## Summary
Exposes two Twenty primitives to the AI chat that it could not
previously manage:
- **Navigation menu items** — workspace nav and personal favorites
(favorites are just nav items with `scope: 'user'`).
- **Webhooks** — full CRUD with a structured operations input (record +
metadata events).
Page layouts and workflow runs were originally in this PR but have been
split out — they touch heavier surfaces (21 widget configurations and
the workflow runner cycle, respectively) and deserve their own focused
PRs.
### Tool inventory (8 new tools across 2 providers)
| Provider | Tools |
|---|---|
| NavigationMenuItem | `list_`, `create_`, `update_`,
`delete_navigation_menu_item` |
| Webhook | `list_`, `create_`, `update_`, `delete_webhook` |
### Design notes
- Both providers follow the established **view-style pattern**: tool
workspace service lives in the entity module's `tools/` folder, is
provided + exported by the entity module, and `ToolProviderModule`
imports the entity module. No `@Global()` modules or injection tokens
introduced.
- `create_navigation_menu_item` uses a Zod `discriminatedUnion` on
`type` (`FOLDER` / `LINK` / `OBJECT` / `VIEW` / `RECORD` /
`PAGE_LAYOUT`). `scope: 'workspace' | 'user'` switches between shared
nav and personal favorites — the underlying
`NavigationMenuItemAccessService` enforces LAYOUTS for workspace writes.
- Webhook operations accept both record events (`{kind:'record', object,
event}` → `<object>.<event>`) and metadata events (`{kind:'metadata',
metadataName, operation}` → `metadata.<metadataName>.<operation>`).
- Permissions reuse existing flags (`LAYOUTS`, `API_KEYS_AND_WEBHOOKS`).
No new permission flags, no migrations.
### Category cleanup
- New: `ToolCategory.NAVIGATION_MENU_ITEM`, `ToolCategory.WEBHOOK`.
- `ToolCategory.VIEW_FIELD` → folded into `VIEW`. Same permission gate,
same domain — separate category was organizational drift.
- `navigate_app` action stays in `ToolCategory.ACTION` where it belongs.
### System prompt addition
[chat-system-prompts.const.ts](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/ai/ai-chat/constants/chat-system-prompts.const.ts)
now teaches the AI:
- Favorites are nav items with `scope: 'user'`.
- A default OBJECT nav item is auto-created with
`create_object_metadata` — don't double-create.
### One file = one export
Every new schema / type / util file has exactly one top-level export.
## Test plan
- [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — passes
- [ ] Spin up locally and exercise via AI chat:
- [ ] "Pin the Companies view to my favorites in a folder called
Important." → `create_navigation_menu_item` (FOLDER, user) then (VIEW,
user, folderId)
- [ ] "Register a webhook to https://example.com firing when any person
is created or updated." → `create_webhook` with discriminated operations
- [ ] Verify workspace-scoped nav writes are denied for a user without
LAYOUTS permission
- [ ] Verify user-scoped nav writes work without LAYOUTS permission
## Follow-ups (separate PRs)
- Page layout tools (record-page, record-index, standalone) — needs
widget-config strategy.
- Workflow run tools (list, get, run, stop) — uses the workflow-runner
cycle path.
- Dashboard / page-layout tool unification —
`DashboardToolWorkspaceService` and a future
`PageLayoutToolWorkspaceService` both inject the same trio
(PageLayout/Tab/Widget services).
- Webhook Settings page reads from raw Apollo query — switch to the
metadata store so it refreshes when the AI mutates webhooks.
Replace OAuth2ClientManagerService with per provider each loading their
own entity and resolving tokens internally
Removes the ugly spread pattern of sprinkling tokens everywhere, this
caused downtime of messaging when we migrated to encrypted tokens
as title
Tested on Vexa public application install
- before -> 5.4s
- after -> 2.55s
Tested on Exa public application install
- before -> 5.5s
- after -> 2.24s
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
**Problem:**
When using Twenty Send Email UI IMAP/SMTP message threading is broken on
Twenty side as well as recipient email client
**Twenty side fix:**
- SMTP has no concept of `externalThreadId` sendEmail resolver always
returns null, this breaks threading
Fix is to pass `parentThreadExternalId` to
`resolveOutboundThreadExternalId` for SMTP/IMAP path
**Recipient email client fix:**
- Fetch associated threads as per RFC spec to write `References` header
```
From: johndoe@domain.com
To: janedoe@domain.com
Subject: Test
References: <root@...> <mid1@...> <parent@...>
```
# Introduction
Jobs were refreshing token and returning them as plain text, resulting
to underlying code flow failure as expecting encrypted tokens
## Next
We should define a strong typescript signature to avoid such things to
happen again, or least have an explicit naming
## Problem
The cron-trigger cache key (`module:workflow:workflow-cron-triggers`)
can get stuck without a TTL, silently halting **all** cron-triggered
workflows for a whole tenant until the key is manually deleted from
Redis.
Repro path:
1. Cache miss → DB-scan branch runs.
2. Inner loop writes triggers via `hashSet` (creates the key, **no TTL
yet**).
3. Worker crashes / OOMs / gets killed by a deploy between any `hashSet`
and the trailing `expire(1h)` call.
4. Key now exists with TTL = `-1` and a partial set of fields.
5. Next tick: `hashGetValues` returns those fields →
`cachedValues.length > 0` → **cache-hit branch** → `expire` is never
called.
6. Key has no TTL, so it never auto-expires. The DB-scan branch never
runs again. New / missing triggers are never picked up. Workflows go
silent.
Observed in production: cache key with `TTL: no limit` and 121 fields.
Deleting the key restored normal behaviour (next tick rebuilt with TTL
~3600).
## Fix
Set the TTL right after first value is added
## Monitoring
Added a "Cache miss" log count in workflow dashboard, counted among the
last 6 hours. Turns green if >= 5
<img width="1627" height="721" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-21 at 16 46 13"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8262dd5f-fbbd-43c9-aede-c0ce5d6a0f59"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
## Summary
- Moves current version to previous versions array
- Sets TWENTY_CURRENT_VERSION to the new version
- Updates TWENTY_NEXT_VERSIONS with the next minor version
## Checklist
- [ ] Verify version constants are correct
Co-authored-by: Github Action Deploy <github-action-deploy@twenty.com>
## Summary
When an existing user accepts an invite into a workspace whose
`activationStatus` is not `ACTIVE` (e.g. `SUSPENDED`, `INACTIVE`,
`PENDING_CREATION`), the throw in
`throwIfWorkspaceIsNotReadyForSignInUp` returns:
> User is not part of the workspace
The message describes the symptom (they aren't a member yet) instead of
the cause (the workspace can't accept new members), which makes invitees
assume their invite is broken when the real issue is the target
workspace's state.
