.json` reports **0 warnings / 0 errors** for both `twenty-server` and `twenty-front`. Every changed line is exactly the id correction inside a disable directive (262 insertions / 262 deletions, no collateral edits). > Addresses the cubic review, which flagged that the canonical oxlint id is `typescript/...` (no `@`). Worth noting the original `@typescripttypescript/` was not actually a silent no-op — oxlint matches these directives loosely by rule name — but `typescript/` is the correct, config-aligned id. |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
3d49642d12 |
[AUDIT] Run knip over twenty-server (#21159)
# Introduction Run [knip](https://knip.dev/) over twenty-server Used config: ```json { "$schema": "https://unpkg.com/knip@5/schema.json", "workspaces": { "packages/twenty-server": { "entry": [ "src/main.ts", "src/command/command.ts", "src/queue-worker/queue-worker.ts", "src/database/scripts/setup-db.ts", "src/database/scripts/truncate-db.ts", "src/database/clickHouse/migrations/run-migrations.ts", "src/database/clickHouse/seeds/run-seeds.ts", "src/instrument.ts", "lingui.config.ts", "test/integration/graphql/codegen/index.ts", "test/integration/utils/setup-test.ts", "test/integration/utils/teardown-test.ts", "scripts/**/*.ts", "**/*.spec.ts", "**/*.integration-spec.ts" ], "project": ["src/**/*.ts", "test/**/*.ts", "scripts/**/*.ts"], "ignore": [ "src/database/typeorm/**/migrations/**", "src/database/typeorm/**/*.entity.ts", "**/*.workspace-entity.ts", "**/logic-function-resource/constants/seed-project/**" ], "ignoreDependencies": ["@types/psl", "@types/aws-lambda"], "ignoreBinaries": ["nest", "lingui", "typeorm"] } } } ``` |
||
|
Parship Chowdhury
|
120793f69f |
fix: block self-impersonation in admin panel (#21130)
## Issue - From Settings -> Admin Panel -> Workspace -> Members, impersonating the currently logged-in user still issued an impersonation login token. Token exchange produced invalid impersonation JWTs (`impersonatorUserWorkspaceId === impersonatedUserWorkspaceId`). JWT validation then failed with `User cannot impersonate themselves`, leaving the app in an endless loading state until cookies were cleared. - Closes #21086 ## Approach I was first thinking of to only hide the impersonate button for the logged-in user in the admin, since they can not click what isn’t shown (as I thought it was just a frontend issue). But that was not enough: - The `impersonate` mutation can still be called directly (GraphQL client, scripts, devtools). - Before this fix, the mutation could succeed and only fail later at JWT validation, which led to invalid tokens and a broken session. So the PR does both: - Frontend: hide/disable self-impersonation in the UI and avoid reloading on failed token exchange (UX). - Backend: reject self-impersonation in `ImpersonationService` and at token exchange (enforcement, fail fast before bad tokens). Hiding the button is the right product behavior; the backend change is what makes the rule real and safe. ## How to test Manual: - Log in as a user with admin impersonation. - Go to Settings -> Admin panel -> Workspace -> open your workspace -> members. - Confirm your row has no Impersonate button; other members still do. - Open Admin Panel -> User for yourself -> confirm no impersonate button. - Open Settings -> Members -> your own member profile -> confirm no Impersonate action. - Impersonate another member -> should work as before Automated: `npx jest impersonation.service.spec` ### Before: <img width="830" height="413" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-02 122224" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46f38a74-8bd6-4ffa-b749-500ce18314f1" /> ### After: <img width="795" height="369" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-02 122333" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/62ece4a8-d38b-4f91-817f-792ff49b146b" /> --------- Signed-off-by: Parship Chowdhury <parshipchowdhury@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Etienne <45695613+etiennejouan@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
neo773
|
1ba7a3fa54 |
fix: lowercase OAuth handle to prevent duplicate connected accounts (#21120)
Google and Microsoft connect flows stored the provider-returned email verbatim, so a re-auth with different casing (Sam@ vs sam@) missed the existing-account lookup and created a duplicate. Normalize the handle to lowercase at extraction, matching the SSO controller. Note: not doing backfill for now |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
75df1f3997 |
chore(settings): address review comments from PR 21072 (#21121)
## Summary Round through bosiraphael's 31 review threads on the merged PR #21072 (discovery hero + ephemeral playground token). The user asked to apply each suggestion only where it adds value, so this PR is split into three buckets. ### Comments (~17 threads) - Tightened security-rationale / CSS-gotcha / API-doc comments to one or two factual lines - Kept (shortened) the comments above `RequireAccessTokenGuard` call sites — without them a future reader could remove the guard and silently reopen the escalation hole - Kept (shortened) the in-memory-only rationale on `playgroundApiKeyState` for the same reason - Kept `flex: 1 + min-height: 0` CSS gotcha on `SubMenuTopBarContainer` — non-obvious and easy to break ### Structure / extraction - Move `WEBHOOK_TABLE_ROW_GRID_TEMPLATE_COLUMNS` to its own constants file (one-export-per-file) - Split `SettingsAgentToolsTab` and `SettingsAgentToolsTable` across queries/, hooks/, types/, utils/: - `graphql/queries/findManyApplicationsForToolTable.ts` - `graphql/queries/findManyMarketplaceAppsForToolTable.ts` - `hooks/useSettingsAgentToolsTable.ts` (data loading + index merging) - `types/SettingsAgentToolItem|Application|MarketplaceApp` - `utils/getToolApplicationId|getToolLink` - Extract `SettingsAiModelsTab` optimistic mutations into `hooks/useSettingsAiModelsActions` (handleModelFieldChange, handleUseRecommendedToggle, handleModelToggle, handleToggleAllVisibleModels) - Extract `SettingsAI.handleCreateTool` into `hooks/useCreateTool` - Drop unnecessary `useMemo` wrappers on `heroTabs` arrays (SettingsObjects, SettingsLayout) - Simplify `MenuItemToggle` handler in SettingsAgentSkillsTab: `onToggleChange={setShowDeactivated}` (no longer wrapping with arrow + read of stale `!showDeactivated`) ### Hero assets - Replace placeholder `customize-illustration` with per-page exports - Rename `layout/customize-illustration-{light,dark}.png` → `layout/cover-{light,dark}.png` - Add `cover-{light,dark}.png` for **applications** and **members** (they were both pointing at the layout placeholder as a TODO) - Overwrite `data-model/cover-*.png`, `playground/cover-*.png`, `ai/ai-tools-cover-*.png` with the new exports ## Test plan - [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` ✅ - [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` ✅ - [ ] `npx nx lint twenty-front` ✅ (oxlint + oxfmt, 0 warnings/errors) - [ ] `/settings/layout`, `/settings/data-model`, `/settings/applications`, `/settings/ai`, `/settings/api-webhooks`, `/settings/members` each render the new hero illustration (light + dark) - [ ] AI tab: tool list still loads, search + Custom/Managed/Standard filters still work, "New Tool" still navigates to detail - [ ] AI tab: Models tab — smart/fast model select, "Use best models only" toggle, per-model checkboxes, toggle-all all still optimistic+revert on error - [ ] Skills tab: "Deactivated" toggle still flips show/hide - [ ] Webhooks table still uses the 1fr 28px grid |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
b338a7a1d2 |
feat(settings): discovery hero rollout + ephemeral playground token (#21072)
## Summary
Two intertwined streams of work:
### UI — discovery hero pattern, settings shell, AI/API redesign
- **Generalize `SettingsDiscoveryHeroCard`** and use it on Layout, Data
Model, Apps, AI, API/Webhooks, Members. Drops 4 per-page wrapper files
(`SettingsObjectCoverImage`, `SettingsLayoutCoverImage`,
`SettingsLayoutCustomizeVideoModal`,
`SettingsDataModelVisualizeVideoModal`). Each page now supplies cover
src, modal id, and tab list.
