6b49a14b9ffe24d45c83ba776ef40db6177f37c5
384 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Félix Malfait
|
6b49a14b9f |
feat(auth): set 50-character maximum length on passwords (#20655)
## Summary - Cap password length at 50 characters in the shared regex used by sign-up, password reset, and password change (both `twenty-front` and `twenty-server`). - Update the user-facing validation message on sign-up and password reset to mention both the 8 min and 50 max bounds. - Extend the `PASSWORD_REGEX` unit test to cover the new upper bound. The cap also prevents unbounded inputs from reaching bcrypt, which silently truncates passwords above 72 bytes and can mask user-visible bugs. ## Test plan - [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth/utils/__tests__/passwordRegex.test.ts` passes (8-char min and 50-char max). - [ ] Sign up with a 51-character password — form rejects with "Password must be between 8 and 50 characters". - [ ] Sign up with an 8–50 character password — succeeds. - [ ] Password reset rejects a 51-character password with the same message. - [ ] Existing users with longer passwords (if any pre-exist) can still sign in (the regex only gates write paths: sign-up, change, reset). |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
45bea6f991 |
feat(secret-encryption): drop APP_SECRET from approved-access-domain validation and session cookies (#20580)
## Summary Continues retiring `APP_SECRET` as a hot signing secret (after the TOTP migration in #20577). This PR moves the last two cryptographic uses of `APP_SECRET` off it: 1. **Approved-access-domain validation tokens** — was a one-shot `sha256(JSON.stringify({id, domain, key: APP_SECRET}))` HMAC with no built-in expiry. Now a JWT signed by the workspace `signingKey` with a 7-day expiry and claims bound to `approvedAccessDomainId`, `workspaceId`, and `domain`. 2. **Express-session cookie signing** — was `sha256(APP_SECRET || 'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')`. Now `HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY, info='twenty:hmac:v1:session-cookie')` with `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` supported for rotation. ### Approved-access-domain — strict cutover - `ApprovedAccessDomainService.mintValidationToken` issues a JWT via `JwtWrapperService.signAsyncOrThrow` (workspace `signingKey`, asymmetric ES256 with kid-based rotation built in). - `validateApprovedAccessDomain` verifies the JWT, asserts `type === APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN`, cross-checks `claim.approvedAccessDomainId` against the URL's `approvedAccessDomainId`, then re-checks `domain` and `workspaceId` against the stored row. Any failure maps to `APPROVED_ACCESS_DOMAIN_VALIDATION_TOKEN_INVALID`. - **No legacy fallback:** any pending invitation link minted with the old SHA hash will fail validation and must be re-sent. Volume is small and admins can re-issue from settings — this is the cleanest cutover. ### Session cookies — bridged cutover - `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` returns an array `[HKDF(ENCRYPTION_KEY), HKDF(FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY)?, sha256(APP_SECRET || 'SESSION_STORE_SECRET')?]`. - `express-session` signs new cookies with the first secret and verifies against any entry, so in-flight cookies signed under the legacy SHA keep verifying until `maxAge` (30 min) expires. - New `deriveInstanceHmacKey` HKDF utility uses a dedicated `twenty:hmac:v1:` info prefix — distinct from the AEAD subkey prefix `twenty:enc:v2:` — so HMAC and encryption subkeys can never collide for the same raw `ENCRYPTION_KEY`. - TODO comment marks the legacy slot for removal post-2.5. ### Notes on rotation behaviour - Rotating `ENCRYPTION_KEY` while keeping the old value in `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` keeps cookies signed under either key verifying. New cookies sign under the new key. After all in-flight cookies expire (≤30 min), the fallback slot can be dropped from env. - Rotating the workspace `signingKey` (already supported by `JwtKeyManagerService`) keeps already-issued approved-access-domain JWTs verifying via `kid` until their 7-day expiry. ## Test plan - [x] Unit tests for `ApprovedAccessDomainService` cover: happy path, JWT verify