The sibling branch a few lines above — for brand-new users hitting the
same non-ACTIVE workspace — already returns `"Workspace is not ready to
welcome new members"`. This PR reuses the same message in the
existing-user branch so both paths give a consistent, accurate
explanation.
Single file, two string literals.
## Test plan
- [ ] Sign in via Google with an existing Twenty account, accepting an
invite to a `SUSPENDED` workspace → confirm the new message is shown
instead of "User is not part of the workspace".
- [ ] Confirm the happy path (sign-in to an `ACTIVE` workspace via
invite) is unchanged — early-return on `ACTIVE` is untouched.
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
## Summary
`PermissionsException` thrown by `SettingsPermissionGuard` (and other
permission code paths) was bubbling up through every typed REST
exception filter and landing in the global `UnhandledExceptionFilter`,
which falls back to **500** for anything that isn't an `HttpException`.
So a forbidden user (e.g. an API key whose role doesn't have
`DATA_MODEL`) calling `GET /rest/metadata/objects` got:
```
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error "Entity performing the request does not have permission"
```
GraphQL already had the right plumbing via
`permissionGraphqlApiExceptionHandler` (`ForbiddenError` → 403,
`UserInputError` → 400, `NotFoundError` → 404). This PR mirrors it on
the REST side.
## What
- New util `permissionRestApiExceptionCodeToHttpStatus` mapping every
`PermissionsExceptionCode` → HTTP status, with `assertUnreachable` to
force explicit handling of future codes.
- New filter `PermissionsRestApiExceptionFilter`
(`@Catch(PermissionsException)`) that delegates to
`HttpExceptionHandlerService.handleError(...)` with the resolved status.
- Wired `PermissionsRestApiExceptionFilter` (placed first, so the typed
filter wins over any sibling catch-all) into `@UseFilters(...)` of every
REST controller that uses `SettingsPermissionGuard` or whose service can
throw `PermissionsException`:
- `object-metadata`, `field-metadata`, `webhook`, `api-key`
- `view`, `view-sort`, `view-group`, `view-filter`, `view-filter-group`,
`view-field`
- `page-layout`, `page-layout-widget`, `page-layout-tab`
- `front-component`, `ai-generate-text`
- Unit tests covering 403 / 400 / 404 / 500 mappings.
## Mapping
| Code | Status |
|------|--------|
| `PERMISSION_DENIED`, `NO_AUTHENTICATION_CONTEXT`,
`ROLE_LABEL_ALREADY_EXISTS`, `CANNOT_UNASSIGN_LAST_ADMIN`,
`CANNOT_UPDATE_SELF_ROLE`, `CANNOT_DELETE_LAST_ADMIN_USER`,
`ROLE_NOT_EDITABLE`, `CANNOT_ADD_OBJECT_PERMISSION_ON_SYSTEM_OBJECT`,
`CANNOT_ADD_FIELD_PERMISSION_ON_SYSTEM_OBJECT` | **403** |
| `INVALID_ARG`, `INVALID_SETTING`,
`CANNOT_GIVE_WRITING_PERMISSION_ON_NON_READABLE_OBJECT`,
`CANNOT_GIVE_WRITING_PERMISSION_WITHOUT_READING_PERMISSION`,
`ONLY_FIELD_RESTRICTION_ALLOWED`,
`FIELD_RESTRICTION_ONLY_ALLOWED_ON_READABLE_OBJECT`,
`FIELD_RESTRICTION_ON_UPDATE_ONLY_ALLOWED_ON_UPDATABLE_OBJECT`,
`EMPTY_FIELD_PERMISSION_NOT_ALLOWED`,
`ROLE_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_ONE_TARGET`, `ROLE_CANNOT_BE_ASSIGNED_TO_USERS`
| **400** |
| `ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, `OBJECT_METADATA_NOT_FOUND`,
`FIELD_METADATA_NOT_FOUND`, `FIELD_PERMISSION_NOT_FOUND`,
`PERMISSION_NOT_FOUND` | **404** |
| All remaining "internal" codes (rethrown as-is in GraphQL) | **500** |
## Before
<img width="507" height="216" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-19 at 19 26 07"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/21d633aa-7ee8-4923-94e4-7ad57258a29e"
/>
## After
<img width="610" height="385" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-19 at 19 26 01"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0103b7ee-7df7-4aef-999a-73c22901afd2"
/>
- check size while reading stream instead of checking after reading all
stream
- move MAX_TARBALL_UPLOAD_SIZE_BYTES to config variables
- increase MAX_TARBALL_UPLOAD_SIZE_BYTES default from 50Mb to 100Mb
# Introduction
This PR is a followup of https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/20673
It aims to unify the authentication/permissions layer with all the
connectedAccount interactions across the application
## Deprecate
- findAll
- findById
## Email sync
An user can only sync the message of his own connected account
## Workflow email
- Related https://github.com/twentyhq/private-issues/issues/478
- Only reauthorize owned account
## Context
When signing up on a new workspace,
`SignInUpService.signUpOnNewWorkspace`
manually drove a transaction with `createQueryRunner` /
`startTransaction` /
`commitTransaction` / `rollbackTransaction` / `release`.
If the underlying Postgres connection dropped mid-transaction
(`idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`, server-side termination), the
`pg`
client's `'error'` event fires. TypeORM's connect-time listener responds
by
calling `release()` on the `QueryRunner`, which sets `isReleased = true`
but
deliberately does **not** touch `isTransactionActive`.
The `catch` branch then hit:
```ts
if (queryRunner.isTransactionActive) {
await queryRunner.rollbackTransaction(); // throws QueryRunnerAlreadyReleasedError
}
throw error;
```
Error from Sentry
```typescript
QueryRunnerAlreadyReleasedError: Query runner already released. Cannot run queries anymore.
at PostgresQueryRunner.query (.../PostgresQueryRunner.js:177)
at PostgresQueryRunner.rollbackTransaction (.../PostgresQueryRunner.js:167)
at SignInUpService.signUpOnNewWorkspace (.../sign-in-up.service.js:370)
```
## Changes
Replaced the hand-rolled transaction with
this.dataSource.transaction(...).