- **Modal**: swap `<video>` placeholder for the Vimeo iframe pattern
from `twenty-docs`, per-tab `vimeoId`. Drop the parallel border-bottom
on the header (TabList draws its own baseline) and the grey background
behind the video. Note: Vimeo's embed allowlist applies — the iframes
load with the correct URL on `localhost` but the player itself requires
the video owner to allow the dev/staging domains in Vimeo settings.
- **AI page** rebuilt into a Cockpit pattern (Overview / Models / Skills
/ Tools / Usage). New `SettingsAiOverviewTab` with default Smart/Fast
pickers, at-a-glance stats, and an MCP signpost that deep-links to
`/settings/api-webhooks#mcp`. System Prompt link moved under Models.
Advanced tab removed.
- **API & Webhooks** now has 4 tabs (Playground / MCP / API Keys /
Webhooks). Hero card above tabs. Playground tab inverted to "Core API" /
"Metadata API" sections, each containing REST + GraphQL cards — schema
is the meaningful axis, protocol is secondary. Hash deep-link sync
delegated to the shared `TabListFromUrlOptionalEffect`.
- **Settings shell**: unified drawer outer padding (kill `isSettings`
branch), extract `CollapsibleNavigationDrawerSection`, add `iconColor`
on settings nav items, fix Exit Settings button alignment, 880px content
cap.
### Backend — strategy C: ephemeral playground token
The legacy paste-your-API-key flow is replaced by an on-demand
short-lived token scoped to the calling user's permissions. No shared
"Playground" API key to manage or revoke.
- New `JwtTokenTypeEnum.PLAYGROUND`. `PlaygroundTokenJwtPayload =
Omit<AccessTokenJwtPayload, 'type' | impersonation fields>` so any
future ACCESS claim flows through automatically.
- `AccessTokenService.generatePlaygroundToken` signs an access-shaped
JWT with `type: PLAYGROUND` and a configurable short TTL. A shared
private `resolveTokenSubject` helper parallelizes the user / workspace /
userWorkspace lookups for both generators.
- `JwtAuthStrategy.validateAccessToken` widened to accept
`AccessTokenJwtPayload | PlaygroundTokenJwtPayload`; impersonation gated
on `payload.type === ACCESS` so the union narrows without `as unknown
as` casts. The two branches in `validate()` collapse into one.
- New `PLAYGROUND_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN` config var (default `2h`).
- New `generatePlaygroundToken` mutation (`WorkspaceAuthGuard`, no args,
returns `AuthToken`).
- Frontend `useOpenPlayground` hook centralizes mint → atom write →
navigate, with Apollo `onError` snackbar and a "use cached PLAYGROUND
token if still fresh" short-circuit (decodes via `jwt-decode`, checks
both `type` AND `exp`). Old API_KEY tokens left in localStorage from the
prior paste-form flow are rejected on `type` alone and force a re-mint —
this is what was causing the "This API Key is revoked" symptom on stale
browsers.
### Drive-by cleanups
- `PlaygroundToken` DTO removed (identical shape to `AuthToken` already
in use).
- 5 `customize-sidebar.webm` imports and the dead placeholder pipeline
removed.
## Test plan
### Discovery hero
- [ ] `/settings/layout`, `/settings/data-model`,
`/settings/applications`, `/settings/ai`, `/settings/api-webhooks`,
`/settings/members` each render the discovery hero card with its
illustration + play button + tabbed modal
- [ ] Modal tabs show the correct Vimeo embed URL per tab; aspect ratio
stays at 1440/900; no parallel border-bottom jog at the tab baseline
- [ ] AI Overview tab shows Smart/Fast model pickers + stats grid + MCP
signpost card; the MCP card lands on `/settings/api-webhooks#mcp` with
the MCP tab active
### API playground (ephemeral token)
- [ ] With an empty `playgroundApiKeyState` in localStorage, clicking
REST or GraphQL playground card opens the playground and the cached
token has `type: "PLAYGROUND"` with ~2h exp
- [ ] Clicking the card again within the freshness window does **not**
re-mint (`iat` / fingerprint stable across visits)
- [ ] Planting a fake API_KEY-shaped JWT in localStorage and clicking
the card forces a fresh mint (old token rejected on `type`)
- [ ] `GET /rest/companies?limit=1` with the cached token returns 200 +
real data
- [ ] `POST /graphql { __typename }` returns 200
### Settings shell
- [ ] Settings nav matches main app drawer padding; sections collapse;
Exit Settings button aligns with the workspace links above
- [ ] Active nav items have a right-gap (cleaner active state)
- [ ] Content area capped at 880px
### Verify
- [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` passes
- [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` passes
- [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-front` passes
- [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` passes
|
||
|
martmull
|
961745e9ba |
Fix latency spike on application lookup (#21042)
Fixes https://discord.com/channels/1130383047699738754/1509645089062781058 Caching application entities to improve authentication latency |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
ebfaca5b3d |
EncryptedString PlaintextString branded string types (#21001)
## Summary closes https://github.com/twentyhq/core-team-issues/issues/2464 Introduces compile-time branded types to distinguish encrypted ciphertext from plaintext strings, preventing mix-ups like the one fixed in #20819 — but at the type level rather in addition to the one existing at runtime. ### Branded string primitives - Created `EncryptedString` and `PlaintextString` as hard nominal brands using `z.string().brand(...)`, making them non-assignable to each other or to raw `string` - Created `isEncryptedString` type predicate to narrow `string` to `EncryptedString` based on the `enc:v2:` envelope prefix - Retyped `SecretEncryptionService`: `encryptVersioned` accepts `PlaintextString`, `decryptVersioned` returns `PlaintextString` ### Entity typing - Typed encrypted columns across entities: `SigningKeyEntity.privateKey`, `TwoFactorAuthenticationMethodEntity.secret`, `ApplicationRegistrationVariableEntity.encryptedValue`, `ApplicationVariableEntity.value` - Parameterized JSONB types for connected account connection parameters (`ImapSmtpCaldavParams<Pwd>`) with reusable aliases `EncryptedImapSmtpCaldavParams` / `DecryptedImapSmtpCaldavParams` - Typed DTOs (`CreateApplicationRegistrationVariableInput`, `UpdateApplicationRegistrationVariablePayload`, `UpdateApplicationVariableEntityInput`) with `PlaintextString` ### ApplicationVariable always-encrypt uniformization - Retyped `ApplicationVariableEntity.value` to `EncryptedString | ''` — all values are now encrypted regardless of `isSecret` - Updated `ApplicationVariableEntityService` to always encrypt on write and always decrypt on read - Simplified `UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService` by removing conditional encrypt/decrypt-on-isSecret-toggle logic - Added slow instance command (`2.9.0`) to backfill-encrypt existing `isSecret=false` plaintext rows and tighten the `CHECK` constraint ### ConfigStorageService refactor - Split `convertAndSecureValue` (which used `any`) into two well-typed methods: `convertAndDecrypt` and `convertAndEncrypt` - Introduced `isSensitiveStringValue` type predicate to narrow values before encryption/decryption ### What's next - Typeorm entity derivation to strictly type sitemap configuration as code + handler logic for encryption rotation - https://github.com/twentyhq/core-team-issues/issues/2465 |
||
|
Etienne
|
eda41b4eba |
feat(ai) - add observability (#20850)
**AI Chat - Tool Executions (counters, tagged with model)** ai-chat/tool-execution-succeeded: number of tool calls invoked by the AI that completed without error ai-chat/tool-execution-failed: number of tool calls invoked by the AI that threw an error **AI Chat - Token Usage (counters, tagged with model)** ai-chat/input-tokens: total input tokens sent to the model across all turns ai-chat/output-tokens: total output tokens generated by the model ai-chat/cache-read-tokens: input tokens served from the model's prompt cache (cheaper) ai-chat/cache-write-tokens: input tokens written into the prompt cache for future reuse **AI Chat - Latency (histograms in ms, tagged with model)** ai-chat/turn-latency-ms: total duration of a full chat turn (from stream start to stream end) ai-chat/step-latency-ms: duration of a single reasoning/tool-call step within a turn ai-chat/ttft-ms: time-to-first-token, i.e. how long until the model starts streaming output **MCP - Tool Executions (counters)** mcp/tool-execution-succeeded: number of MCP tool calls that completed successfully mcp/tool-execution-failed: number of MCP tool calls that threw an error |
||
|
neo773
|
323e66433e |
lint: migrate prettier to oxfmt (#20783)
Most changes are `implements` being unwrapped this is not a oxfmt regression Prettier in 3.7 (we're on 3.1) changed this behaviour prettier blog [post](https://prettier.io/blog/2025/11/27/3.7.0#change-18094) This unifies our linting tooling --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions <github-actions@twenty.com> Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
923c3beead |
fix(auth): clarify error when joining a non-active workspace (#20769)
## Summary When an existing user accepts an invite into a workspace whose `activationStatus` is not `ACTIVE` (e.g. `SUSPENDED`, `INACTIVE`, `PENDING_CREATION`), the throw in `throwIfWorkspaceIsNotReadyForSignInUp` returns: > User is not part of the workspace The message describes the symptom (they aren't a member yet) instead of the cause (the workspace can't accept new members), which makes invitees assume their invite is broken when the real issue is the target workspace's state. The sibling branch a few lines above — for brand-new users hitting the same non-ACTIVE workspace — already returns `"Workspace is not ready to welcome new members"`. This PR reuses the same message in the existing-user branch so both paths give a consistent, accurate explanation. Single file, two string literals. ## Test plan - [ ] Sign in via Google with an existing Twenty account, accepting an invite to a `SUSPENDED` workspace → confirm the new message is shown instead of "User is not part of the workspace". - [ ] Confirm the happy path (sign-in to an `ACTIVE` workspace via invite) is unchanged — early-return on `ACTIVE` is untouched. --------- Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
||
|
Weiko
|
265d2edc83 |
Fix QueryRunnerAlreadyReleasedError in sign-in-up service (#20734)
## Context
When signing up on a new workspace,
`SignInUpService.signUpOnNewWorkspace`
manually drove a transaction with `createQueryRunner` /
`startTransaction` /
`commitTransaction` / `rollbackTransaction` / `release`.