failure, wrong token type, JWT id ≠ input id, JWT-claimed domain ≠ row, missing row, already-validated row. - [x] Unit tests for `resolveSessionCookieSecretsOrThrow` cover: throws without keys, primary order (`ENCRYPTION_KEY` → APP_SECRET fallback), `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` placement, empty-string vars treated as unset, legacy slot omitted when `APP_SECRET` missing, HKDF domain separation across purposes. - [x] `nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` — clean. - [x] Full test surface across approved-access-domain, secret-encryption, session-storage — 78/78 pass. - [ ] CI green. - [ ] Manual smoke: boot with a dummy `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, confirm sign-in succeeds (session cookie works), create + validate an approved-access-domain end-to-end through the UI. |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
0d5617d446 |
chore(server): drop unused postgresCredentials feature (#20573)
## Summary Drops the `postgresCredentials` legacy feature: a never-finished "postgres proxy" that would have let users query their workspace data over a standard Postgres connection. Nothing — frontend, e2e, Zapier, docs, other server code — calls these mutations/query. ## History - **Introduced** June 2024 (#5767, Thomas Trompette) as "first step for creating credentials for database proxy", alongside the Postgres FDW / remote-server work and the custom `twenty-postgres-spilo` image. Planned follow-ups (provisioning a DB on the proxy, mapping users, exposing it as a remote server) never landed. - **Abandoned** January 2026 (#17001, Weiko) when the sibling "remote integration" feature was removed as a BREAKING CHANGE — "not maintained for more than a year and never officially launched". The spilo image was then replaced with vanilla `postgres:16` (#19182, March 2026), retiring the FDW infrastructure entirely. - This PR finishes the cleanup: removes the orphaned module, the `allPostgresCredentials` relation, `JwtTokenTypeEnum.POSTGRES_PROXY` + payload, the reserved metadata keywords, and adds a 2.5.0 fast instance command that drops `core.postgresCredentials` (reversible `down`). Regenerated frontend GraphQL types + SDK metadata client. ## Test plan - [x] `tsgo --noEmit` clean on twenty-server + twenty-front; lint + prettier clean on touched files. - [x] `database:migrate:generate` reports no pending schema diff; server boots and serves the new schema. |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
34d9fcaba1 |
chore(auth): drop unused workspacePersonalInviteToken from SSO state (#20557)
## Summary
Pure dead-code removal. The Google and Microsoft SSO strategies have
been packing `workspacePersonalInviteToken` into the OAuth `state` blob
and re-emitting it on `validate()`, but
[`signInUpWithSocialSSO`](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/auth.service.ts)
never destructures or reads it from the user object. The SSO flow
resolves invitations by the IdP-verified email instead:
```ts
const invitation =
currentWorkspace && email
? await this.findInvitationForSignInUp({
currentWorkspace,
email, // ← matched against appToken.context.email
})
: undefined;
```
So the strategy plumbing is write-only and confusing for readers.
Removed from:
-
[`SocialSSOState`](packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/types/social-sso-state.type.ts)
- `GoogleRequest['user']` and `MicrosoftRequest['user']`
- The `state` JSON in both strategies' `authenticate()`
- The user object in both strategies' `validate()`
No frontend change needed — `useAuth.buildRedirectUrl` still sets the
`inviteToken` query param when a personal invite token is present (used
by other paths), and nothing on the SSO server side was reading it.
The token-based invitation lookup is preserved for the password signup
flow via `auth.resolver.signUp` → `findInvitationForSignInUp({
currentWorkspace, workspacePersonalInviteToken })`. Unrelated,
untouched.
## Test plan
- [x] `npx jest engine/core-modules/auth` (twenty-server) — 26 suites /
178 tests pass.
- [x] `tsgo -p tsconfig.json --noEmit` — no new errors on the touched
files (pre-existing `IS_REST_METADATA_API_NEW_FORMAT_DIRECT` errors on
main are unrelated).
- [x] `oxlint` + `prettier --check` on touched files — clean.