TypeORM's built-in wrapper already does what we need:
- starts/commits/rolls back the transaction
- wraps rollback in try { ... } catch { /* ignore */ }, so a connection
drop no longer masks the real error
- releases the QueryRunner unconditionally
## Note
Other fix would have been to do this
```typescript
if (queryRunner.isTransactionActive && **!queryRunner.isReleased**) {
try {
await queryRunner.rollbackTransaction();
} catch {
```
## Summary
Adds the symmetric counterpart to `@WasIntroducedInUpgrade` for the
upgrade-aware ORM. Today the framework can describe "this column will
exist once upgrade X applies" but not "this
column will stop existing once upgrade X applies". Plain field deletion
only works when nothing writes to the table during the mid-state window
between the binary booting and the drop
migration completing for a given workspace — fine for sparse tables
(`DropWorkspaceVersionColumn`, `DropPostgresCredentialsTable`), risky
for hot-write tables.
This PR ships the primitive on its own so the upcoming
`rolePermissionFlag.flag` drop has the framework support it needs. No
in-tree consumer yet — coverage is via unit tests against
synthetic entities.
### What's in it
- **New `@WasRemovedInUpgrade({ upgradeCommandName })` decorator**
(class- or property-scope) — mirrors `@WasIntroducedInUpgrade`, uses the
shared
`defineUpgradeMetadataOnClassOrProperty` helper, exposes class +
property getters.
- **`resolveEntityShapeAtUpgradeCursor`** now folds applied-removals
into the existing `hiddenPropertyNames` set. Intro-pending and
removal-applied share one hide bucket — both ask
TypeORM for the same thing.
- **`UpgradeAwareEntityMetadataAdapter`** now disables `isSelect`,
`isInsert`, **and** `isUpdate` for any hidden column, restoring
canonical values when the column comes back.
Previously only `isSelect` was flipped, which left an
INSERT-into-nonexistent-column hole the intro path was tacitly relying
on application code to avoid; this PR closes that hole for
both directions.
- **`validateUpgradeAwareEntityDecorators`** validates
`@WasRemovedInUpgrade` `upgradeCommandName` references, and surfaces a
new `removal-before-introduction` problem when a property
has both decorators with the removal step preceding the introduction
step.
**Problem**
AI_MODEL_PREFERENCES, JSON env var is not supported +
IS_CONFIG_VARIABLES_IN_DB_ENABLED=false in twenty cloud server
-> No option to set AI_MODEL_PREFERENCES
**Solution**
AI_MODEL_PREFERENCES supports three override sources beyond the
hardcoded code defaults, in priority order:
- DB (IS_CONFIG_VARIABLES_IN_DB_ENABLED=true), the only writable source;
admin-panel mutations persist here
- ENV not usable in Twenty Cloud, which does not handle JSON-format env
vars
- **Introduced in this PR** --> File
(AI_MODEL_PREFERENCES_STORAGE_PATH), a read-only startup fallback, the
only viable override in Cloud/self-managed deployments where DB config
is disabled and JSON env vars are unsupported.
# Introduction
Prevent any cross user `connectedAccount` `connectionParamaters` leak
Also encrypt in db all `connectionParameters` password
Never return any password through `DTO` anymore
The settings now allow update mutation without providing the password in
edition mode
Verified all `connectionParameters.password` interaction
## Integration tests
- Added more coverage for both failing and successful paths
- Introduced a new env var that allow bypass the provider connection
test
## Legacy connected Account decryption support
Stop allowing non encrypted decryption on `accessToken` and
`refreshToken`, only allow legacy decryption on refactored
`connectionParameters`
## Upsert ownership
Completely got rid of the connected workspace schema context which is
legacy
Also now a user can only upsert a connected account for him only..
## New UI
<img width="1770" height="1852" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55c1dc89-42ff-4084-95e2-cc5f9e23753b"
/>
If in edition the password is by default disabled
It needs to be selected as being edited to be enabled
## Next
- Refactor tool permissions flag not to include connected accounts
- Remove the legacy connected standard object
- Refactor and improve connected account resolver auth
## Summary
Replaces the temporary `select: { ... }` workaround in
`WorkspaceFlatApplicationMapCacheService` (introduced by #20159) with a
property-level `@WasIntroducedInUpgrade` decorator on
`ApplicationEntity.logo`.
#20159's own description called itself out: *"This is a temporary fix
for cross-version upgrade process, a better fix would be to expose an
hasInstanceCommandBeenRun() util (and later a decorator)"*. The
decorator now exists, courtesy of #20686.
## Root cause recap
`ApplicationEntity.logo` is added by
`2-2-instance-command-fast-1777539664664-add-logo-to-application.ts`.
The column is declared on the entity class, so before that instance
command runs (i.e. on a cross-version upgrade from a 2.1 or older
baseline), TypeORM's bare `repository.find()` emits `SELECT \"logo\" …`
against a table that doesn't have the column yet → upgrade aborts.
#20159 worked around this by listing every column **except** `logo` in
an explicit `select`, with an `as unknown as
FindOptionsSelect<ApplicationEntity>` cast.
## Summary
Adds a daily Enterprise-only cron that rotates the current ES256 JWT
signing key once it has been current for `SIGNING_KEY_ROTATION_DAYS`.
Manual rotation from the admin panel is unaffected.
### Behaviour
- `SIGNING_KEY_ROTATION_DAYS` is **opt-in**: when unset, the cron is a
no-op.
- Rotation flips `isCurrent` and clears the previous key's `privateKey`
in the same transaction, then inserts the new `isCurrent=true` row.
- The previous key's row is kept (`revokedAt` stays `null`) so its
`publicKey` can keep verifying tokens it signed until they expire; only
the encrypted `privateKey` is wiped since it can no longer be used to
sign.
- **No auto-revocation** — revoking a key remains a manual admin action,
reserved for leak / emergency response.
- The cron is also a no-op when `EnterprisePlanService.isValid()` is
`false`.
### Wiring
- `JwtKeyManagerService.rotateCurrent()`
- `SigningKeyRotationService.rotateIfDue()` (reads
`SIGNING_KEY_ROTATION_DAYS`, skips when unset)
- `RotateSigningKeysCronJob` (Enterprise-gated, rethrows on failure)
registered in `JwtModule`
- `RotateSigningKeysCronCommand` registered with `cron:register:all`
- `ROTATE_SIGNING_KEYS_CRON_PATTERN = '15 3 * * *'` (daily, no-op until
threshold)
Operator documentation lives in #20611 (docs PR).
