## Summary
- Adds a trivial always-on observable gauge (`twenty.heartbeat = 1`) so
the OTLP exporter fires on every 10s collection tick, even on idle pods.
Without this, `PeriodicExportingMetricReader` skips the export when
`scopeMetrics` is empty, so the process-log wrapper never runs and we
can't prove OTLP connectivity.
- Adds a one-time "first periodic export attempt" log line inside the
wrapped exporter, completing the startup log sequence: `OTLP reader
enabled` → `first periodic export attempt` → `first export ok` / `export
failed`.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
## Summary
Fixes `METADATA_VALIDATION_FAILED` / “view field already exists” when
saving dashboard **record table** widgets after the first persist (e.g.
several table widgets on one dashboard).
## Problem
Draft view columns used **client-generated** `viewField` ids. After
save, the API stored **different** ids. The next upsert still sent the
old draft ids as `viewFieldId`. The server only matched on that id,
missed every row, and tried to **create** columns that already existed
for the same `fieldMetadataId` + view.
## Summary
Adds **grep-friendly** `console` logging around the OpenTelemetry
metrics OTLP exporter in
[`packages/twenty-server/src/instrument.ts`](packages/twenty-server/src/instrument.ts)
so production / staging can confirm whether the app is exporting metrics
and why exports fail.
## Log format
- Prefix: **`[Twenty OTEL metrics]`** (easy to filter in Loki / `kubectl
logs | grep`).
- **Startup:** whether the OTLP reader is enabled, `exportIntervalMs`,
and endpoint as `protocol//host/path` only (no credentials).
- **First successful export:** one `console.log` per process (`first
export ok`) with metric data point count — avoids spamming every 10s.
- **Each failed export:** `console.warn` with result code, point count,
and serialized error (including nested `AggregateError` causes when
present).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
## Summary
App developers can now declare third-party OAuth integrations (GitHub,
Linear, Slack, etc.) in their manifest and the platform handles the full
authorize → callback → token-exchange → refresh → injection lifecycle.
The dev writes ~10 lines of config and reads tokens via
`useOAuth('linear')` inside any logic function.
```ts
// app/src/oauth-providers/linear.ts
export default defineOAuthProvider({
universalIdentifier: '...',
name: 'linear',
displayName: 'Linear',
authorizationEndpoint: 'https://linear.app/oauth/authorize',
tokenEndpoint: 'https://api.linear.app/oauth/token',
scopes: ['read', 'write'],
connectionMode: 'per-user',
clientIdVariable: 'LINEAR_CLIENT_ID',
clientSecretVariable: 'LINEAR_CLIENT_SECRET',
tokenRequestContentType: 'form-urlencoded',
});
// app/src/logic-functions/handlers/...
const { accessToken } = useOAuth('linear'); // throws OAuthNotConnectedError if missing
```
## Architecture
- **Storage**: extends the existing `connectedAccount` table — new
nullable `applicationOAuthProviderId` FK + new `app` value on the
`ConnectedAccountProvider` enum. Existing Google/Microsoft flows are
untouched.
- **OAuth flow**: a single `/apps/oauth/authorize` +
`/apps/oauth/callback` controller pair handles every app provider. State
travels in a JWT signed via the existing `JwtWrapperService` (new
`APP_OAUTH_STATE` token type).
- **Token exchange**: goes through
`SecureHttpClientService.createSsrfSafeFetch()` (so an installed app
can't point `tokenEndpoint` at internal hosts).
- **Refresh**: piggybacks on the existing
`ConnectedAccountRefreshTokensService` dispatch — Google/Microsoft
drivers untouched, new app driver lives engine-side under
`application-oauth-provider/refresh/`.
- **Injection**: the executor injects refreshed tokens as env vars
(`OAUTH_<NAME>_ACCESS_TOKEN`, `_HANDLE`, `_SCOPES`, `_CONNECTED`); the
SDK helpers `useOAuth` / `useOptionalOAuth` read them.
- **Frontend**: auto-rendered "OAuth Connections" section under each
app's settings tab (no custom front component needed). App-managed
connections are filtered out of `/settings/accounts` so the
email/calendar page stays focused.
- **Disconnect**: best-effort revoke against the manifest's
`revokeEndpoint` before deleting the row.
## Reference app
`packages/twenty-apps/internal/twenty-linear/` exercises the full
pipeline:
- `defineOAuthProvider` for Linear
- `POST /linear/create-issue` and `GET /linear/teams` HTTP-route logic
functions
- Vitest tests for the handlers
## Tests
- 14 server-side Jest tests: token-exchange util (form-urlencoded vs
JSON, PKCE, error paths), flow service (authorize URL shape, state
binding, ConnectedAccount upsert on first/reconnect, per-workspace mode,
invalid state)
- 8 app-level Vitest tests: handler error paths, GraphQL request shape,
Linear error propagation
- All 4 packages clean: `npx nx lint:diff-with-main` and `npx tsc
--noEmit`
## Test plan
- [ ] Apply migration on a dev DB: `npx nx run
twenty-server:database:migrate:prod`
- [ ] Regenerate frontend types: `npx nx run
twenty-front:graphql:generate --configuration=metadata`
- [ ] Create a Linear OAuth app at
https://linear.app/settings/api/applications/new with redirect URI
`<SERVER_URL>/apps/oauth/callback`
- [ ] Deploy + install `twenty-linear` on a workspace, paste the Linear
client id/secret into the app's variables
- [ ] Click "Connect Linear" in the app's settings tab → complete OAuth
→ verify `connectedAccount` row created with `provider = 'app'`
- [ ] Trigger `POST /linear/create-issue` with a valid teamId → verify
issue lands in Linear
- [ ] Disconnect → verify the row is deleted and (if Linear's revoke
endpoint is configured in the manifest) the revoke call fires
- [ ] Verify `/settings/accounts` does NOT show the Linear connection —
it appears only under the Linear app's settings tab
## Out of scope (deliberately)
- **Cron + per-user providers**: a cron-triggered function with a
per-user OAuth provider currently returns `CONNECTED=false` (no user
context). The follow-up design is `useOAuthForUser(name,
userWorkspaceId)` paired with a `POST /apps/oauth/connection-token`
endpoint, deferred to keep this PR focused.