If the underlying Postgres connection dropped mid-transaction
(`idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`, server-side termination), the
`pg`
client's `'error'` event fires. TypeORM's connect-time listener responds
by
calling `release()` on the `QueryRunner`, which sets `isReleased = true`
but
deliberately does **not** touch `isTransactionActive`.
The `catch` branch then hit:
```ts
if (queryRunner.isTransactionActive) {
await queryRunner.rollbackTransaction(); // throws QueryRunnerAlreadyReleasedError
}
throw error;
```
Error from Sentry
```typescript
QueryRunnerAlreadyReleasedError: Query runner already released. Cannot run queries anymore.
at PostgresQueryRunner.query (.../PostgresQueryRunner.js:177)
at PostgresQueryRunner.rollbackTransaction (.../PostgresQueryRunner.js:167)
at SignInUpService.signUpOnNewWorkspace (.../sign-in-up.service.js:370)
```
## Changes
Replaced the hand-rolled transaction with
this.dataSource.transaction(...).
TypeORM's built-in wrapper already does what we need:
- starts/commits/rolls back the transaction
- wraps rollback in try { ... } catch { /* ignore */ }, so a connection
drop no longer masks the real error
- releases the QueryRunner unconditionally
## Note
Other fix would have been to do this
```typescript
if (queryRunner.isTransactionActive && **!queryRunner.isReleased**) {
try {
await queryRunner.rollbackTransaction();
} catch {
```
|
||
|
neo773
|
6cd069ce40 |
messaging minor perf improvement (#20687)
This PR adds two changes 1. Pass `lite:true` to `ExecuteInWorkspaceContextOptions` introduced in https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/18376 2. Remove redundant gmail alias call, it adds 300ms every cron job, we only do it once now when user connects, realistically I don't see people changing their aliases every day you only set it up once actual real diff is small, it's just prettier format contributing to diff Objective decrease total time take per job |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
6b49a14b9f |
feat(auth): set 50-character maximum length on passwords (#20655)
## Summary - Cap password length at 50 characters in the shared regex used by sign-up, password reset, and password change (both `twenty-front` and `twenty-server`). - Update the user-facing validation message on sign-up and password reset to mention both the 8 min and 50 max bounds. - Extend the `PASSWORD_REGEX` unit test to cover the new upper bound. The cap also prevents unbounded inputs from reaching bcrypt, which silently truncates passwords above 72 bytes and can mask user-visible bugs. ## Test plan - [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth/utils/__tests__/passwordRegex.test.ts` passes (8-char min and 50-char max). - [ ] Sign up with a 51-character password — form rejects with "Password must be between 8 and 50 characters". - [ ] Sign up with an 8–50 character password — succeeds. - [ ] Password reset rejects a 51-character password with the same message. - [ ] Existing users with longer passwords (if any pre-exist) can still sign in (the regex only gates write paths: sign-up, change, reset). |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
45bea6f991 |
feat(secret-encryption): drop APP_SECRET from approved-access-domain validation and session cookies (#20580)
## Summary Continues retiring `APP_SECRET` as a hot signing secret (after the TOTP migration in #20577). This PR moves the last two cryptographic uses of `APP_SECRET` off it: 1. **Approved-access-domain validation tokens** — was a one-shot `sha256(JSON.stringify({id, domain, key: APP_SECRET}))` HMAC with no built-in expiry. Now a JWT signed by the workspace `signingKey` with a 7-day expiry and claims bound to `approvedAccessDomainId`, `workspaceId`, and `domain`. 2. **Express-session cookie signing** — was `sha256(APP_SECRET || 'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')`. Now `HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY, info='twenty:hmac:v1:session-cookie')` with `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` supported for rotation. ### Approved-access-domain — strict cutover - `ApprovedAccessDomainService.mintValidationToken` issues a JWT via `JwtWrapperService.signAsyncOrThrow` (workspace `signingKey`, asymmetric ES256 with kid-based rotation built in). - `validateApprovedAccessDomain` verifies the JWT, asserts `type === APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN`, cross-checks `claim.approvedAccessDomainId` against the URL's `approvedAccessDomainId`, then re-checks `domain` and `workspaceId` against the stored row. Any failure maps to `APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN_VALIDATION_TOKEN_INVALID`. - **No legacy fallback:** any pending invitation link minted with the old SHA hash will fail validation and must be re-sent. Volume is small and admins can re-issue from settings — this is the cleanest cutover. ### Session cookies — bridged cutover - `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` returns an array `[HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY), HKDF(FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY)?, sha256(APP_SECRET || 'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')?]`. - `express-session` signs new cookies with the first secret and verifies against any entry, so in-flight cookies signed under the legacy SHA keep verifying until `maxAge` (30 min) expires. - New `deriveInstanceHmacKey` HKDF utility uses a dedicated `twenty:hmac:v1:` info prefix — distinct from the AEAD subkey prefix `twenty:enc:v2:` — so HMAC and encryption subkeys can never collide for the same raw `ENCRYPTION_KEY`. - TODO comment marks the legacy slot for removal post-2.5. ### Notes on rotation behaviour - Rotating `ENCRYPTION_KEY` while keeping the old value in `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` keeps cookies signed under either key verifying. New cookies sign under the new key. After all in-flight cookies expire (≤30 min), the fallback slot can be dropped from env. - Rotating the workspace `signingKey` (already supported by `JwtKeyManagerService`) keeps already-issued approved-access-domain JWTs verifying via `kid` until their 7-day expiry. ## Test plan - [x] Unit tests for `ApprovedAccessDomainService` cover: happy path, JWT verify failure, wrong token type, JWT id ≠ input id, JWT-claimed domain ≠ row, missing row, already-validated row. - [x] Unit tests for `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` cover: throws without keys, primary order (`ENCRYPTION_KEY` → APP_SECRET fallback), `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` placement, empty-string vars treated as unset, legacy slot omitted when `APP_SECRET` missing, HKDF domain separation across purposes. - [x] `nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` — clean. - [x] Full test surface across approved-access-domain, secret-encryption, session-storage — 78/78 pass. - [ ] CI green. - [ ] Manual smoke: boot with a dummy `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, confirm sign-in succeeds (session cookie works), create + validate an approved-access-domain end-to-end through the UI. |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
0d5617d446 |
chore(server): drop unused postgresCredentials feature (#20573)
## Summary Drops the `postgresCredentials` legacy feature: a never-finished "postgres proxy" that would have let users query their workspace data over a standard Postgres connection. Nothing — frontend, e2e, Zapier, docs, other server code — calls these mutations/query. ## History - **Introduced** June 2024 (#5767, Thomas Trompette) as "first step for creating credentials for database proxy", alongside the Postgres FDW / remote-server work and the custom `twenty-postgres-spilo` image. Planned follow-ups (provisioning a DB on the proxy, mapping users, exposing it as a remote server) never landed. - **Abandoned** January 2026 (#17001, Weiko) when the sibling "remote integration" feature was removed as a BREAKING CHANGE — "not maintained for more than a year and never officially launched". The spilo image was then replaced with vanilla `postgres:16` (#19182, March 2026), retiring the FDW infrastructure entirely. - This PR finishes the cleanup: removes the orphaned module, the `allPostgresCredentials` relation, `JwtTokenTypeEnum.POSTGRES_PROXY` + payload, the reserved metadata keywords, and adds a 2.5.0 fast instance command that drops `core.postgresCredentials` (reversible `down`). Regenerated frontend GraphQL types + SDK metadata client. ## Test plan - [x] `tsgo --noEmit` clean on twenty-server + twenty-front; lint + prettier clean on touched files. - [x] `database:migrate:generate` reports no pending schema diff; server boots and serves the new schema. |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
34d9fcaba1 |
chore(auth): drop unused workspacePersonalInviteToken from SSO state (#20557)
## Summary
Pure dead-code removal. The Google and Microsoft SSO strategies have
been packing `workspacePersonalInviteToken` into the OAuth `state` blob
and re-emitting it on `validate()`, but
[`signInUpWithSocialSSO`](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/auth.service.ts)
never destructures or reads it from the user object. The SSO flow
resolves invitations by the IdP-verified email instead:
```ts
const invitation =
currentWorkspace && email
? await this.findInvitationForSignInUp({
currentWorkspace,
email, // ← matched against appToken.context.email
})
: undefined;
```
So the strategy plumbing is write-only and confusing for readers.