This PR adds two changes
1. Pass `lite:true` to `ExecuteInWorkspaceContextOptions` introduced in
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/18376
2. Remove redundant gmail alias call, it adds 300ms every cron job, we
only do it once now when user connects, realistically I don't see people
changing their aliases every day you only set it up once
actual real diff is small, it's just prettier format contributing to
diff
Objective decrease total time take per job
## Summary
- Moves current version to previous versions array
- Sets TWENTY_CURRENT_VERSION to the new version
- Updates TWENTY_NEXT_VERSIONS with the next minor version
## Checklist
- [ ] Verify version constants are correct
Co-authored-by: Github Action Deploy <github-action-deploy@twenty.com>
## What
When the same PR introduces a new core entity *and* adds a cache
provider that queries it, every workspace step from older versions that
runs before the introducing instance step hits `relation … does not
exist` — the cause of the failed [v2.6.0 staging-ci
run](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/26042742000).
Same class of failure for renamed core entities and for new FK columns
hidden inside relation loads.
This PR adds **upgrade-aware entity decorators** + a runtime that adapts
TypeORM's view of the schema to the current `core.upgradeMigration`
cursor.
## Strategy
```
┌────────────────────────────────┐
│ @Entity classes (final shape) │
│ + @WasIntroducedInUpgrade │
│ + @WasRenamedInUpgrade │
└───────────────┬────────────────┘
│
UpgradeSequenceRunner.run()
┌─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
step N+1 begins step N just completed
│ │
└────────► adapter.refresh() ◄──────────────┘
│
reads core.upgradeMigration via
UpgradeMigrationService.getLastAttemptedInstanceCommand
│
▼
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ UpgradeAwareEntityMetadataAdapter │
│ • mutates EntityMetadata.tableName / tablePath │
│ -> historical name for renames not yet applied │
│ • flips column.isSelect = false for not-yet-introduced│
│ columns │
│ • tracks per-entity availability sidecar │
└─────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
DataSource.getRepository wrapped at TypeOrmModule.forRoot:
repo.find() / findOne() / count() / …
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ wrapRepositoryWithUpgradeAwareProxy │
│ • entity unavailable -> short-circuit │
│ (find -> [], count -> 0, │
│ findOneOrFail -> EntityNotFound) │
│ • write -> Promise.reject( │
│ UpgradeUnavailableEntityWriteEx) │
│ • find({ relations: ['X'] }) with X │
│ unavailable -> X stripped │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
The decorator strings reference real `core.upgradeMigration.name` values
(`${version}_${className}_${timestamp}`). A boot-time validator walks
the actual `UpgradeSequenceReaderService.getUpgradeSequence()` and fails
fast on typos.
## Files
- New decorators:
`engine/core-modules/upgrade/decorators/was-introduced-in-upgrade.decorator.ts`,
`was-renamed-in-upgrade.decorator.ts`
- Runtime: `engine/twenty-orm/upgrade-aware/` (adapter, proxy, install
hook, state singleton, exceptions)
- Wired into `UpgradeSequenceRunnerService` (`refresh()` between steps)
and `TypeOrmModule.forRoot` (proxy install)
- 2-6 entity decorations: `RolePermissionFlagEntity` (rename history +
new `permissionFlagId` column), `PermissionFlagEntity` (new catalog)
## Validation
End-to-end local cross-version upgrade (v1.22 → HEAD): `28 workspace(s)
succeeded, 0 failed`; `upgrade:status → Instance: Up to date, 4 up to
date, 0 behind, 0 failed`. Full log excerpts and the
second-failure-found-and-fixed (`WorkspaceRolesPermissionsCacheService`
relation load) in [this
comment](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/20686#issuecomment-4480036816).
## Test plan
- [x] Adapter spec covers rename mutation; proxy spec covers `find()`
short-circuit on unavailable entity. Resolver + validator + decorators
are covered by `resolve-entity-shape-at-upgrade-cursor.util.spec.ts`
(integration-level via real decorator application).
- [x] `nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` + `nx typecheck
twenty-server` clean
- [x] All 82 affected tests passing
- [ ] Cross-version-upgrade CI re-runs after this lands; v2.6.0 retag
once green
## Follow-ups deferred
- v2.7 `connectionProvider` rename repro as a permanent end-to-end test
artifact
- Extending the proxy to also cover `EntityManager.getRepository` and
`createQueryBuilder` if a non-`find()` upgrade-time consumer surfaces
Split of #20377.
## Summary
This PR separates available permission flags from per-role permission
flag grants.
Previously, `core.permissionFlag` stored the role assignment directly:
`roleId + flag`. This PR renames that legacy grant table to
`core.rolePermissionFlag`, then recreates `core.permissionFlag` as the
catalog of available permission flags.
## What changed
- Rename the existing `core.permissionFlag` grant table to
`core.rolePermissionFlag`.
- Add the new syncable `core.permissionFlag` catalog entity with key,
label, description, icon, permission type, relevance flags, and
custom/standard metadata.
- Add stable `SystemPermissionFlag` universal identifiers for the
built-in `PermissionFlagType` values.
- Seed the standard permission flags for every workspace under the
Twenty standard application.
- Backfill existing role grants:
- create missing catalog rows for existing grant keys,
- add `rolePermissionFlag.permissionFlagId`,
- migrate grants from the old string `flag` column to the new catalog
FK,
- replace the old `(flag, roleId)` uniqueness with `(permissionFlagId,
roleId)`.
- Rewire role permission flag caches, permission checks, role DTO
mapping, and `upsertPermissionFlags` to resolve through the catalog.
- Keep the existing public role permission API shape: product/app
surfaces still talk about `permissionFlags` and return `{ id, roleId,
flag }`.
- Update metadata flat-entity machinery, migration builders, validators,
action handlers, snapshots, generated schemas, docs, and app fixtures
for the new `permissionFlag` / `rolePermissionFlag` split.
## Behavior after this PR
- Existing permission flag grants keep working.
- Existing GraphQL role permission flows keep the same public naming.
- Standard permission flags are represented as catalog rows.
- Permission checks now compare grants through catalog universal
identifiers instead of the legacy `flag` column.