- **Token encryption at rest**: tokens stored as plain `varchar`
matching the existing Google/Microsoft pattern. Worth a separate
cross-cutting PR.
- **Manifest endpoint pinning**: a malicious app upgrade could change
`tokenEndpoint` silently. Same trust model as logic-function source code
(which already runs arbitrary server-side); worth tightening across the
whole upgrade pipeline rather than just OAuth.
- **CLI helpers** (`twenty oauth show-callback-url`, `twenty oauth
connect`): manual setup for v1.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Reverts **#20064** (`feat(sentry): propagate workspace context to all
spans`) and downgrades **@sentry** packages from **10.51** back to
**10.27** (reversing **#20149**), to validate in production whether
recent Sentry/instrumentation changes correlate with OTLP/metrics
issues.
## Changes
1. **Revert #20064** — removes `beforeSendSpan` from `instrument.ts`,
restores `WorkspaceAuthContextMiddleware` / `BullMQDriver` behavior, and
deletes the three `apply-workspace-sentry-*` utils added in that PR.
2. **Sentry versions** — `packages/twenty-server` (`@sentry/nestjs`,
`@sentry/node`, `@sentry/profiling-node`) and `packages/twenty-front`
(`@sentry/react`) set to `^10.27.0`; `yarn.lock` regenerated via `yarn
install`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
## Summary
Three independently-useful correctness fixes for the `code_interpreter`
tool, all surfaced while standing up a self-hosted code interpreter
against MCP. Each is isolated to one bug and applies regardless of
`CODE_INTERPRETER_TYPE`.
### 1. UI: unwrap `execute_tool` envelope when rendering
`code_interpreter` output
When `code_interpreter` is invoked through MCP's `execute_tool`
meta-tool, the result arrives wrapped: `{success, result: {stdout,
exitCode, files, ...}, ...}`. `ToolStepRenderer` reads `exitCode` at the
top level, which is `undefined` → the step renders as "Failed" even on a
clean `exitCode === 0`. Symmetric to the input-side unwrap that already
exists; the fix lifts `outputObj.result` when `rawToolName ===
'execute_tool'`.
### 2. Helper: route `TwentyMCP.call_tool` through `execute_tool` for
catalog tools
The `TwentyMCP` helper injected into every code-interpreter sandbox
exposes a `call_tool(name, arguments)` method. Direct MCP calls only
work for the 5 meta-tools (`get_tool_catalog`, `learn_tools`,
`execute_tool`, `load_skills`, `search_help_center`); the 250+ catalog
tools are accessed through `execute_tool`. Today
`twenty.call_tool('find_companies', {...})` raises "Unknown tool". This
commit detects catalog tools and auto-routes them through
`execute_tool`. It also flattens the nested `{catalog: {category:
[...]}}` shape returned by `list_tools()` and propagates `{success:
false}` envelopes as explicit exceptions (they were being silently
returned as dicts).
### 3. Prompt: stop the agent from hallucinating \`import twenty\`
Despite the helper being pre-injected, models frequently emitted
\`import twenty\` and crashed with \`ModuleNotFoundError\`. Two
contributing sources: the helper docstring did not explicitly say "do
not import," and the code-interpreter skill template's example block
referenced placeholder tool names. Fix: explicit "DO NOT import twenty"
block in the helper + rewritten skill examples using real tool names and
real response shapes.
## Test plan
- [ ] Existing \`code_interpreter\` tests still pass.
- [ ] Run a chat turn that invokes \`code_interpreter\` indirectly via
MCP \`execute_tool\` and confirm the UI no longer flips to "Failed" on
\`exitCode === 0\`.
- [ ] From inside the sandbox, run \`twenty.call_tool('find_companies',
{limit: 5})\` and confirm records return (was raising "Unknown tool").
- [ ] Confirm \`twenty.list_tools()\` returns a flat list, not the
nested \`{catalog: {...}}\` envelope.
- [ ] Trigger a tool error from inside the sandbox and confirm it raises
rather than returning a \`{success: false}\` dict.
- [ ] Ask an LLM to use \`code_interpreter\`; confirm it does not emit
\`import twenty\`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix@twenty.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
The dev seeder creates `ConnectedAccount` records with fake OAuth tokens
(`'exampleRefreshToken'` / `'exampleAccessToken'`) and points
`MessageChannel` / `CalendarChannel` records at them with
`isSyncEnabled: true`. When the sync cron jobs run in the demo
workspace, they:
1. Pick up these seeded channels (filter is `isSyncEnabled: true` +
pending sync stage)
2. Try to refresh the fake OAuth tokens
3. Mark the channels as `FAILED_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS`
4. Surface a "Sync lost with mailbox X — please reconnect" banner in the
UI
This banner appears every time the demo workspace is loaded, even though
nothing is actually broken.
## Fix
Set `isSyncEnabled: false` on all 12 seeded channels (6 message, 6
calendar). This is the canonical "don't sync this channel" mechanism —
the same state a real user lands in when they toggle sync off in account
settings.