- [ ] Manual smoke: Google sign-in still works (workspace selection /
verify flow unaffected since `workspaceInviteHash`, `workspaceId`,
`action`, `locale`, `billingCheckoutSessionState`, `returnToPath` still
flow correctly).
|
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
49b9660420 |
fix(auth): preserve returnToPath across Google/Microsoft SSO redirects (#20537)
## Summary Fixes the consent-modal-not-reopening half of [#20535](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/issues/20535): when a signed-out user opens an OAuth `/authorize?...` URL (e.g. ChatGPT connecting to `api.twenty.com/mcp`) and signs in with **Google or Microsoft**, the original `/authorize` request was lost and the consent screen never reopened. ### Root cause `PageChangeEffect` already saves the deep link as `returnToPath` (Jotai atom) before navigating to `/welcome`. That atom is in-memory: it survives SPA navigation, and the cross-subdomain workspace hop is handled by `useBuildSearchParamsFromUrlSyncedStates` round-tripping the value through the URL. But the social-SSO path leaves `app.twenty.com` entirely — `app.twenty.com/welcome` → `api.twenty.com/auth/google` → Google → `api.twenty.com/auth/google/redirect` → frontend — so the atom is wiped. None of the existing code paths plumbed `returnToPath` through that hop: - `useAuth.buildRedirectUrl` packed `workspaceInviteHash`/`action`/etc. but not `returnToPath`. - `SocialSSOState` / the Google + Microsoft strategies didn't carry it through the OAuth `state` blob. - `signInUpWithSocialSSO` + `computeRedirectURI` didn't re-emit it on the redirect back to the frontend. The email path worked because all transitions stay on the default frontend domain, so the atom survives until `SignInUpGlobalScopeForm` bakes it into the workspace URL. ### What changed Plumb `returnToPath` through the SSO state the same way `workspaceInviteHash` and `action` already flow: - **Frontend** (`useAuth.buildRedirectUrl`): read `returnToPath` from the Jotai store and append it to `/auth/google` / `/auth/microsoft` when set and structurally valid. - **Server types** (`SocialSSOState`, `GoogleRequest['user']`, `MicrosoftRequest['user']`): add optional `returnToPath`. - **Strategies** (`google.auth.strategy.ts`, `microsoft.auth.strategy.ts`): include `returnToPath: req.query.returnToPath` in the JSON `state` and read it back in `validate`. - **auth.service.ts** (`signInUpWithSocialSSO`, `computeRedirectURI`): forward `returnToPath` on both branches — the multi-workspace redirect to `AppPath.SignInUp?tokenPair=...` and the single-workspace redirect to `<workspace>/verify?loginToken=...`. Validated via a new `isValidReturnToPath` helper so a tampered query value can't become an open-redirect vector. After the round-trip, `useInitializeQueryParamState` rehydrates the atom from the URL and `usePageChangeEffectNavigateLocation` resolves it as the post-auth destination — same mechanism the email path already relied on. Out of scope: the OAuth `resource` parameter handling tracked in [#20296](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/issues/20296) is independent and not addressed here. ## Test plan - [x] `npx jest src/engine/core-modules/auth` (twenty-server) — 27 suites / 183 tests pass, including new `is-valid-return-to-path.util.spec.ts`. - [x] `npx jest src/modules/auth` (twenty-front) — 13 suites / 52 tests pass, including two new cases in `useAuth.test.tsx` covering the happy path and the protocol-relative open-redirect guard. - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` / `twenty-front` — clean. - [x] `npx oxlint` + `prettier --check` on touched files — clean. - [ ] Manual: signed-out user opens `https://app.twenty.com/authorize?client_id=...` → Continue with Google → completes Google → selects workspace → consent screen renders. - [ ] Manual: same flow, single workspace — lands on consent screen directly after Verify. - [ ] Manual: email path still works (regression). - [ ] Manual: tamper `returnToPath=//evil.com` on the `/auth/google` URL → server validation rejects, user lands at default home, not at `evil.com`. E2E note: existing `return-to-path.spec.ts` already covers deep links with query params through the email path. A mock OAuth provider would be needed to cover the SSO path end-to-end; unit coverage stands in for now. |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
e0b4c9918b |
feat(twenty-server): introduce ENCRYPTION_KEY env var with versioned envelope (#20528)
## Summary
- Adds `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (primary) and `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
(decrypt-only fallback for rotation) env vars to twenty-server, with
backward-compatible fallback to `APP_SECRET` when `ENCRYPTION_KEY` is
unset.