- Workspace deletion cleanup now verifies both `permissionFlag` and
`rolePermissionFlag`.
## What is not in this PR
- Public GraphQL CRUD for custom permission flags.
- App manifest support for declaring new custom permission flags.
- Frontend UI for creating or assigning custom permission flags beyond
the existing role permission flow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Weiko <corentin@twenty.com>
Fixes#20629
Problem
The OpenAPI schema for PHONES composite fields documented
additionalPhones as string[], but the actual runtime type (defined in
phones.composite-type.ts) is Array<{ number: string, countryCode:
string, callingCode: string }>. This caused generated SDK types and API
docs for create/update payloads to be incorrect.
Root cause
A hardcoded mistake in
convert-object-metadata-to-schema-properties.util.ts — the
FieldMetadataType.PHONES branch set additionalPhones.items to { type:
'string' } instead of an object schema.
Changes
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/utils/convert-object-metadata-to-schema-properties.util.ts
- Changed additionalPhones.items from { type: 'string' } to { type:
'object', properties: { number, countryCode, callingCode } }, matching
AdditionalPhoneMetadata.
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/open-api/utils/__tests__/components.utils.spec.ts
- Updated all three inline snapshot occurrences (for ObjectName,
ObjectNameForResponse, ObjectNameForUpdate) to expect the correct object
shape instead of string.
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
- Cap password length at 50 characters in the shared regex used by
sign-up, password reset, and password change (both `twenty-front` and
`twenty-server`).
- Update the user-facing validation message on sign-up and password
reset to mention both the 8 min and 50 max bounds.
- Extend the `PASSWORD_REGEX` unit test to cover the new upper bound.
The cap also prevents unbounded inputs from reaching bcrypt, which
silently truncates passwords above 72 bytes and can mask user-visible
bugs.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth/utils/__tests__/passwordRegex.test.ts`
passes (8-char min and 50-char max).
- [ ] Sign up with a 51-character password — form rejects with "Password
must be between 8 and 50 characters".
- [ ] Sign up with an 8–50 character password — succeeds.
- [ ] Password reset rejects a 51-character password with the same
message.
- [ ] Existing users with longer passwords (if any pre-exist) can still
sign in (the regex only gates write paths: sign-up, change, reset).
## Context
The runtime create-field path and the v2.5
`NormalizeCompositeFieldDefaultsCommand` workspace upgrade both run
composite `defaultValue`s through `nullifyEmptyCompositeDefaultValue`.
The manifest install/sync path was the only write path that skipped it:
[`fromFieldManifestToUniversalFlatFieldMetadata`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/application/application-manifest/converters/from-field-manifest-to-universal-flat-field-metadata.util.ts)
passed `fieldManifest.defaultValue` through verbatim.
For the SDK-emitted ACTOR system fields (`createdBy` / `updatedBy`),
`twenty-sdk` ships `{ name: "''", source: "'MANUAL'" }`. After the
runtime or the 2.5 normalize command stores them, the workspace row
holds the canonical four-key form `{ context: null, name: null, source:
"'MANUAL'", workspaceMemberId: null }`. The next install computes its TO
map from the manifest, still gets the raw two-key shape, and diffs it
against the normalized FROM. The dispatcher emits a `defaultValue`
update on each system actor field; the flat-field-metadata validator
rejects it with `FIELD_MUTATION_NOT_ALLOWED`, blocking every re-install
of any application that defines a custom object on a v2.5-normalized
workspace.
## Fix
Normalize composite `defaultValue`s inside the converter, reusing the
same `nullifyEmptyCompositeDefaultValue` helper the three other write
paths already share:
-
[`get-default-flat-field-metadata-from-create-field-input.util.ts`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/flat-field-metadata/utils/get-default-flat-field-metadata-from-create-field-input.util.ts)
— `createOneObject` and `createOneField` GraphQL paths.
-
[`sanitize-raw-update-field-input.ts`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/flat-field-metadata/utils/sanitize-raw-update-field-input.ts)
— `updateOneField` GraphQL path.
-
[`2-5-workspace-command-1778000001000-normalize-composite-field-defaults.command.ts`](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/blob/main/packages/twenty-server/src/database/commands/upgrade-version-command/2-5/2-5-workspace-command-1778000001000-normalize-composite-field-defaults.command.ts)
— the upgrade backfill that introduced the divergence.
After the fix, the four write paths agree on the canonical shape, so
re-installs are no-ops on system actor fields regardless of when the 2.5
normalize command ran. Non-composite types pass through unchanged.
## Test
New spec
`from-field-manifest-to-universal-flat-field-metadata.util.spec.ts`
covers:
- Empty-name actor defaults are normalized to the four-key canonical
shape.
- The converter is idempotent: feeding its own output back in produces
the same result (so two consecutive syncs of the same manifest never
emit a `defaultValue` update).
- When the manifest omits `defaultValue`, the converter falls back to
`generateDefaultValue` and normalizes the result.
- Non-composite defaults pass through unchanged.
```
PASS src/engine/core-modules/application/application-manifest/converters/__tests__/from-field-manifest-to-universal-flat-field-metadata.util.spec.ts
fromFieldManifestToUniversalFlatFieldMetadata
composite defaultValue normalization
✓ normalizes empty-name actor defaults to the canonical four-key shape
✓ is idempotent: re-running the converter on its own output yields the same defaultValue
✓ falls back to the generated default and normalizes it when defaultValue is omitted
✓ leaves non-composite defaults untouched
Tests: 4 passed
```
## CI gap that let this through
The integration suites covering manifest install (`appDevOnce` against
the test workspace) never re-installed an existing app on a workspace
whose composite fields had already been put through the 2.5 normalize
command. They synced once, then ran assertions on the resulting state;
the second sync that would have re-triggered the `defaultValue` diff was
never exercised.
If we want to catch this class of regression at the integration level
too, we'd add a test that (1) syncs an app whose manifest includes an
ACTOR system field with the raw SDK shape, (2) invokes
`NormalizeCompositeFieldDefaultsCommand` directly on the test workspace,
(3) re-syncs the same manifest, and (4) asserts no
`FIELD_MUTATION_NOT_ALLOWED` errors. The unit-level idempotency check in
this PR is the minimal version of that same coverage. Happy to ship that
integration spec in a follow-up if it'd help.