Removed from:
-
[`SocialSSOState`](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/types/social-sso-state.type.ts)
- `GoogleRequest['user']` and `MicrosoftRequest['user']`
- The `state` JSON in both strategies' `authenticate()`
- The user object in both strategies' `validate()`
No frontend change needed — `useAuth.buildRedirectUrl` still sets the
`inviteToken` query param when a personal invite token is present (used
by other paths), and nothing on the SSO server side was reading it.
The token-based invitation lookup is preserved for the password signup
flow via `auth.resolver.signUp` → `findInvitationForSignInUp({
currentWorkspace, workspacePersonalInviteToken })`. Unrelated,
untouched.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest engine/core-modules/auth` (twenty-server) — 26 suites /
178 tests pass.
- [x] `tsgo -p tsconfig.json --noEmit` — no new errors on the touched
files (pre-existing `IS_REST_METADATA_API_NEW_FORMAT_DIRECT` errors on
main are unrelated).
- [x] `oxlint` + `prettier --check` on touched files — clean.
- [ ] Manual smoke: Google sign-in still works (workspace selection /
verify flow unaffected since `workspaceInviteHash`, `workspaceId`,
`action`, `locale`, `billingCheckoutSessionState`, `returnToPath` still
flow correctly).
|
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
49b9660420 |
fix(auth): preserve returnToPath across Google/Microsoft SSO redirects (#20537)
## Summary Fixes the consent-modal-not-reopening half of [#20535](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/issues/20535): when a signed-out user opens an OAuth `/authorize?...` URL (e.g. ChatGPT connecting to `api.twenty.com/mcp`) and signs in with **Google or Microsoft**, the original `/authorize` request was lost and the consent screen never reopened. ### Root cause `PageChangeEffect` already saves the deep link as `returnToPath` (Jotai atom) before navigating to `/welcome`. That atom is in-memory: it survives SPA navigation, and the cross-subdomain workspace hop is handled by `useBuildSearchParamsFromUrlSyncedStates` round-tripping the value through the URL. But the social-SSO path leaves `app.twenty.com` entirely — `app.twenty.com/welcome` → `api.twenty.com/auth/google` → Google → `api.twenty.com/auth/google/redirect` → frontend — so the atom is wiped. None of the existing code paths plumbed `returnToPath` through that hop: - `useAuth.buildRedirectUrl` packed `workspaceInviteHash`/`action`/etc. but not `returnToPath`. - `SocialSSOState` / the Google + Microsoft strategies didn't carry it through the OAuth `state` blob. - `signInUpWithSocialSSO` + `computeRedirectURI` didn't re-emit it on the redirect back to the frontend. The email path worked because all transitions stay on the default frontend domain, so the atom survives until `SignInUpGlobalScopeForm` bakes it into the workspace URL. ### What changed Plumb `returnToPath` through the SSO state the same way `workspaceInviteHash` and `action` already flow: - **Frontend** (`useAuth.buildRedirectUrl`): read `returnToPath` from the Jotai store and append it to `/auth/google` / `/auth/microsoft` when set and structurally valid. - **Server types** (`SocialSSOState`, `GoogleRequest['user']`, `MicrosoftRequest['user']`): add optional `returnToPath`. - **Strategies** (`google.auth.strategy.ts`, `microsoft.auth.strategy.ts`): include `returnToPath: req.query.returnToPath` in the JSON `state` and read it back in `validate`. - **auth.service.ts** (`signInUpWithSocialSSO`, `computeRedirectURI`): forward `returnToPath` on both branches — the multi-workspace redirect to `AppPath.SignInUp?tokenPair=...` and the single-workspace redirect to `<workspace>/verify?loginToken=...`. Validated via a new `isValidReturnToPath` helper so a tampered query value can't become an open-redirect vector. After the round-trip, `useInitializeQueryParamState` rehydrates the atom from the URL and `usePageChangeEffectNavigateLocation` resolves it as the post-auth destination — same mechanism the email path already relied on. Out of scope: the OAuth `resource` parameter handling tracked in [#20296](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/issues/20296) is independent and not addressed here. ## Test plan - [x] `npx jest src/engine/core-modules/auth` (twenty-server) — 27 suites / 183 tests pass, including new `is-valid-return-to-path.util.spec.ts`. - [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth` (twenty-front) — 13 suites / 52 tests pass, including two new cases in `useAuth.test.tsx` covering the happy path and the protocol-relative open-redirect guard. - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` / `twenty-front` — clean. - [x] `npx oxlint` + `prettier --check` on touched files — clean. - [ ] Manual: signed-out user opens `https://app.twenty.com/authorize?client_id=...` → Continue with Google → completes Google → selects workspace → consent screen renders. - [ ] Manual: same flow, single workspace — lands on consent screen directly after Verify. - [ ] Manual: email path still works (regression). - [ ] Manual: tamper `returnToPath=//evil.com` on the `/auth/google` URL → server validation rejects, user lands at default home, not at `evil.com`. E2E note: existing `return-to-path.spec.ts` already covers deep links with query params through the email path. A mock OAuth provider would be needed to cover the SSO path end-to-end; unit coverage stands in for now. |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
e0b4c9918b |
feat(twenty-server): introduce ENCRYPTION_KEY env var with versioned envelope (#20528)
## Summary
- Adds `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (primary) and `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
(decrypt-only fallback for rotation) env vars to twenty-server, with
backward-compatible fallback to `APP_SECRET` when `ENCRYPTION_KEY` is
unset.
- Introduces a versioned ciphertext envelope `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`
using AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 derived per-context keys. The 8-hex
`keyId` fingerprint lets every row identify which physical key encrypted
it, so rotation routes directly to primary or fallback without trial
decryption; GCM's auth tag gives true integrity (legacy CTR has none).
