# Introduction
Getting rid of the fine grained PAT used to dispatch to internal
repositories.
Repo dispatch requires the contents write permissions which is too wide
for such use
Refactored all senders and target to pass through a workflow dispatch
instead
Creating a centralize app that forges a token with actions: write only
provided permissions to mitigate any token exfiltrations
## Summary
- Fix expression injection vulnerabilities in composite actions
(`restore-cache`, `nx-affected`) and workflow files (`claude.yml`)
- Reduce overly broad permissions in `ci-utils.yaml` (Danger.js) and
`ci-breaking-changes.yaml`
- Restructure `preview-env-dispatch.yaml`: auto-trigger for members,
opt-in for contributor PRs via `preview-app` label (safe because
keepalive has no write tokens)
- Isolate all write-access operations (PR comments, cross-repo posting)
to a new dedicated
[`twentyhq/ci-privileged`](https://github.com/twentyhq/ci-privileged)
repo via `repository_dispatch`, so that workflows in twenty that execute
contributor code never have write tokens
- Create `post-ci-comments.yaml` (`workflow_run` bridge) to dispatch
breaking changes results to ci-privileged, solving the [fork PR comment
issue](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/13713#issuecomment-3168999083)
- Delete 5 unused secrets and broken `i18n-qa-report` workflow
- Remove `TWENTY_DISPATCH_TOKEN` from twenty (moved to ci-privileged as
`CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`)
- Use `toJSON()` for all `client-payload` values to prevent JSON
injection
## Security model after this PR
| Workflow | Executes fork code? | Write tokens available? |
|----------|---------------------|------------------------|
| preview-env-keepalive | Yes | None (contents: read only) |
| preview-env-dispatch | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN
only |
| ci-breaking-changes | Yes | None (contents: read only) |
| post-ci-comments (workflow_run) | No (default branch) |
CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN only |
| claude.yml | No (base branch) | CI_PRIVILEGED_DISPATCH_TOKEN,
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN |
| ci-utils (Danger.js) | No (base branch) | GITHUB_TOKEN (scoped) |
All actual write tokens (`TWENTY_PR_COMMENT_TOKEN`,
`CORE_TEAM_ISSUES_COMMENT_TOKEN`) live in `twentyhq/ci-privileged` with
strict CODEOWNERS review and branch protection.
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify preview environment comments still appear on member PRs
- [ ] Verify adding `preview-app` label triggers preview for contributor
PRs
- [ ] Verify breaking changes reports still post on PRs (including fork
PRs)
- [ ] Verify Claude cross-repo responses still post on core-team-issues
- [ ] Confirm ci-privileged branch protection is enforced
Paul Rastoin