**Stacked on #20527**
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48995655-401a-4c35-8094-e88da8408bdd
## Summary
Surfaces the one-hop relation traversal added in #20527 through the
existing **composite sub-field dropdown pattern**. Clicking a
MANY_TO_ONE relation field in the "+ Filter" picker now opens the same
second-level dropdown that composite fields (FULL_NAME, ADDRESS,
CURRENCY, etc.) already use — populated with the target object's
filterable fields. Picking one (e.g. `Company → Name`) builds a filter
that serializes to the nested GraphQL filter the backend now accepts: `{
company: { name: { ilike: "%X%" } } }`.
No new components. The whole feature reuses
`AdvancedFilterSubFieldSelectMenu` + the existing
`subFieldNameUsedInDropdownComponentState` + the existing `MenuItem
hasSubMenu` indicator. Only the conditions that gate the sub-menu (and
the sub-menu's content for relations) were broadened.
## What landed
| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `ObjectFilterDropdownFilterSelectMenuItem` | Sub-menu chevron now
shows on MANY_TO_ONE relations (`isManyToOneRelationField` util). |
| `AdvancedFilterFieldSelectMenu` | Relation clicks open the sub-menu
alongside composite clicks. |
| `AdvancedFilterSubFieldSelectMenu` | New branch: when the sub-menu
type is `'RELATION'`, render the target object's filterable fields via
`useFilterableFieldMetadataItems(targetObjectMetadataId)`. Composite
logic untouched. |
| `objectFilterDropdownSubMenuFieldType` state | Widened to accept a
`'RELATION'` sentinel. Role-permissions sub-field menu narrows it back
out (it doesn't traverse relations). |
| `useSelectFieldUsedInAdvancedFilterDropdown` | New optional
`targetFieldMetadataItem` arg. When present, the stored RecordFilter's
`type` is the target field's type so the operand picker and value input
render the target's operands (`'TEXT'` operators when filtering
`company.name`, etc.). |
| `turnRecordFilterIntoGqlOperationFilter` (shared) | When the filter
targets a `RELATION` field with a `subFieldName`, synthesize a
field-metadata for the target, recurse to build the inner filter, then
wrap it under the relation field's name → `{ relationName: {
targetFieldName: { ...operator } } }`. |
`RecordFilter.subFieldName` stays narrowly typed as
`CompositeFieldSubFieldName` so the wide downstream consumers
(`shouldShowFilterTextInput`, composite handlers in the serializer,
etc.) don't change. The relation target field's name is stored through a
narrowly-scoped cast at the dropdown's storage point — the serializer
checks `filter.type === 'RELATION'` before interpreting it as a target
field name, so the cast can't be mis-read by composite-only code paths.
## Test plan
- [ ] Open a table view on People, click "+ Filter", click "Company" →
sub-menu opens with Company's filterable fields
- [ ] Pick "Name" → operand picker shows TEXT operators (Contains,
Equals, …)
- [ ] Type "Airbnb" → filter applies, table shows people whose company
name contains "Airbnb"
- [ ] Verify network tab: the GraphQL filter variable is `{ company: {
name: { ilike: "%Airbnb%" } } }`
- [ ] Same flow with a composite target field (e.g. `Company →
annualRecurringRevenue → amountMicros`) — should work end-to-end
(backend supports composite-within-relation; #20527 has an integration
test covering this)
- [ ] Composite fields (FULL_NAME, ADDRESS) still open their normal
sub-menu and filter correctly — no regression
- [ ] Role-permissions field-select sub-field menu is unaffected (it
bails out early on the RELATION sentinel)
## Out of scope
- ONE_TO_MANY traversal (no backend support yet)
- Aggregates (`people.count > 5`)
- Persisting relation-traversal filters into a saved view (ViewFilter
has no `relationPath` column yet; that's a separate slice)
- REST API DSL changes
- AI Tools
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
- Adds a new admin-only **Security** tab to the Admin Panel (alongside
General/Apps/AI/Config/Health) containing a **Signing Keys** section.
The tab is intentionally introduced now so the upcoming **Encryption
rotation** work can land as a sibling section.
- Lists every JWT signing key with key id, `createdAt`, `revokedAt`,
current/active/revoked status, and a **7-day verification count** read
from Redis. A trailing row aggregates **legacy HS256** verifications so
it is clear when the deprecated path is still in use.
- Lets an admin **revoke** a public key. Revoking the current key drops
`isCurrent`, sets `revokedAt`, nulls the encrypted `privateKey` and
clears the in-process cached current key; the existing lazy path in
`JwtKeyManagerService.getCurrentSigningKey()` then mints a fresh current
key on the next sign.
## Backend
- `SigningKeyVerifyCounterService` — bucketed Redis counter under the
existing `EngineMetrics` namespace. 1-day UTC-aligned buckets, 8-day TTL
refreshed on every increment, batched read via `mget`. Failures are
swallowed and logged at `warn` so a Redis hiccup cannot break auth.
- `JwtWrapperService.verifyJwtToken` records verifies **after success**
for both ES256 (`kid` as identifier) and HS256 (the literal `legacy`
identifier).
- `JwtKeyManagerService.listSigningKeys()` and `revokeSigningKey(id)`:
list ordered by `isCurrent DESC, createdAt DESC`; revoke is idempotent,
validates the UUID, invalidates the public-key cache, and resets the
cached current-key promise.
- `AdminPanelResolver.getSigningKeys` (query) and `revokeSigningKey`
(mutation) are both decorated with `@UseGuards(AdminPanelGuard)` so they
are admin-only, like the 35 existing admin-only methods on this
resolver. `privateKey` is never returned over GraphQL.
## Frontend
- New `SECURITY` tab id wired into `SettingsAdminContent` and
`SettingsAdminTabContent` (gated by `canAccessFullAdminPanel`).
- `SettingsAdminSecurity` / `SettingsAdminSigningKeysTable` strictly
reuse existing admin-panel components: `Section`, `H2Title`,
`Table`/`TableRow`/`TableCell`/`TableHeader` from `@/ui/layout/table`,
`Tag`/`Button` from `twenty-ui`, and `ConfirmationModal` mirroring the
queue retry/delete modals. Only one minimal styled helper for the
monospaced UUID rendering.
- `useRevokeSigningKey` uses `useApolloAdminClient`, refetches
`GetSigningKeys`, shows success/error snackbars (same pattern as
`useRetryJobs`/`useDeleteJobs`).