## Why this approach
- **ConnectedAccount records stay**: the demo workspace still shows Tim,
Jony, Phil, Jane as having connected their email/calendar — realistic
- **Pre-seeded messages and calendar events stay visible**: those don't
depend on `isSyncEnabled`
- **Crons no longer pick them up**: they filter on `isSyncEnabled:
true`, so `false` short-circuits the entire sync attempt — no failure,
no banner
- **Semantically correct**: the seeded accounts have fake tokens that
were never going to sync successfully; `isSyncEnabled: true` was
effectively a lie
- **No production code touched**: no `isDemo` flags, no magic-string
detection, no workspace-ID filters in the cron path
## Alternatives considered and rejected
- **Add an `isDemo` flag**: schema change, leaks demo knowledge into
production tables
- **Skip channels with fake tokens (`example*` pattern)**: hacky
magic-string detection in the auth refresh path
- **Filter demo workspace IDs in the cron**: production paths shouldn't
reference demo IDs
- **Don't activate demo workspaces**: breaks the demo workspace UX
entirely
## Test plan
- [ ] Reset the database and reseed (`npx nx database:reset
twenty-server`)
- [ ] Load the demo workspace — confirm no "Sync lost with mailbox"
banner appears
- [ ] Confirm seeded connected accounts still show in Settings →
Accounts
- [ ] Confirm pre-seeded messages and calendar events still appear in
the UI
- [ ] Confirm a real connected account (added via OAuth) still syncs
normally — its channel will have `isSyncEnabled: true` and the cron will
pick it up
## Related
Companion to https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/20167, which
removes the `--dev-mode` cron filter that was masking this banner issue
in the dev image.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
The `twenty-app-dev` Docker image previously passed `--dev-mode` to
`cron:register:all`, which skipped all calendar, messaging, and workflow
sync cron jobs (only 4 generic crons were registered). This caused
periodic sync to silently stop after the initial import for community
members using the dev image as their actual instance.
## What changed
- Removed `--dev-mode` flag from
`packages/twenty-docker/twenty-app-dev/rootfs/etc/s6-overlay/scripts/register-crons.sh`
so the dev image registers all cron jobs (matching production behavior)
- Removed the now-unused `--dev-mode` option, `DEV_MODE_COMMANDS` set,
and conditional filtering logic from `cron-register-all.command.ts`
## Why this is safe
- **No log noise**: cron jobs gracefully no-op when no connected
accounts exist — they query for pending channels, find zero, and exit
early
- **No false banner**: the "reconnect account" banner only shows when a
user explicitly connected an account whose OAuth later fails, which is
correct behavior. No seed/demo data creates connected accounts, so a
fresh dev instance won't see any banner
- **Hiding crons just hid the symptom**: silently breaking sync with no
user feedback is worse than showing the banner if OAuth is misconfigured
## Context
Surfaced by a community member who reported that calendar sync cron jobs
never appeared in the queue after restarting the dev image, and only the
initial import worked. `--dev-mode` was added in #19138 as an
optimization for development but it doesn't match how the dev image is
actually used by community members deploying Twenty.
## Test plan
- [ ] Build/run the `twenty-app-dev` image
- [ ] Confirm worker logs show all cron jobs registering (calendar,
messaging, workflow, etc.)
- [ ] With no connected accounts: confirm no errors or log noise
- [ ] With a connected Google calendar: confirm periodic sync triggers
after ~5 minutes
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## PR Description
### Summary
- Add AI chat thread actions: rename, archive (soft-delete via
`deletedAt`), and hard-delete with confirmation.
- Add chat thread filtering by status (active/archived/all), group-by
mode, and last activity.
- Rework drawer/side-panel thread lists to share thread sections, item
menus, archive icons, and empty-state behavior.
- Extend server chat thread model/API with `deletedAt`, mutations,
broadcasts, and archive-aware stream guards.
### Decisions
- Two-stage lifecycle: Archive sets `deletedAt` (soft); Delete is a
separate action on archived threads that hard-deletes the row. Aligns
with Twenty's soft-delete convention (Felix's suggestion).
- `lastMessageAt` is derived from `MAX(agentMessage.createdAt)` on read,
not stored. List query does inline aggregation for sort; `@ResolveField`
covers single-thread / mutation paths so the schema contract is honest
everywhere. Matches `timeline-messaging.service.ts` precedent and the
existing `totalInputCredits` / `totalOutputCredits` `@ResolveField`
pattern in the same resolver.
- Replaced auto-CRUD `chatThreads` (cursor-paginated Connection) with a
custom `[AgentChatThreadDTO!]` resolver. Frontend metadata-store treats
threads as a flat collection and filters/sorts client-side, so cursor
pagination was performative.
- Sending in an archived chat unarchives it optimistically on the client
and authoritatively on the server.
- Grouping and last-activity filtering use `lastMessageAt ?? updatedAt`
so archive/rename don't bump threads in the list.
- Kept metadata-store core API unchanged; AI chat uses the same local
cast pattern already used by other metadata-store partial updates.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b179b7b-1a2a-4a7a-aa0a-c88f6f051a87
## Context
This is a temporary fix for cross-version upgrade process, a better fix
would be to expose an hasInstanceCommandBeenRun() util (and later a
decorator)
## Summary
Removes the `?token=` URL query-parameter fallback from JWT
authentication. Every authenticated route (`/graphql`, `/metadata`,
REST, etc.) used to accept a full workspace JWT in the URL alongside the
`Authorization` header. The fallback was intended for the REST API
Playground only, but it was wired into the global Passport JWT extractor
and applied to every route.
URL-borne tokens leak into:
- Server access logs (nginx / Apache / CDN / proxy / load balancer)
- Log aggregators (Datadog, CloudWatch, Loki, Sumo, …)
- Browser history (and synced across devices)
- `Referer` headers when navigating to external pages
- Browser extensions with `tabs`/`webNavigation` permissions
A leaked log line was equivalent to a leaked workspace credential for
the lifetime of the token.
## What changed
- **`jwt-wrapper.service.ts`** — `extractJwtFromRequest()` is now
header-only (`ExtractJwt.fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken()`). No URL
fallback anywhere in the system.