- Introduces a versioned ciphertext envelope `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`
using AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 derived per-context keys. The 8-hex
`keyId` fingerprint lets every row identify which physical key encrypted
it, so rotation routes directly to primary or fallback without trial
decryption; GCM's auth tag gives true integrity (legacy CTR has none).
- Migrates `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` to the new envelope
and plumbs `workspaceId` through every caller, so per-workspace HKDF
context binds each row to its tenant.
The remaining encryption sites (`jwt-key-manager`, `config-storage`,
`postgres-credentials`, `application-variable`, TOTP) stay on the legacy
unprefixed CTR path and will be migrated in follow-up PRs. The
operator-facing rotation runbook is out of scope here.
### Format details
`enc:v{N}:{keyId}:{base64}` — `N=2` is the only version produced by new
writes (`v1` exists for backward-compatible decryption of existing
connected-account rows). `keyId =
sha256(rawKey).slice(0,4).toString('hex')`. The CHECK constraint on
`core.connectedAccount.{accessToken,refreshToken}` is relaxed from `LIKE
'enc:v1:%'` to `LIKE 'enc:v_:%'` so both versions pass.
### Key resolution
| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_SECRET` | Encrypt
with | Decrypt try order |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| set | set | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary →
fallback |
| set | unset | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary |
| unset | set | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` →
fallback |
| unset | unset | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` |
| unset | unset | unset | startup error | n/a |
## Test plan
- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx jest
'secret-encryption|connected-account-token-encryption|connected-account-refresh-tokens|encrypt-connected-account-tokens|connection-provider-oauth-flow'`
— 87 tests pass
- [x] New `secret-encryption.service.versioned.spec.ts` covers: key
resolution table (no-key error, APP_SECRET fallback, ENCRYPTION_KEY
precedence), v2 round-trip with/without workspaceId, GCM tamper
rejection, workspaceId-mismatch rejection, keyId-based primary→fallback
routing, missing-key error names the fingerprint, v1 legacy decryption,
no-prefix legacy decryption, malformed envelope rejection.
- [x] Updated `connected-account-token-encryption.service.spec.ts`
covers workspaceId binding and HKDF context isolation.
- [x] Updated slow instance command spec verifies workspaceId is
threaded through encryption and the relaxed `enc:v_:%` LIKE pattern
matches both v1 and v2.
- [ ] Manual E2E: connect a Gmail account on a freshly deployed instance
with `APP_SECRET` only → confirm `core.connectedAccount.accessToken` is
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: rotate — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` and
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<old APP_SECRET>`, restart, confirm
pre-rotation rows still decrypt and new rows carry the new `keyId`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: missing key — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` without the
fallback, confirm decrypt error names the old `keyId` so the operator
can identify the missing key.
|
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
643ec121a7 |
[twenty-server] no-misused-promise lint (#20529)
# Introduction
Adding `no-miused-promise` lint rule to the twenty-server
In order to flag such pattern
```ts
// ❌ Flagged — forEach doesn't await the callback
items.forEach(async (item) => {
await process(item);
});
```
## What happened
- Refactored the code-interpreter driver to have a async onResult (
which is also expected by e2b )
- Workspace manager still dirty solution including force cast
- Basic fixes
|
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
ac653182b2 |
feat(server): migrate all remaining JWT token types to ES256 (#20513)