<img width="1293" height="881" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7cf98664-950b-4451-af85-27781a8e9a9c"
/>
## Summary
Continues retiring `APP_SECRET` as a hot signing secret (after the TOTP
migration in #20577). This PR moves the last two cryptographic uses of
`APP_SECRET` off it:
1. **Approved-access-domain validation tokens** — was a one-shot
`sha256(JSON.stringify({id, domain, key: APP_SECRET}))` HMAC with no
built-in expiry. Now a JWT signed by the workspace `signingKey` with a
7-day expiry and claims bound to `approvedAccessDomainId`,
`workspaceId`, and `domain`.
2. **Express-session cookie signing** — was `sha256(APP_SECRET ||
'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')`. Now `HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY,
info='twenty:hmac:v1:session-cookie')` with `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
supported for rotation.
### Approved-access-domain — strict cutover
- `ApprovedAccessDomainService.mintValidationToken` issues a JWT via
`JwtWrapperService.signAsyncOrThrow` (workspace `signingKey`, asymmetric
ES256 with kid-based rotation built in).
- `validateApprovedAccessDomain` verifies the JWT, asserts `type ===
APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN`, cross-checks `claim.approvedAccessDomainId`
against the URL's `approvedAccessDomainId`, then re-checks `domain` and
`workspaceId` against the stored row. Any failure maps to
`APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN_VALIDATION_TOKEN_INVALID`.
- **No legacy fallback:** any pending invitation link minted with the
old SHA hash will fail validation and must be re-sent. Volume is small
and admins can re-issue from settings — this is the cleanest cutover.
### Session cookies — bridged cutover
- `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` returns an array
`[HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY), HKDF(FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY)?,
sha256(APP_SECRET || 'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')?]`.
- `express-session` signs new cookies with the first secret and verifies
against any entry, so in-flight cookies signed under the legacy SHA keep
verifying until `maxAge` (30 min) expires.
- New `deriveInstanceHmacKey` HKDF utility uses a dedicated
`twenty:hmac:v1:` info prefix — distinct from the AEAD subkey prefix
`twenty:enc:v2:` — so HMAC and encryption subkeys can never collide for
the same raw `ENCRYPTION_KEY`.
- TODO comment marks the legacy slot for removal post-2.5.
### Notes on rotation behaviour
- Rotating `ENCRYPTION_KEY` while keeping the old value in
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` keeps cookies signed under either key
verifying. New cookies sign under the new key. After all in-flight
cookies expire (≤30 min), the fallback slot can be dropped from env.
- Rotating the workspace `signingKey` (already supported by
`JwtKeyManagerService`) keeps already-issued approved-access-domain JWTs
verifying via `kid` until their 7-day expiry.
## Test plan
- [x] Unit tests for `ApprovedAccessDomainService` cover: happy path,
JWT verify failure, wrong token type, JWT id ≠ input id, JWT-claimed
domain ≠ row, missing row, already-validated row.
- [x] Unit tests for `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` cover: throws
without keys, primary order (`ENCRYPTION_KEY` → APP_SECRET fallback),
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` placement, empty-string vars treated as unset,
legacy slot omitted when `APP_SECRET` missing, HKDF domain separation
across purposes.
- [x] `nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` — clean.
- [x] Full test surface across approved-access-domain,
secret-encryption, session-storage — 78/78 pass.
- [ ] CI green.
- [ ] Manual smoke: boot with a dummy `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, confirm sign-in
succeeds (session cookie works), create + validate an
approved-access-domain end-to-end through the UI.
## Summary
- The upgrade runner calls `getWorkspaceLastAttemptedCommandName` twice
per workspace step. Grafana showed it averaging ~4.4s and trending
upward as the `core.upgradeMigration` table grows during an in-flight
upgrade.
- The old query joined every outer row against a correlated subquery
(`attempt = (SELECT MAX(sub.attempt) ... WHERE sub.name = m.name AND
sub."workspaceId" = m."workspaceId")`). Even with the `(workspaceId,
name, attempt)` index added in 2.3, each outer row triggers an index
lookup — fine for a few rows, painful at production scale.
- Replaced with a two-level `DISTINCT ON`:
- Inner `DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId", name) ORDER BY "workspaceId", name,
attempt DESC` walks `IDX_UPGRADE_MIGRATION_WORKSPACE_ID_NAME_ATTEMPT`
directly and yields one row per `(workspaceId, name)` at max attempt.
- Outer `DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId") ORDER BY "workspaceId", "createdAt"
DESC` picks the most recent row per workspace.
- Semantically identical; planner now does a single index walk + one
sort instead of N correlated lookups.
The same correlated-subquery shape exists in
`getLastAttemptedCommandNameOrThrow`, `areAllWorkspacesAtCommand`, and
`getLastAttemptedInstanceCommand`. They run far less often during an
upgrade (per instance step, not per workspace step), so they're out of
scope for this hotfix — happy to follow up if we want them too.
## Benchmark (prod)
Run over all distinct workspaceIds in `core."upgradeMigration"`:
| Variant | Execution Time |
| --- | --- |
| Before (correlated subquery) | **2979.659 ms** |
| After (two-level DISTINCT ON) | **1225.690 ms** |
~2.4× faster, and the gap widens as the table grows over the course of
an upgrade.
Equivalence confirmed: the diff query below returned `0` divergent
workspaces on prod.
### Variant A — original (correlated subquery)
```sql
SELECT DISTINCT ON (m."workspaceId")
m."workspaceId", m.name, m.status, m."executedByVersion",
m."errorMessage", m."createdAt", m."isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration" m
WHERE m."workspaceId" IN ($1, $2, ...)