- **`open-api.service.ts` / `base-schema.utils.ts`** — Dropped the
`token?: string` plumbing that propagated the URL token into the schema
description. The "Authentication" section gains a "Never put your token
in a URL" warning. The "Usage with LLMs" section is rewritten to point
at the **Twenty MCP server** (header-authenticated, exposes typed tools
— the right tool for AI agents) instead of telling users to paste
tokenized OpenAPI URLs into Cursor/ChatGPT.
- **`RestPlayground.tsx`** — Now fetches the OpenAPI schema with
`Authorization: Bearer ${playgroundApiKey}` and passes the JSON document
to Scalar via `spec.content` instead of constructing a URL with
`?token=`. Aborts in-flight fetches on unmount/key change.
- **New integration test** — Asserts `?token=` is rejected on `/rest/*`,
`/graphql`, `/metadata`, and that `/rest/open-api/core?token=` returns
the unauthenticated base schema (no workspace object paths).
## Why not keep `?token=` scoped to the OpenAPI endpoint only
The first instinct was to narrow the fallback to just
`/rest/open-api/*`, since that endpoint is what the Scalar playground
component fetches. But the same log-leakage attack still applies to that
endpoint — the workspace JWT would still sit in access logs, just from
one URL pattern instead of all of them. The cleaner long-term fix is to
remove the URL pattern entirely and let the playground fetch with a
header (Scalar supports `spec.content` natively). For LLM agent use, the
MCP server is a strictly better path — typed tools, OAuth or
header-based API key auth, no tokens in URLs anywhere.
## Not affected
File downloads at `file-url.service.ts` also use `?token=` URLs but with
separate, short-lived `FILE`-typed tokens validated by
`file-by-id.guard.ts` directly (not via `extractJwtFromRequest`). That
mechanism is scoped per-file with limited TTL and is acceptable.
## Action required for users
Anyone who previously pasted `?token=` URLs into LLM tools, scripts,
bookmarks, or shared configs should rotate their workspace API keys.
Those tokens are likely captured in server logs / chat histories
somewhere.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` — clean
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-front` — clean
- [x] OpenAPI utils unit tests + snapshots — 11/11 pass
- [ ] Run the new integration test against a live server: `nx run
twenty-server:test:integration:with-db-reset` and verify
`url-token-auth-rejection.integration-spec.ts` passes
- [ ] Manually open Settings → Playground → REST, confirm the schema
loads (now via Bearer header instead of `?token=` URL)
- [ ] Manually verify `POST /metadata?token=<jwt>` (no Authorization
header) returns Forbidden, and the same request with the token in the
header returns the user
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Background
The 2026-04-26 incident saw 716M Sonnet 4.6 tokens consumed in a single
trial workspace. Two causes: failed agent executions weren't billed
(addressed by #20065) and the credit-cap gate had been removed from
`WorkflowExecutorWorkspaceService.executeStep` in #19904, leaving no
enforcement point at all.
## Why not just revert #19904#19904 was right that gating at the workflow executor is too coarse.
When one user exhausted a workspace's credits via chat, *all* workflows
hard-failed mid-run — including cheap DB/CRUD/branch automations costing
essentially nothing. Reverting would re-introduce that cliff.
## New design: gate at the AI entry points
The chat resolver already gates this way
(`agent-chat.resolver.ts:137-148`). This PR replicates the same pattern
at every other point where the workspace can incur real AI cost:
- `executeAgent` in `agent-async-executor.service.ts`
- the REST handler in `ai-generate-text.controller.ts`
- `generateThreadTitle` in `agent-title-generation.service.ts`
In each, after auth/validation: skip if `IS_BILLING_ENABLED` is false;
otherwise call `BillingService.canBillMeteredProduct(workspaceId,
BillingProductKey.WORKFLOW_NODE_EXECUTION)`; on `false`, throw
`BillingException(BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED)`. No new method, no new
exception code, no new product key.
This matches industry convention (Lovable/Replit also gate at the
expensive-operation boundary, not at every cheap step).
## Deliberately not gated
- `WorkflowExecutorWorkspaceService.executeStep` — the design choice is
now intentional, so the #19904 TODO is replaced by a one-line
absolute-behavior comment explaining why the gate isn't here. Cheap
workflow steps (DB CRUD, branching, action steps) are not gated, so a
chat-driven cap exhaustion does not block non-AI automations.
- `repair-tool-call.util` — repair is a sub-call inside an already-gated
AI flow. If the parent is gated, repair will naturally not run. Adding a
gate here adds complexity without value.
## Net effect
A workspace that exhausts credits via chat or AI agent stops making AI
calls. Its non-AI workflows continue running normally. A workflow with
both AI and non-AI steps fails at the AI step with
`BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED`, but downstream non-AI steps that don't
depend on the AI output still run.
## Conflicts
This PR overlaps with three other in-flight PRs in the same files. None
of them touch the gate logic; rebasing on top of any of them is trivial:
- #20065 (agent-async-executor): adds `workspaceId` to `executeAgent`
args and bills in `finally`. The gate at the top of `executeAgent` from
this PR sits naturally above that.
- #20066 (REST controller): adds usage billing to the controller.
- #20067 (title gen): adds usage billing to title generation and
tool-call repair.
Recommend landing #20065/#20066/#20067 first; this PR rebases trivially
on top.
## Tests
Out of scope per the PR series convention. The existing chat-resolver
gate isn't unit-tested either; this PR follows the same precedent.
Follow-up: add integration coverage that exercises a workspace at
`hasReachedCurrentPeriodCap=true` against each of the three new gates
plus the pre-existing chat-resolver gate.
## Future follow-ups
- Per-user soft cap inside a workspace (the Lovable Business-tier
pattern), so one user can't exhaust the workspace's cap.
- Pre-flight cost estimate so the user sees an "approaching cap" warning
before the hard stop.
- Rename `BillingProductKey.WORKFLOW_NODE_EXECUTION` — the name predates
this design choice and is misleading now that it gates AI entry points
rather than workflow nodes.