- Migrates `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` to the new envelope
and plumbs `workspaceId` through every caller, so per-workspace HKDF
context binds each row to its tenant.
The remaining encryption sites (`jwt-key-manager`, `config-storage`,
`postgres-credentials`, `application-variable`, TOTP) stay on the legacy
unprefixed CTR path and will be migrated in follow-up PRs. The
operator-facing rotation runbook is out of scope here.
### Format details
`enc:v{N}:{keyId}:{base64}` — `N=2` is the only version produced by new
writes (`v1` exists for backward-compatible decryption of existing
connected-account rows). `keyId =
sha256(rawKey).slice(0,4).toString('hex')`. The CHECK constraint on
`core.connectedAccount.{accessToken,refreshToken}` is relaxed from `LIKE
'enc:v1:%'` to `LIKE 'enc:v_:%'` so both versions pass.
### Key resolution
| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_SECRET` | Encrypt
with | Decrypt try order |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| set | set | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary →
fallback |
| set | unset | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary |
| unset | set | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` →
fallback |
| unset | unset | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` |
| unset | unset | unset | startup error | n/a |
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx jest
'secret-encryption|connected-account-token-encryption|connected-account-refresh-tokens|encrypt-connected-account-tokens|connection-provider-oauth-flow'`
— 87 tests pass
- [x] New `secret-encryption.service.versioned.spec.ts` covers: key
resolution table (no-key error, APP_SECRET fallback, ENCRYPTION_KEY
precedence), v2 round-trip with/without workspaceId, GCM tamper
rejection, workspaceId-mismatch rejection, keyId-based primary→fallback
routing, missing-key error names the fingerprint, v1 legacy decryption,
no-prefix legacy decryption, malformed envelope rejection.
- [x] Updated `connected-account-token-encryption.service.spec.ts`
covers workspaceId binding and HKDF context isolation.
- [x] Updated slow instance command spec verifies workspaceId is
threaded through encryption and the relaxed `enc:v_:%` LIKE pattern
matches both v1 and v2.
- [ ] Manual E2E: connect a Gmail account on a freshly deployed instance
with `APP_SECRET` only → confirm `core.connectedAccount.accessToken` is
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: rotate — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` and
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<old APP_SECRET>`, restart, confirm
pre-rotation rows still decrypt and new rows carry the new `keyId`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: missing key — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` without the
fallback, confirm decrypt error names the old `keyId` so the operator
can identify the missing key.
|
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
643ec121a7 |
[twenty-server] no-misused-promise lint (#20529)
# Introduction
Adding `no-miused-promise` lint rule to the twenty-server
In order to flag such pattern
```ts
// ❌ Flagged — forEach doesn't await the callback
items.forEach(async (item) => {
await process(item);
});
```
## What happened
- Refactored the code-interpreter driver to have a async onResult (
which is also expected by e2b )
- Workspace manager still dirty solution including force cast
- Basic fixes
|
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
ac653182b2 |
feat(server): migrate all remaining JWT token types to ES256 (#20513)
## Summary Extends the asymmetric signing work from #20467 to cover **every remaining `JwtTokenTypeEnum` value**: `LOGIN`, `WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, `FILE`, `API_KEY`, `APPLICATION_ACCESS`, `APPLICATION_REFRESH`, `APP_OAUTH_STATE`, plus the ACCESS-shaped session token issued by the code interpreter tool. After this PR, every JWT the server signs is ES256 with a `kid` pointing at the current `core."signingKey"` row, while legacy HS256 tokens (no `kid` header) remain verifiable indefinitely through the existing fallback in `JwtWrapperService.resolveVerificationKey`. No new entity / migration / config: this is a pure routing change on top of the infrastructure that already shipped. ## Why `#20467` only flipped `ACCESS` and `REFRESH` to ES256. Every other JWT type was still HS256-signed against the global `APP_SECRET`, which kept the original blast radius (a leaked `APP_SECRET` invalidates *every* JWT type forever). Migrating the rest unifies the sign path on rotatable per-server private keys without forcing any token reissue. ## Mechanical changes ### Sign side (8 services) - `LoginTokenService.generateLoginToken` - `TransientTokenService.generateTransientToken` - `WorkspaceAgnosticTokenService.generateWorkspaceAgnosticToken` - `ApplicationTokenService.signApplicationToken` (`APPLICATION_ACCESS` + `APPLICATION_REFRESH`) - `ApiKeyService.generateApiKeyToken` - `FileUrlService.signFileByIdUrl` / `signWorkspaceLogoUrl` - `ConnectionProviderOAuthFlowService.signState` (`APP_OAUTH_STATE`) - `CodeInterpreterTool.generateSessionToken` Each call site swaps `jwtWrapperService.sign(payload, { secret: generateAppSecret(...), ... })` for `await jwtWrapperService.signAsync(payload, { expiresIn, [jwtid] })`. The `generateAppSecret` calls on the sign side are dropped (verifier-side `generateAppSecret` stays in `resolveVerificationKey` for the HS256 fallback). ### Verifier side - `WorkspaceAgnosticTokenService.validateToken` now goes through `verifyJwtToken` instead of the bespoke `verify({ secret })` path, so new ES256 tokens are accepted while the legacy HS256 fallback inside `resolveVerificationKey` still serves the old shape. - `JwtWrapperService.sign()` is kept (legacy compat / tests) but is now strictly deprecated — there are no remaining production callers. ### Async ripple (`signFileByIdUrl` was synchronous) - `FileUrlService.signFileByIdUrl` and `signWorkspaceLogoUrl` are now `async`; the `signUrl` callback used by `getRecordImageIdentifier` is widened to accept `Promise<string | null>`. - Every direct/indirect caller is updated: admin panel (user lookup + statistics + top workspaces), search service (`computeSearchObjectResults`, `getImageIdentifierValue`), workspace resolver (`logo` resolver, public workspace by domain/id), `WorkspaceMemberTranspiler` (now `async toWorkspaceMemberDto[s]` / `toDeletedWorkspaceMemberDto[s]` / `generateSignedAvatarUrl`), `UserService.loadSignedAvatarUrlsByUserId`, `UserWorkspaceService.castWorkspaceToAvailableWorkspace`, workspace-invitation, approved-access-domain, agent-chat-streaming, agent-message-part resolver, navigation-menu-item record identifier, file-ai-chat / file-core-picture / file-email-attachment / file-workflow / files-field services, rich-text & files-field query result getters, and the code-interpreter tool. ## Backward compatibility - **Legacy HS256 tokens (no `kid`)** keep verifying via `resolveVerificationKey` → `extractAppSecretBody` → `generateAppSecret` for both `workspaceId`-bearing and `userId`-bearing payloads. - The `API_KEY` HS256-via-ACCESS-secret fallback (#16504) still kicks in inside `verifyJwtToken` for pre-2025-12-12 API keys. - No payload shape changes, no DB writes, no env var changes — old tokens issued by `main` continue to authenticate. ## Tests ### Unit (all green locally — 63/63) Updated specs for every migrated service to mock `signAsync` instead of `sign` and assert the new option shape: - `login-token.service.spec.ts`, `transient-token.service.spec.ts`, `workspace-agnostic-token.service.spec.ts`, `application-token.service.spec.ts`, `api-key.service.spec.ts`, `connection-provider-oauth-flow.service.spec.ts`. ### Integration (`jwt-key-rotation.integration-spec.ts`) - Existing ACCESS coverage (current key, legacy HS256 fallback, rotated-out key, revoked key, unknown kid) is preserved. - New `it.each` assertion: `REFRESH`, `WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, and `LOGIN` tokens emitted by the real signUp → signUpInNewWorkspace → getAuthTokensFromLoginToken pipeline are ES256 with a `kid` matching the current signing key — proves end-to-end that the migration didn't regress those flows. ## Open question (separate decision) This PR keeps the legacy HS256 verification fallback **forever**. We may eventually want to sunset it for `API_KEY` once telemetry shows pre-migration tokens are gone, but that's a separate product/security decision and not part of this change. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` passes - [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` passes - [ ] `jwt-key-rotation` integration suite passes (new + existing assertions) - [ ] Manually verify: signing in issues an ES256 ACCESS / REFRESH token, generating an API key issues an ES256 token with `kid`, signed file URL JWT is ES256 with `kid` - [ ] Pre-existing HS256 tokens still authenticate (covered by integration test, but worth a manual check with a token from `main`) |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
a159a68e2c |
[twenty-server] no floating promises lint rule (#20499)
## Introduction
That's an audit + RFC
## Fire-and-forget (`void`) -- Intentional, correct
These are telemetry, metrics, and audit logging in hot paths or
non-critical contexts. `void` is the right choice.