AND m.attempt = (
SELECT MAX(sub.attempt)
FROM core."upgradeMigration" sub
WHERE sub.name = m.name
AND sub."workspaceId" = m."workspaceId"
)
ORDER BY m."workspaceId", m."createdAt" DESC;
```
### Variant B — new (two-level DISTINCT ON)
```sql
SELECT DISTINCT ON (latest_per_name."workspaceId")
latest_per_name."workspaceId",
latest_per_name.name,
latest_per_name.status,
latest_per_name."executedByVersion",
latest_per_name."errorMessage",
latest_per_name."createdAt",
latest_per_name."isInitial"
FROM (
SELECT DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId", name)
"workspaceId", name, status, "executedByVersion",
"errorMessage", "createdAt", "isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration"
WHERE "workspaceId" = ANY($1)
ORDER BY "workspaceId", name, attempt DESC
) latest_per_name
ORDER BY latest_per_name."workspaceId", latest_per_name."createdAt" DESC;
```
### Equivalence check (returned 0 on prod)
```sql
WITH target_ids AS (
SELECT DISTINCT "workspaceId"
FROM core."upgradeMigration"
WHERE "workspaceId" IS NOT NULL
),
old_result AS (
SELECT DISTINCT ON (m."workspaceId")
m."workspaceId", m.name, m.status, m."executedByVersion",
m."errorMessage", m."createdAt", m."isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration" m
WHERE m."workspaceId" IN (SELECT "workspaceId" FROM target_ids)
AND m.attempt = (
SELECT MAX(sub.attempt)
FROM core."upgradeMigration" sub
WHERE sub.name = m.name
AND sub."workspaceId" = m."workspaceId"
)
ORDER BY m."workspaceId", m."createdAt" DESC
),
new_result AS (
SELECT DISTINCT ON (latest_per_name."workspaceId")
latest_per_name."workspaceId", latest_per_name.name, latest_per_name.status,
latest_per_name."executedByVersion", latest_per_name."errorMessage",
latest_per_name."createdAt", latest_per_name."isInitial"
FROM (
SELECT DISTINCT ON ("workspaceId", name)
"workspaceId", name, status, "executedByVersion",
"errorMessage", "createdAt", "isInitial"
FROM core."upgradeMigration"
WHERE "workspaceId" IN (SELECT "workspaceId" FROM target_ids)
ORDER BY "workspaceId", name, attempt DESC
) latest_per_name
ORDER BY latest_per_name."workspaceId", latest_per_name."createdAt" DESC
),
diffs AS (
SELECT 'only_in_old' AS bucket, o."workspaceId", o.name, o.status, o."createdAt"
FROM old_result o
LEFT JOIN new_result n ON n."workspaceId" = o."workspaceId"
WHERE n."workspaceId" IS NULL OR n.name <> o.name OR n.status <> o.status
UNION ALL
SELECT 'only_in_new', n."workspaceId", n.name, n.status, n."createdAt"
FROM new_result n
LEFT JOIN old_result o ON o."workspaceId" = n."workspaceId"
WHERE o."workspaceId" IS NULL OR o.name <> n.name OR o.status <> n.status
)
SELECT COUNT(*) AS divergent_workspaces FROM diffs;
```
## Test plan
- [ ] `npx nx test twenty-server --testPathPattern upgrade-migration`
- [ ] Integration tests: `npx nx run
twenty-server:test:integration:with-db-reset --testPathPattern
sequence-runner`
- [ ] Verify on staging that the slow query disappears from the
PostgreSQL Grafana board during the next upgrade run
## Summary
Prod deploy of v2.5.0 fails with a query failure inserting into
`core.upgradeMigration`:
```
query failed: INSERT INTO "core"."upgradeMigration" ("id", "name", "status", "attempt", "executedByVersion", "errorMessage", "isInitial", "workspaceId", "createdAt")
VALUES (DEFAULT, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, DEFAULT, $6, DEFAULT),
(DEFAULT, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, DEFAULT, $12, DEFAULT),
... (continues past $2515) ...
```
### Root cause
`UpgradeMigrationService.recordUpgradeMigration` writes one row per
workspace via a single `repository.save([...rows])` call.
`UpgradeMigrationEntity` has **6 user-provided columns** per row
(`name`, `status`, `attempt`, `executedByVersion`, `errorMessage`,
`workspaceId`), so the multi-row INSERT binds `6 * (1 + N_workspaces)`
parameters.
Postgres' wire protocol caps a single statement at **65,535 bind
parameters** (16-bit count). That gives a hard ceiling of ~10,920 rows
per call. Production has enough workspaces to overflow.
## Summary
- Moves current version to previous versions array
- Sets TWENTY_CURRENT_VERSION to the new version
- Updates TWENTY_NEXT_VERSIONS with the next minor version
## Checklist
- [ ] Verify version constants are correct
Co-authored-by: Github Action Deploy <github-action-deploy@twenty.com>
## Summary
Cross-version upgrade still fails after #20581:
```
column WorkspaceEntity.isInternalMessagesImportEnabled does not exist
at ApplicationService.findWorkspaceTwentyStandardAndCustomApplicationOrThrow (application.service.ts:84)
at UpdateGlobalObjectContextCommandMenuItemsCommand.runOnWorkspace (1-23-…)
at BackfillRecordPageLayoutsCommand.runOnWorkspace (1-23-…)
```
(see
https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty-infra/actions/runs/25861366732/job/75993012161)
### Root cause
Same class of bug as #20581, different location.
`ApplicationService.findWorkspaceTwentyStandardAndCustomApplicationOrThrow`
does:
```ts
await this.workspaceRepository.findOne({
where: { id: workspaceId },
withDeleted: true,
});
```
No `select`, so TypeORM emits a SELECT for every column declared on
`WorkspaceEntity`. PR #20457 added `isInternalMessagesImportEnabled` to
the entity; its DB column is only created by the 2-5 fast instance
command `1778525104406-add-is-internal-messages-import-enabled`. Many
workspace commands across versions 1-21 → 2-3 call this service (notably
the 1-23 commands shown in the stack), and they all run before the 2-5
instance command — so the bare findOne hits a column that doesn't exist
yet and the upgrade aborts.
### Fix
The function only reads `workspace.id` (passed to cache) and
`workspace.workspaceCustomApplicationId`. Narrow the select to just
those.
The `workspace: WorkspaceEntity` input variant of the function is
unchanged — only the path where we fetch the workspace ourselves is
narrowed. Callers don't see the workspace entity (the function only
returns `{ twentyStandardFlatApplication, workspaceCustomFlatApplication
}`).
### Why not edit the committed 1-23 workspace commands
Same reasoning as #20581: the fix lives in the service that does the
read, so future column additions to `WorkspaceEntity` don't risk
re-breaking every caller. Per `CLAUDE.md`, instance command `up`/`down`
is immutable; this isn't an instance command.
## Test plan
- [ ] Re-run the failing cross-version-upgrade job and confirm it gets
past 1-23
- [ ] Verify the function still resolves the standard + custom
applications correctly for a workspace (no behavior change in returned
shape)
Félix Malfait