## Test plan
- [ ] Trigger a workspace into `hasReachedCurrentPeriodCap=true`.
- [ ] Send a chat message — expect failure with
`BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED`.
- [ ] Run a workflow whose only AI step is an `ai-agent` action — expect
that step to fail with `BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED`, downstream non-AI
steps still run.
- [ ] POST to `/rest/ai/generate-text` — expect
`BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED`.
- [ ] Create a new chat thread (which kicks off `generateThreadTitle`) —
expect `BILLING_CREDITS_EXHAUSTED`.
- [ ] Run a workflow with no AI step (only DB CRUD/branching/actions) —
expect it to run unaffected.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
EDIT :
- solving auto-caching from Anthropic by updating ai-sdk/anthropic +
adding providerOption at stream level
- concerning Bedrock, it needs breakpoint
**1. Breakpoints were only on the system prompt**
The code already placed a cache marker on the system prompt (~10K
tokens). But the conversation history — which can grow to hundreds of
thousands of tokens — had no marker, so Anthropic re-read it at full
price on every turn.
The fix adds a prepareStep hook inside streamText that stamps the last
message with a cache breakpoint before every LLM call. Anthropic then
caches the entire conversation prefix, and subsequent turns read it at
$0.30/M instead of $3/M.
prepareStep is used rather than a one-shot pre-processing step because
an agentic turn makes multiple internal LLM calls as tool results
accumulate — the hook refreshes the breakpoint before each one.
**2. Bedrock was using the wrong field**
The system prompt marker for Bedrock was set as cacheControl: { type:
'ephemeral' } — which is the Anthropic wire format. The Bedrock Converse
API expects cachePoint: { type: 'default' }. The system prompt was
silently not being cached on Bedrock at all.
Both the system prompt and the new prepareStep now go through a shared
getCacheProviderOptions helper that returns the correct field per
provider.
**3. Persisted cached token usage to monitor cache strat. efficiency**
Hardened CalDav with new approach of wrapping axios ssrf http agent to
fetch via `@lifeomic/axios-fetch` because `tsdav` only accept `fetch`
override.
Also Hardened test endpoint
## Summary
Adds `h1`–`h6` component overrides to `LazyMarkdownRenderer` so that
`[[record:...]]` references placed inside markdown headings in the AI
chat are parsed by `processChildrenForRecordLinks` and rendered as
clickable `RecordLink` chips, matching the behavior already in place for
`p`, `li`, `td`, `th`, and `a`.
Fixes#20072
## Test plan
- [ ] In AI chat, ask a question whose answer places a record reference
inside a markdown heading (e.g. `## Found [[person:uuid:John Doe]]`) and
confirm a clickable `RecordLink` chip renders instead of the raw
`[[...]]` text.
- [ ] Verify heading styling (sizes, weights, margins) is unchanged.
Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
---------
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nitin <ehconitin@users.noreply.github.com>
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
# Introduction
Prevent using both `--start-from-workspace-id` and `--workspace`
When any of the two are being passed we prevent passing to the next
instance segment, it would require an upgrade re run even if legit
When `--start-from-workspace-id` is passed we filter from all the
fetched active or suspended workspace ids and apply equivalent filter as
before
# Summary
(fixes#20044)
This PR implements two fixes for the REST API to enforce stricter
validation and provide better error messages.
Issue 1: Cursor parameter silently ignored
Problem: When users provided common cursor aliases (e.g., cursor, after,
before) instead of the correct parameter names (starting_after,
ending_before), the API silently ignored them and returned page 1 on
every request.
Solution: Added strict validation to detect common cursor aliases and
throw a clear error directing users to use the correct parameter names.
Files modified:
-
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/api/rest/input-request-parsers/rest-input-request-parser.exception.ts
-
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/api/rest/input-request-parsers/starting-after-parser-utils/parse-starting-after-rest-request.util.ts
-
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/api/rest/input-request-parsers/ending-before-parser-utils/parse-ending-before-rest-request.util.ts
- Test files for both parsers
Example error:
Invalid cursor parameter 'cursor'. Use 'starting_after' for pagination.
---
Issue 2: OpportunityStageEnum not validated on REST
Problem: When creating or updating opportunities via REST with an
invalid stage value, the API either silently dropped the value or
returned a generic error without listing valid options.
Solution: Updated the SELECT field validation to include valid options
in the error message.
Files modified:
-
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/api/common/common-args-processors/data-arg-processor/validator-utils/validate-rating-and-select-field-or-throw.util.ts
- Test file
Example error:
Invalid value "BAD_VALUE" for field "stage". Valid values are: NEW,
SCREENING, MEETING, PROPOSAL, CUSTOMER
---
### Testing
- Added 5 new test cases for `parse-starting-after-rest-request.util.ts`
- Added 6 new test cases for `parse-ending-before-rest-request.util.ts`
- Added 1 new test case for
`validate-rating-and-select-field-or-throw.util.ts`
- All 21 tests passing
---
Breaking Changes
None - correct usage is unaffected.
---------
Co-authored-by: Etienne <45695613+etiennejouan@users.noreply.github.com>
- Update usageEvent clickhouse table, partitioning, indexing and
projection (auto materialized view) to optimize credit usage queries
- Add caching for available credits and billing subscription
To do in next PR: deprecate enforceCapUsage cron. Bonus : real-time on
billingSubscription
## Summary
- Rename safeParseRelativeDateFilterJSONStringified to
safeParseRelativeDateFilterJsonStringified
- Update the matching utility file, exports, tests, and workflow usages
Part of #19839.