| File | What was voided |
|---|---|
| `sign-in-up.service.ts` | `metricsService.incrementCounter` (sign-up
metric) + `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` (workspace created) |
| `use-graphql-error-handler.hook.ts` | 5x
`metricsService.incrementCounter` (GraphQL operation metrics) |
| `bullmq.driver.ts` | 2x `metricsService.incrementCounter` (job
completed/failed metrics) |
| `call-webhook.job.ts` | 2x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` + 1x
`metricsService.incrementCounter` |
| `custom-domain-manager.service.ts` | `analytics.insertWorkspaceEvent`
(domain activation event) |
| `logic-function-executor.service.ts` |
`auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` (function execution) |
| `workflow-runner.workspace-service.ts` |
`metricsService.incrementCounter` (throttle metric) |
| `cleaner.workspace-service.ts` | `metricsService.incrementCounter`
(deleted workspace metric) |
| `stream-agent-chat.job.ts` | Detached IIFE for streaming chunks
(intentional concurrent pipeline) |
| `workspace-auth-context.middleware.ts` |
`withWorkspaceAuthContext(...)` (AsyncLocalStorage, returns void anyway)
|
## Top-level script entry points (`void bootstrap()`)
These are module-level calls where the promise has no consumer. `void`
makes the lint rule happy and documents the intent.
| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `main.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `command.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `queue-worker.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `truncate-db.ts` | `void dropSchemasSequentially()` |
| `codegen/index.ts` | `void generateTests(forceArg)` |
## Now properly awaited -- Real bug fixes
These were floating promises that could silently fail, lose data, or
cause race conditions.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `billing-sync-plans-data.command.ts` | `meters.map(async ...)` wrapped
in `Promise.all` -- was returning before upserts finished |
| `cache-storage.service.ts` | `setAdd` and `setPop` had `.then()`
chains that weren't returned/awaited |
| `create-audit-log-from-internal-event.ts` | 4x
`auditService.createObjectEvent` now awaited inside a job |
| `cleaner.workspace-service.ts` | 2x `emailService.send(...)` now
awaited -- emails could silently fail |
| `agent-async-executor.service.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` +
`billNativeWebSearchUsage` in `finally` block now awaited |
| `repair-tool-call.util.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` now awaited |
| `agent-title-generation.service.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` now
awaited |
| `chat-execution.service.ts` | `billNativeWebSearchUsage` now awaited |
| `ai-generate-text.controller.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` in
`finally` block now awaited |
| `agent-turn.resolver.ts` | `messageQueueService.add(...)` now awaited
|
| `command.ts` | `app.close()` now awaited (was exiting before graceful
shutdown) |
| `i18n.service.ts` | `loadTranslations()` in `onModuleInit` now awaited
|
| `workspace-query-hook.explorer.ts` | `explore()` in `onModuleInit` now
awaited |
| `message-queue.explorer.ts` | `handleProcessorGroupCollection` in
`onModuleInit` now awaited |
| `ai-billing.service.spec.ts` | Test now properly `await`s the async
call |
| `messaging-messages-import.service.spec.ts` | `expect(...)` now
properly `await`ed for async assertion |
| `archive.finalize()` (3 files) | Voided -- promise resolution already
handled by `pipeline()` / `on('end')` |
## Impersonation & security audit trail -- Upgraded from `void` to
`await`
These were previously fire-and-forget but are
security/compliance-critical events that must be reliably persisted.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `impersonation.service.ts` | 4x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent`
now awaited (impersonation attempt, token generation
attempt/success/failure) |
| `auth.resolver.ts` | 5x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` now
awaited (impersonation token exchange attempt/success/failure at server
and workspace levels) |
| `auth.service.ts` | 2x `analytics.insertWorkspaceEvent` now awaited
(impersonation attempted/issued) |
## Billing audit -- Upgraded from `void` to `await`
Payment events should be reliably persisted for financial/compliance
reporting.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `billing-webhook-invoice.service.ts` |
`auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent(PAYMENT_RECEIVED_EVENT)` now awaited
inside Stripe webhook handler |
## Fire-and-forget with proper error handling -- Upgraded from bare
`void`
These remain non-blocking but now catch and log errors instead of
risking unhandled rejections.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `logic-function-executor.service.ts` |
`applicationLogsService.writeLogs` now uses `.catch()` instead of bare
`void` -- user-facing logs should surface errors |
## Systemic infrastructure fixes
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `metrics.service.ts` | `incrementCounter`: Redis cache write
(`metricsCacheService.updateCounter`) now uses `.catch()` internally
instead of raw `await` -- prevents unhandled rejections across all `void
metricsService.incrementCounter(...)` call sites when Redis is unhealthy
|
| `audit.service.ts` | `preventIfDisabled`: made properly `async` with
`await` and consistent `Promise<{ success: boolean }>` return type.
Removed broken `catch` that returned an `AuditException` as a value
(wrong constructor args, unreachable dead code). Removed unused
`AuditException` import |
## Fixed in this session (beyond original PR)
| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `telemetry.listener.ts` | Removed misleading `Promise.all` + `void`
combo; replaced with simple `for...of` + `void` |
| `message-queue.explorer.ts` | Changed from `void` to `await` so
startup crashes on registration failure |
|
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
9e515afb13 |
feat(server): asymmetric JWT signing with kid + key rotation table (#20467)
## Context Today every JWT issued by Twenty (access, refresh, login, file, etc.) is HMAC-signed with a per-token-type secret derived from the global `APP_SECRET`. Rotating that secret invalidates **every** active token at once and there is no way to scope a leak to a subset of tokens. This PR is the first slice of a broader effort to **decouple stateful encryption (`APP_SECRET`-derived secrets) from stateless encryption (JWTs)**. It introduces an asymmetric (private/public key) signing path for `ACCESS` and `REFRESH` tokens and a signing-key registry to enable **safe rotation**: leaked keys can be revoked by flipping `revokedAt`/`isCurrent` on the matching row without invalidating tokens issued by other keys. > Out of scope (intentionally): swapping stateful encryption for `APP_SECRET`, asymmetric signing for token types other than `ACCESS`/`REFRESH`, an admin-panel rotation UI, and an enterprise re-encryption command. Those will land in follow-up PRs. ## What changes - **New `core.signingKey` table** (instance command `2.5.0` / `1778550000000`) storing both the public key (PEM, in clear) and the private key (PEM, encrypted with `APP_SECRET` via `SecretEncryptionService`). One row is marked `isCurrent = true` (enforced by a partial unique index). The row's UUID `id` is used directly as the JWT `kid`. - When a key is rotated out, its `privateKey` is nulled (we never keep historical private keys) but the `publicKey` row stays so previously issued tokens can still be verified. - **`JwtKeyManagerService`** lazily loads-or-generates the current signing key on first use: - If a row with `isCurrent = true` exists → decrypts and uses it. - Otherwise → generates a fresh EC P-256 keypair, encrypts the private key, inserts the row (UUID id = kid). Handles concurrent insert races via the unique constraint. - **`JwtWrapperService.signAsync()`** signs `ACCESS`/`REFRESH` payloads with `ES256` and a `kid` header. Falls back to `HS256` if no signing key is available (boot-time DB error, transient failure). - **Dual-path verification** in both `JwtWrapperService.verifyJwtToken` and the Passport `JwtAuthStrategy.secretOrKeyProvider`: - JWT with a `kid` header → resolve the public key PEM by id and verify with `ES256`, - otherwise → fall back to the existing `APP_SECRET`-derived `HS256` path (unchanged). - **`AccessTokenService` / `RefreshTokenService`** now sign through `signAsync` (single public surface; the routing detail stays internal to the wrapper). - **Public key cache**: a new `SigningKeyEntityCacheProviderService` plugs into `CoreEntityCacheService` (`signingKeyPublicKey` namespace) and serves PEMs by id, with the standard local-memo + Redis layering. - **PEM strings end-to-end**: `jsonwebtoken` accepts PEM strings directly for both sign and verify, so the manager never converts to a Node `KeyObject` and the cache hands the PEM straight to `jwt.verify`. ## Why ES256 (and not EdDSA / RS256) - `@nestjs/jwt` is backed by `jsonwebtoken`, which does **not** support EdDSA today. - ES256 keys are tiny (~120 bytes vs 1.6 kB for RS256), signatures are short (~64 bytes), and signing/verification is fast — important since JWT verification runs on every authenticated request. - ES256 is widely supported and standardized (RFC 7518), with mature ecosystem support. ## Why store the private key in DB (not env) - No new secret to provision: existing instances already have `APP_SECRET`, which we reuse to encrypt the private key at rest. - Self-healing: a fresh instance auto-generates its first signing key on first boot. Nothing to copy/paste. - Rotation is a SQL operation against `core.signingKey`, not a redeploy + env mutation. ## Backward compatibility - All previously-issued tokens (no `kid`) keep verifying through the legacy HS256 path with their existing `APP_SECRET`-derived secret. No forced re-login. - Token types not in scope (`WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, `API_KEY`, `FILE`, `LOGIN`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, etc.) keep their current HS256 behavior unchanged — they still go through the synchronous `JwtWrapperService.sign(payload, options)` with a caller-supplied secret. - `signWithAppSecret` is kept intentionally as the HS256 fallback path; it will be deprecated in a follow-up PR. - If the DB lookup/generation fails for any reason, the wrapper logs the error and falls back to HS256 — no startup crash, no silent regression. ## Rotation story 1. Bootstrap: first signing call lazily inserts a row in `core.signingKey` with `isCurrent = true`, `privateKey = encrypt(pem_A)`. New tokens carry `kid_A`. 2. Rotate: `UPDATE core."signingKey" SET "isCurrent" = false, "privateKey" = NULL WHERE id = '<kid_A>';` then insert a new row with `isCurrent = true`. New tokens carry `kid_B`. Tokens still in flight with `kid_A` keep verifying because the public-key row for `kid_A` is still there. 3. Revoke: `UPDATE core."signingKey" SET "revokedAt" = now() WHERE id = '<kid_A>';`. All tokens with `kid_A` now fail verification cleanly with `UNAUTHENTICATED` (no 500). 4. Tokens with no `kid` (legacy) are unaffected throughout. ## Test plan - [x] Unit: `JwtWrapperService` dual-path verification (HS256 no-kid vs ES256 with-kid), unknown-kid → `UNAUTHENTICATED`, `signAsync` happy path + `null` when no key, `signAsync` rejection for non-rotatable types. - [x] Unit: `JwtAuthStrategy` `secretOrKeyProvider` dual-path resolution and algorithm validation. - [x] All existing JWT/auth/application unit tests adjusted to the renamed public method. - [x] Integration (`jwt-key-rotation.integration-spec.ts`): - **Happy path**: signed-up user's `ACCESS` token has `alg=ES256` + correct UUID `kid`, the `isCurrent=true` row exists in `core.signingKey`, `getCurrentUser` resolves. - **Legacy fallback**: hand-crafted no-kid HS256 token verifies via the legacy `APP_SECRET`-derived path. - **Previous-key rotation**: token signed by a hardcoded *previous* key whose row is pre-inserted with `privateKey = NULL` (rotated-out) still verifies — proves the leaked-key revocation flow works in both directions. - **Unknown kid**: token signed with an orphan UUID `kid` is cleanly rejected (no 500). - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` - [x] `npx nx test twenty-server` - [x] `npx nx run twenty-server:lint` |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
6c18bacb93 |
Encrypt connected account accessToken and refreshToken (#20441)
# Introduction Encrypt the `connectedAccount` `accessToken` and `refreshToken` using `APP_SECRET` in order to mitigate potential data leak or `core` table compromise ## Decrypt Temporary allow already plain text stored token to be retrieve without decryption until the slow instance has been passed Will uncomment the invariant check in a patch when the instance slow has fully be run ## Standards - Token are encrypted as quickly as possible - A token cannot be written in database non encrypted by mistake using a custom constraint ( `enc:` prefix ) ## What's next We should standardize not managing secret as is in the the services and layer, they should be encrypted on the flight the earliest and should never be logged Will create a dedicated pattern afterwards for `applicationVariables` secrets too --------- Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charlesBochet@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Paul Rastoin
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9813467cee |
Refactor SAML relayState structure (#20430)
# Introduction Restructure the RelayState and avoid asserting the idp identifier from this opaque blob Inferring the id from the secured validated and signed request params |
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Félix Malfait
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459c64f642 |
Prevent non-admin users from impersonating admin users (#20412)
## Summary - Adds a privilege check to workspace-level impersonation: non-admin users can no longer impersonate users who have `canAccessFullAdminPanel` or `canImpersonate` flags - Adds the same check in JWT token validation as defense-in-depth (invalidates existing impersonation sessions targeting admin users) - Adds 3 unit tests covering: non-admin → admin blocked, non-admin → canImpersonate blocked, admin → admin allowed ## Test plan - [x] Unit tests pass (14/14 in `impersonation.service.spec.ts`) - [x] Typecheck passes - [ ] Verify workspace-level impersonation of regular users still works normally - [ ] Verify server-level impersonation by admins is unaffected 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Félix Malfait
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4da8878697 |
feat: add email forwarding message channel (#19535)
## Summary - Add email forwarding as a new message channel type, allowing users to forward emails from addresses like `support@mycompany.com` into Twenty - Inbound emails arrive via S3 (SES → S3 bucket), are polled by a cron job, parsed, routed to the correct workspace/channel, and persisted as messages - Dedicated settings page at `/settings/accounts/new-email-forwarding` where users provide their source email handle and receive a unique forwarding address - Forwarding channels bypass the IMAP/mailbox sync state machine — they skip cron-driven sync, relaunch, and message-list-fetch lifecycle stages - Forwarding address section shown at the top of the Emails settings page so users can find/copy their addresses after initial setup - Tab names for forwarding channels display the user-provided handle (e.g. `support@mycompany.com`) instead of the internal routing address - Shared utilities extracted from IMAP driver: `extractThreadId`, `extractParticipants`, `extractAddresses` to avoid code duplication - Uses the existing S3 bucket (STORAGE_S3_*) with `inbound-email/` prefix — no separate bucket needed - Feature gated behind `isEmailForwardingEnabled` client config (requires `INBOUND_EMAIL_DOMAIN` + S3 storage) ## New backend modules - `InboundEmailS3ClientProvider` — lazy-initialized S3 client using existing storage config - `InboundEmailStorageService` — S3 operations (get, move to processed/unmatched/failed) - `InboundEmailParserService` — RFC 822 parsing via `postal-mime`, builds `MessageWithParticipants` - `InboundEmailImportService` — orchestrates download → parse → route → persist → archive - `MessagingInboundEmailPollCronJob` — polls S3 `incoming/` prefix, enqueues import jobs - `CreateEmailForwardingChannelInput` DTO — accepts user-provided `handle` ## New frontend components - `SettingsAccountsNewEmailForwardingChannel` — dedicated page with handle input form + forwarding address result - `SettingsAccountsEmailForwardingSection` — forwarding address list on the Emails settings page - `useConnectedAccountHandleMap` — shared hook for account ID → handle lookup - `useCreateEmailForwardingChannel` — mutation hook accepting handle parameter ## Test plan - [x] 17 unit tests for inbound email import service (all outcomes: imported, unmatched, loop_dropped, unconfigured, parse_failed, persist_failed) - [x] 16 tests for `computeSyncStatus` including EMAIL_FORWARDING cases - [x] 11 tests for `extractEnvelopeRecipient` utility - [x] TypeScript typechecks pass for both twenty-server and twenty-front - [x] Lint passes for both packages - [ ] Manual: create forwarding channel, verify forwarding address generated - [ ] Manual: send email to forwarding address, verify it appears in Twenty https://claude.ai/code/session_01KpyF6p4cUEnuaT4h8DP5Pm --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <62795688+neo773@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com> |
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Thomas Trompette