## Validation
- CI passed
## Summary
`AgentAsyncExecutorService.executeAgent` consumes Anthropic tokens at
two points (the main `generateText` and the optional structured-output
sub-call). Billing was previously the **caller's** responsibility,
executed only after `executeAgent` returned. If `executeAgent` threw —
e.g. when `structuredResult.output == null` for a schema-mismatched
response, or anything caught by the catch-and-rethrow — we paid
Anthropic but never recorded a `usageEvent`. Likely the dominant source
of the 716M-token-vs-3.27-credits discrepancy seen on the affected
workspace in the 2026-04-26 incident.
## What changed
- Inject `AiBillingService` into `AgentAsyncExecutorService`. Add
`workspaceId` (required), `userWorkspaceId`, and `operationType`
(default `AI_WORKFLOW_TOKEN`) to `executeAgent`'s args.
- Capture `accumulatedUsage`, `cacheCreationTokens`, and
`nativeWebSearchCallCount` into mutable locals as each `generateText`
resolves. A throw between the main and structured-output calls still
bills the first call's tokens; the schema-validation throw still bills
the merged usage.
- Wrap the body in `try { ... } finally { ... }`. The finally calls
`calculateAndBillUsage` and `billNativeWebSearchUsage`, each guarded by
its own `try/catch + logger.error` so a billing exception can't mask the
original execution error or block the second emit.
- `ai-agent.workflow-action.ts`: pass the new args; drop the
now-redundant billing calls and `AiBillingService` injection.
`AiBillingModule` removed from this action's module imports.
- `run-evaluation-input.job.ts`: pass `workspaceId` (already in `data`)
and `userWorkspaceId: null`. **As a side effect, the eval pipeline now
bills correctly** — closing an additional billing leak from the audit
(`RunEvaluationInputJob` previously called `executeAgent` and discarded
`executionResult.usage`).
## Behavior change worth calling out
Previously, failed agent executions were silently free. They will now be
billed for the tokens Anthropic charged us. This is intentional and
correct.
## Test plan
- [ ] Trigger a workflow agent action that succeeds — `usageEvent` count
should match what was previously emitted.
- [ ] Trigger a workflow agent with a JSON response schema and ambiguous
input that produces a non-schema-conforming output
(`structuredResult.output == null`) — verify a `usageEvent` row is now
written for the consumed tokens (was 0 rows previously).
- [ ] Trigger a `runEvaluationInput` GraphQL mutation — verify a
`usageEvent` row is written (was 0 rows previously).
## Notes for review
- Conflicts trivially with the Sentry-context PR on
`run-evaluation-input.job.ts`. Recommend merging Sentry-context first;
this PR's 2-line argument addition rebases inside that PR's
`aiCallContextService.run(...)` callback wrapper.
- A small follow-up after this lands: thread `billingContext` through
the `experimental_repairToolCall` callback in
`agent-async-executor.service.ts:198` (currently marked with a TODO from
the title-gen+repair-tool PR).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
`POST /rest/ai/generate-text` calls `generateText` and returns `usage`
to the client without emitting a `usageEvent`. Authenticated, gated only
by `PermissionFlagType.AI` — any workspace user with that permission
could call it in a loop without billing. Identified during the
2026-04-26 incident audit.
## What changed
- Inject `AiBillingService` into `AiGenerateTextController`.
- Add `@AuthUserWorkspaceId() userWorkspaceId: string` to source the
user-workspace identifier.
- Wrap the `generateText` call in `try { ... return ... } finally { ...
}` so billing fires even if the controller throws after Anthropic was
paid.
- Bill with `UsageOperationType.AI_WORKFLOW_TOKEN` and
`cacheCreationTokens: result.usage.inputTokenDetails?.cacheWriteTokens
?? 0`.
- Inner `try/catch` around the billing emit so a billing error can't
break the response.
- One-line module change: `AiGenerateTextModule` imports
`AiBillingModule` (NestJS DI requirement).
## Test plan
- [ ] Call `POST /rest/ai/generate-text` with a small prompt; verify a
`usageEvent` row appears in ClickHouse for the workspace with the
correct token count and `operationType = AI_WORKFLOW_TOKEN`.
- [ ] Call with a malformed model id that throws after the API key is
validated — verify no spurious billing call occurs (no Anthropic call
was made).
## Notes for review
- Response shape unchanged.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
Two `generateText` call sites were unbilled — identified during the
2026-04-26 incident audit:
- **Thread title generation**
(`AgentTitleGenerationService.generateThreadTitle`) — fires once per new
chat thread; low-volume but completeness matters.
- **Tool-call repair** (`repairToolCall` util, used inside
`experimental_repairToolCall` callbacks) — can fire `MAX_STEPS` times
per agent turn if a model gets stuck producing malformed tool calls.
## What changed
- `AgentTitleGenerationService` — inject `AiBillingService`, expand
`generateThreadTitle` signature to accept `workspaceId` and
`userWorkspaceId`, bill in a `finally` block with
`UsageOperationType.AI_CHAT_TOKEN`. Restructured so the no-default-model
short-circuit happens before the `try`, avoiding a fake billing call.
- `repair-tool-call.util.ts` — added an optional `billingContext` arg
containing `aiBillingService`, `modelId`, `workspaceId`,
`userWorkspaceId`, `operationType`. Wraps the `generateText` call in
`try/finally`; bills in finally with the operation type provided by the
caller. Optional so existing callers keep compiling.
- `chat-execution.service.ts` — threads `billingContext`
(`AI_CHAT_TOKEN`) into the repair callback.
- `agent-chat.service.ts` — passes `workspaceId` and
`thread.userWorkspaceId` to `generateThreadTitle`.
- `agent-async-executor.service.ts` — TODO comment marking that the
repair callback should thread billing once `executeAgent` accepts
`workspaceId` (depends on the executeAgent-finally PR).
## Follow-up
After the executeAgent-finally PR lands, `workspaceId` is in scope at
the `experimental_repairToolCall` callback in
`agent-async-executor.service.ts:198`. Thread `billingContext` through
to fire repair-call billing for workflow agents too, and remove the
TODO. Tiny follow-up.
## Test plan
- [ ] Create a new chat thread; verify a `usageEvent` row is written for
the title generation call.
- [ ] Send a chat message that triggers tool-call repair (e.g. force a
malformed tool call); verify a `usageEvent` row for the repair sub-call.
## Notes for review
- `billingContext` arg made **optional** to allow incremental rollout —
the executeAgent-finally PR plus a small follow-up will close the
agent-async-executor side.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
After the 2026-04-26 token-usage incident, identifying the responsible
workspace from a Sentry trace required a Postgres scavenger hunt —
Vercel AI SDK auto-instrumentation captures token counts and model name
but no twenty-specific identifiers, and that same gap exists for every
other auto-instrumented span (HTTP outbound, Postgres queries, GraphQL
resolvers, Redis, etc.).
This PR plugs that gap globally, not just for AI:
- A small utility
(`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/sentry/utils/sentry-workspace-context.util.ts`)
that writes workspace identifiers onto Sentry's active isolation scope
as a `twenty` context block plus filterable tags and a `Sentry.setUser`
call.
- Two hook points covering all server traffic:
- **`WorkspaceAuthContextMiddleware`** — already runs after token
hydration on the GraphQL, metadata, admin-panel, and REST routes. It now
calls the utility once per authenticated request, before delegating to
`withWorkspaceAuthContext`.
- **`BullMQDriver.work` and `SyncDriver.processJob`** — every queue job
now runs inside `Sentry.withIsolationScope` and applies workspace
context from `job.data.workspaceId` (skipping silently for system jobs
that don't carry one).
- A `beforeSendSpan` hook in `instrument.ts` that reads the scope's
`twenty` context block back and projects it onto every span as
`twenty.workspace.id` and (when available) `twenty.user_workspace.id` —
dotted-namespace naming consistent with OTel/Sentry conventions like
`user.id` and `http.response.status_code`. Spans without a workspace
context (unauthenticated traffic) pass through untouched.
## Why this shape
Sentry's docs position `beforeSendSpan` as a per-span hook. The previous
iteration set context only at AI-specific call sites, which left non-AI
spans (DB queries, outbound HTTP, regular GraphQL queries, workflow
steps not touching AI) entirely unenriched. Hooking the two existing
global boundaries — auth middleware for HTTP/GraphQL/REST, and the queue
driver `work()` callback for background jobs — covers every
authenticated span across the app with no per-handler instrumentation.
## What's not in this PR
AI-specific identifiers (`twenty.agent.id`, `twenty.thread.id`,
`twenty.turn.id`, `twenty.workflow_run.id`) are out of scope here.
They're useful additions but require either propagating the IDs through
the call stack or a more fine-grained scope (per-step, per-turn) than
the request/job boundary, which is best handled in follow-up PRs that
target those specific call sites.
## Test plan
- [ ] Make any authenticated GraphQL request locally and confirm the
resulting span(s) in Sentry carry `twenty.workspace.id` and (for
user-authenticated routes) `twenty.user_workspace.id`.
- [ ] Make any authenticated REST request and confirm the same.
- [ ] Trigger a queue job (chat stream, agent turn evaluation, workflow
run, etc.) and confirm spans produced inside the worker carry
`twenty.workspace.id`.
- [ ] Confirm that DB and outbound HTTP spans produced under the
request/job also carry the workspace tag — these previously had no
twenty-specific identifiers.
- [ ] In the Sentry UI, filter events by the `twenty.workspace.id` tag
and confirm matching events appear.
## Notes for review
- Sentry init lives in `instrument.ts`, loaded before Nest bootstraps,
so `beforeSendSpan` runs outside Nest DI and reads context off the
isolation scope rather than holding a service reference.
- The middleware change is three lines; the BullMQ wrap is a single
`Sentry.withIsolationScope` around the existing job handler body; the
SyncDriver wrap mirrors it for the dev/test path. No new modules or DI
providers.
- The previous iteration's `AiCallContextService` and per-handler
`setContext` / `withContext` calls have been removed in favor of these
two hooks.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Introduction
In a nutshell, added a more readable logs that relates that when
performing a workspace fitlered workspace you can only browser the
workspace commands sequence
This PR is not a fix, but a log improvement
As before when cross-upgrading a single workspace you would be facing a
`instance` sync barrier error as not all your workspaces would have been
updated
Now logging and early returning instead of letting the guard hard throw
## Tests
Created a dedicated test for instance prevention on filtered upgrade
Standardized `migrationRecordToKey` usage across all upgrade integration
tests suites
## Summary
`ImapGetAllFoldersService.isMailboxSelectable` checked
`mailbox.flags?.has('\\Noselect')`, which is case-sensitive. Per [RFC
3501 §6.3.8](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3501#section-6.3.8), IMAP
attribute names are case-insensitive — different servers spell the flag
differently:
| Server | Spelling |
|---|---|
| Dovecot | `\Noselect` |
| Stalwart | `\NoSelect` |
| Cyrus | `\Noselect` |
| RFC examples | `\NOSELECT` |
The previous check only caught Dovecot's spelling. On other servers,
virtual namespace placeholders (e.g. Stalwart's `Shared Folders` parent)
passed through `isMailboxSelectable` and got persisted as folders. When
`MessagingMessageListFetchJob` later ran, it issued `SELECT "Shared
Folders"`, the server correctly rejected it with `NO [NONEXISTENT]
Mailbox does not exist.`, and the entire message-list fetch failed for
the channel.
## Reproduction
1. Connect an IMAP account whose server advertises a `\NoSelect` (or
`\NOSELECT`) namespace placeholder. Stalwart Mail v0.15.x exhibits this
with shared mailboxes:
```
* LIST (\NoSelect) "/" "Shared Folders"
```
2. The folder discovery job persists it as a syncable folder.
3. `MessagingMessageListFetchJob` runs and fails:
```
IMAP: Error fetching message list: D0 SELECT "Shared Folders"
responseStatus: NO serverResponseCode: NONEXISTENT
```
## Fix
Iterate the flag set and lowercase-compare against `'\\noselect'`. This
matches every legal spelling without changing behavior for compliant
`\Noselect` clients.