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eddd2c979a |
Add Workspace Created and Payment Received ClickHouse events (#20277)
## Summary - Adds two new workspace audit events for the AARRR funnel tracked in ClickHouse - **Workspace Created**: emitted in `signUpOnNewWorkspace` after the transaction commits, capturing every new workspace creation - **Payment Received**: emitted in `processInvoicePaid` on every Stripe `invoice.paid` webhook, with `stripeInvoiceId`, `amountPaid`, and `billingReason` properties. First payment per workspace can be derived at query time via `min(timestamp)` grouped by `workspaceId` ## Test plan - [x] Verify `Workspace Created` event appears in ClickHouse after signing up on a new workspace - [x] Verify `Payment Received` event appears in ClickHouse after a Stripe `invoice.paid` webhook fires - [x] Confirm no event is emitted if the billing customer cannot be resolved from `stripeCustomerId` - [x] Run existing `SignInUpService` unit tests pass with the new `AuditService` mock Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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Félix Malfait
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e3be1f4971 |
Make ConnectionProvider a true SyncableEntity (#20232)
## Summary PR #20181 left `ConnectionProvider` in the `SyncableEntity` enum but bypassing the standard sync pipeline — manifest sync called the bespoke `ApplicationOAuthProviderService.upsertManyFromManifest()` instead of going through the workspace-migration orchestrator like every other SyncableEntity. Anything that assumed *"all SyncableEntity values flow through the same pipeline"* (dev UI sync tracking, verification tooling) was wrong about ConnectionProvider — that's the inconsistency this PR closes. This PR follows the `.cursor/skills/syncable-entity-*` guides religiously, all six steps. ## What changes **Step 1 — Types & Constants** (`@syncable-entity-types-and-constants`) - Add `connectionProvider` to `ALL_METADATA_NAME` (twenty-shared) - Make `ApplicationOAuthProviderEntity` extend `SyncableEntity` (drops the ad-hoc columns since the base class provides them, adds `deletedAt`, drops the old `(applicationId, universalIdentifier)` unique in favour of SyncableEntity's `(workspaceId, universalIdentifier)`) - `FlatConnectionProvider`, `FlatConnectionProviderMaps`, `FLAT_CONNECTION_PROVIDER_EDITABLE_PROPERTIES`, `UniversalFlatConnectionProvider`, six action types - Register in **all** the central registries: `AllFlatEntityTypesByMetadataName`, `ALL_METADATA_ENTITY_BY_METADATA_NAME`, `ALL_ENTITY_PROPERTIES_CONFIGURATION`, `ALL_MANY_TO_ONE_*`, `ALL_ONE_TO_MANY_*`, `ALL_METADATA_REQUIRED_METADATA_FOR_VALIDATION`, `ALL_METADATA_SERIALIZED_RELATION`, `ALL_JSONB_PROPERTIES_WITH_SERIALIZED_RELATION`, `WORKSPACE_CACHE_KEYS_V2` (`flatConnectionProviderMaps`), `METADATA_EVENTS_TO_EMIT` - `case 'connectionProvider':` in seven discriminated-union switches (`derive-metadata-events-*`, `optimistically-apply-*`, `enrich-create-*`) **Step 2 — Cache & Transform** (`@syncable-entity-cache-and-transform`) - `WorkspaceFlatConnectionProviderMapCacheService` (extends `WorkspaceCacheProvider`, decorated with `@WorkspaceCache`, soft-delete-aware) - `fromConnectionProviderEntityToFlatConnectionProvider` util - `fromConnectionProviderManifestToUniversalFlatConnectionProvider` util - `FlatConnectionProviderModule` wires the cache service - Wired the manifest converter into `compute-application-manifest-all-universal-flat-entity-maps` **Step 3 — Builder & Validation** (`@syncable-entity-builder-and-validation`) - `FlatConnectionProviderValidatorService` — never throws, returns error arrays; uses indexed `byUniversalIdentifier` for the (name, applicationUniversalIdentifier) uniqueness check (no `Object.values().find()` on the hot path) - `WorkspaceMigrationConnectionProviderActionsBuilderService` - Registered in both validators-module + builder-module - **Wired into the orchestrator** (the most-commonly-forgotten step per the rule) — constructor inject, destructure `flatConnectionProviderMaps`, `validateAndBuild`, append actions to the final migration **Step 4 — Runner & Actions** (`@syncable-entity-runner-and-actions`) - Three handlers (create / update / delete) using the canonical `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerActionHandler` mixin - Registered in `WorkspaceSchemaMigrationRunnerActionHandlersModule` **Step 5 — Integration** (`@syncable-entity-integration`) - Delete the `upsertManyFromManifest` bypass on `ApplicationOAuthProviderService` - Remove the bypass call from `ApplicationSyncService` — manifest sync now flows through the standard pipeline - Drop `ApplicationOAuthProviderModule` from `ApplicationManifestModule` (no longer needed) - Import `FlatConnectionProviderModule` from `ApplicationOAuthProviderModule` to keep the cache discoverable - 3 new exception codes: `INVALID_CONNECTION_PROVIDER_INPUT`, `CONNECTION_PROVIDER_NOT_FOUND`, `CONNECTION_PROVIDER_NAME_ALREADY_EXISTS` **Migration** - Generated via `database:migrate:generate` (instance command `1777896012579`): drops the old `(applicationId, universalIdentifier)` unique constraint, adds `deletedAt` column, adds the `(workspaceId, universalIdentifier)` unique index that `SyncableEntity` requires. - Verified clean — a second `migrate:generate` pass produces zero drift. **Step 6 — Tests** (`@syncable-entity-testing`) - 3 new specs for the manifest converter (defaults, optional fields, all-fields) - All 32 existing OAuth-provider tests still pass - ConnectionProvider has no end-user GraphQL CRUD (it's manifest-driven only), so the GraphQL integration suite that other SyncableEntities ship doesn't apply here **Codegen** - Regenerated GraphQL artifacts (twenty-front + twenty-client-sdk) against the live schema ## Why this matters Before: - `ConnectionProvider` claimed to be a `SyncableEntity` (in the enum) - But the entity didn't extend `SyncableEntity` - And the manifest sync bypassed the standard pipeline - → Verification tooling, dev UI sync tracking, anything iterating over `ALL_METADATA_NAME` got inconsistent behaviour After: - `ConnectionProvider` is a `SyncableEntity` end-to-end - Single sync path through the workspace-migration orchestrator (same as `agent`, `skill`, `frontComponent`, `webhook`, …) - One mental model ## Out of scope (deliberate) - **Renaming the table** from `applicationOAuthProvider` to `connectionProvider` — the `metadataName` is `connectionProvider` (what consumers see in code); the table name is internal. A rename would balloon this PR with mechanical churn unrelated to the sync-pipeline wiring. Worth doing as a follow-up. - **`applicationVariable` SyncableEntity conversion** — the other manifest-sync holdout. Tracked in #20215. ## Test plan - [ ] Migration up/down clean against fresh DB - [ ] Install an app whose manifest declares connection providers — providers appear in the workspace - [ ] Re-deploy the app with one provider added, one removed, one renamed → all reconciled correctly via the sync pipeline - [ ] Verify the dev-UI sync-tracking page shows ConnectionProvider entries the same way it shows agents/skills/etc - [ ] OAuth flow still works (existing connections, new connections, reconnect, list/get from SDK) — should be unchanged since the runtime code path didn't move 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