```diff
private isMailboxSelectable(mailbox: ListResponse): boolean {
- return !mailbox.flags?.has('\\Noselect');
+ if (!mailbox.flags) return true;
+ for (const flag of mailbox.flags) {
+ if (flag.toLowerCase() === '\\noselect') return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
```
## Test plan
- [x] Existing `\Noselect` test cases (`should not issue STATUS against
a \Noselect folder`, parent-reference preservation, Sent-folder
exclusion) still pass — the lowercase comparison subsumes them.
- [x] New parameterized test covers `\Noselect`, `\NoSelect`,
`\NOSELECT`, `\noselect` spellings against a Stalwart-style `Shared
Folders` namespace placeholder, asserting Twenty does **not** issue
`STATUS` on the placeholder and does **not** include it in the
discovered folder set.
---------
Co-authored-by: neo773 <62795688+neo773@users.noreply.github.com>
refactored `SentMessagePersistenceService` to be thin wrapper over
`saveMessagesAndEnqueueContactCreation`
this fixes a bug where the old logic did not call match participants
causing messages to not show up
## Summary
- Add optional `rawBody?: string` to `LogicFunctionEvent` and forward it
from the route trigger so HMAC-based webhook signatures (GitHub's
`X-Hub-Signature-256`, Stripe, …) can be verified by user logic
functions.
- Update `github-connector`'s `getRawBodyForSignature` to prefer
`event.rawBody` (with the existing string/base64/null fallbacks kept for
older runtimes).
## Why
GitHub computes `X-Hub-Signature-256` over the **raw bytes** of the
request body. The receiver must verify against those exact bytes — key
order, whitespace and unicode escaping all matter, so the parsed JSON
body cannot be re-serialized to them.
Today the route trigger calls `extractBody(request)` which returns the
parsed object only. NestJS already preserves the raw body on
`request.rawBody` (the app is bootstrapped with `rawBody: true` in
`main.ts`), but it was never propagated into `LogicFunctionEvent`.
As a result the github-connector's webhook handler always took the "raw
body unavailable" branch and rejected every delivery (after #19961 /
962c2b3c14). With this change, signature verification can succeed
end-to-end.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automated daily sync of `ai-providers.json` from
[models.dev](https://models.dev).
This PR updates pricing, context windows, and model availability based
on the latest data.
New models meeting inclusion criteria (tool calling, pricing data,
context limits) are added automatically.
Deprecated models are detected based on cost-efficiency within the same
model family.
**Please review before merging** — verify no critical models were
incorrectly deprecated.
Co-authored-by: FelixMalfait <6399865+FelixMalfait@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
- Add user avatars and workspace logos to the admin general table and
workspace member detail view
- Show app icons in the admin app registrations table and reuse the
shared application display component
- Expose the needed avatar and logo fields through admin GraphQL queries
and backend lookup/statistics services
- Keep workspace fallback behavior consistent when no logo is set and
clean up a few local table styling duplicates
## Testing
- `./node_modules/.bin/tsc -p packages/twenty-front/tsconfig.json
--noEmit --pretty false`
- Manual UI verification of the admin general, workspace detail, and
apps tables
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com>
## Summary
Fixes a race condition in `LocalDriver` where concurrent `execute()`
calls for the same application can trash each other's layer build,
causing logic function executions to fail with either:
- `Error: ENOENT: process.cwd failed with error no such file or
directory, the current working directory was likely removed without
changing the working directory, uv_cwd` (the yarn-install child's `cwd`
got wiped mid-run), or
- `ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '…/<pkg>/<file>.js.map'`
raised from yarn's berry link step (files under the deps layer vanish
while yarn is extracting).
Both are thrown from `…/deps/<checksum>/.yarn/releases/yarn-4.9.2.cjs` —
i.e. the yarn process `copyYarnEngineAndBuildDependencies` spawns with
`cwd: buildDirectory`.
## Root cause
`LocalDriver.createLayerIfNotExist` (and `ensureSdkLayer`) both follow a
check-then-act pattern with no mutual exclusion:
```ts
if (await pathExists(depsNodeModulesPath)) return;
await fs.rm(depsLayerPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
await copyDependenciesInMemory(...);
await copyYarnEngineAndBuildDependencies(depsLayerPath); // spawns yarn with cwd=depsLayerPath
```
The deps layer path is shared across all `execute()` calls that match a
given `yarnLockChecksum`. Two concurrent callers (e.g. a webhook
invocation + a cron-triggered logic function firing while the first
run's layer is still being built) both see no `node_modules`, both
`fs.rm` the directory, and one's yarn child ends up with its `cwd` or
its extraction target gone.
## Fix
Wrap the critical sections with `CacheLockService.withLock` — the same
cache-backed lock the Lambda driver already uses for its layer/executor
builds:
- `createLayerIfNotExist` → lock key
`local-driver-deps-layer:${yarnLockChecksum ?? 'default'}`
- `ensureSdkLayer` → lock key
`local-driver-sdk-layer:${workspaceId}:${applicationUniversalIdentifier}`
A fast-path `pathExists` check is kept outside the lock (so warm
executions still skip lock acquisition entirely), and the existence +
staleness check is **repeated inside the lock** so followers no-op after
the leader finishes.
Lock parameters mirror the Lambda driver's layer-build lock (`ttl=120s`,
`retry=500ms`, `maxRetries=240`).
`cacheLockService` is now passed to `LocalDriver` from
`LogicFunctionDriverFactory` (it was already injected there for the
Lambda driver).
Charles Bochet