## Summary Extends the asymmetric signing work from #20467 to cover **every remaining `JwtTokenTypeEnum` value**: `LOGIN`, `WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, `FILE`, `API_KEY`, `APPLICATION_ACCESS`, `APPLICATION_REFRESH`, `APP_OAUTH_STATE`, plus the ACCESS-shaped session token issued by the code interpreter tool. After this PR, every JWT the server signs is ES256 with a `kid` pointing at the current `core."signingKey"` row, while legacy HS256 tokens (no `kid` header) remain verifiable indefinitely through the existing fallback in `JwtWrapperService.resolveVerificationKey`. No new entity / migration / config: this is a pure routing change on top of the infrastructure that already shipped. ## Why `#20467` only flipped `ACCESS` and `REFRESH` to ES256. Every other JWT type was still HS256-signed against the global `APP_SECRET`, which kept the original blast radius (a leaked `APP_SECRET` invalidates *every* JWT type forever). Migrating the rest unifies the sign path on rotatable per-server private keys without forcing any token reissue. ## Mechanical changes ### Sign side (8 services) - `LoginTokenService.generateLoginToken` - `TransientTokenService.generateTransientToken` - `WorkspaceAgnosticTokenService.generateWorkspaceAgnosticToken` - `ApplicationTokenService.signApplicationToken` (`APPLICATION_ACCESS` + `APPLICATION_REFRESH`) - `ApiKeyService.generateApiKeyToken` - `FileUrlService.signFileByIdUrl` / `signWorkspaceLogoUrl` - `ConnectionProviderOAuthFlowService.signState` (`APP_OAUTH_STATE`) - `CodeInterpreterTool.generateSessionToken` Each call site swaps `jwtWrapperService.sign(payload, { secret: generateAppSecret(...), ... })` for `await jwtWrapperService.signAsync(payload, { expiresIn, [jwtid] })`. The `generateAppSecret` calls on the sign side are dropped (verifier-side `generateAppSecret` stays in `resolveVerificationKey` for the HS256 fallback). ### Verifier side - `WorkspaceAgnosticTokenService.validateToken` now goes through `verifyJwtToken` instead of the bespoke `verify({ secret })` path, so new ES256 tokens are accepted while the legacy HS256 fallback inside `resolveVerificationKey` still serves the old shape. - `JwtWrapperService.sign()` is kept (legacy compat / tests) but is now strictly deprecated — there are no remaining production callers. ### Async ripple (`signFileByIdUrl` was synchronous) - `FileUrlService.signFileByIdUrl` and `signWorkspaceLogoUrl` are now `async`; the `signUrl` callback used by `getRecordImageIdentifier` is widened to accept `Promise<string | null>`. - Every direct/indirect caller is updated: admin panel (user lookup + statistics + top workspaces), search service (`computeSearchObjectResults`, `getImageIdentifierValue`), workspace resolver (`logo` resolver, public workspace by domain/id), `WorkspaceMemberTranspiler` (now `async toWorkspaceMemberDto[s]` / `toDeletedWorkspaceMemberDto[s]` / `generateSignedAvatarUrl`), `UserService.loadSignedAvatarUrlsByUserId`, `UserWorkspaceService.castWorkspaceToAvailableWorkspace`, workspace-invitation, approved-access-domain, agent-chat-streaming, agent-message-part resolver, navigation-menu-item record identifier, file-ai-chat / file-core-picture / file-email-attachment / file-workflow / files-field services, rich-text & files-field query result getters, and the code-interpreter tool. ## Backward compatibility - **Legacy HS256 tokens (no `kid`)** keep verifying via `resolveVerificationKey` → `extractAppSecretBody` → `generateAppSecret` for both `workspaceId`-bearing and `userId`-bearing payloads. - The `API_KEY` HS256-via-ACCESS-secret fallback (#16504) still kicks in inside `verifyJwtToken` for pre-2025-12-12 API keys. - No payload shape changes, no DB writes, no env var changes — old tokens issued by `main` continue to authenticate. ## Tests ### Unit (all green locally — 63/63) Updated specs for every migrated service to mock `signAsync` instead of `sign` and assert the new option shape: - `login-token.service.spec.ts`, `transient-token.service.spec.ts`, `workspace-agnostic-token.service.spec.ts`, `application-token.service.spec.ts`, `api-key.service.spec.ts`, `connection-provider-oauth-flow.service.spec.ts`. ### Integration (`jwt-key-rotation.integration-spec.ts`) - Existing ACCESS coverage (current key, legacy HS256 fallback, rotated-out key, revoked key, unknown kid) is preserved. - New `it.each` assertion: `REFRESH`, `WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, and `LOGIN` tokens emitted by the real signUp → signUpInNewWorkspace → getAuthTokensFromLoginToken pipeline are ES256 with a `kid` matching the current signing key — proves end-to-end that the migration didn't regress those flows. ## Open question (separate decision) This PR keeps the legacy HS256 verification fallback **forever**. We may eventually want to sunset it for `API_KEY` once telemetry shows pre-migration tokens are gone, but that's a separate product/security decision and not part of this change. ## Test plan - [ ] CI green - [ ] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` passes - [ ] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` passes - [ ] `jwt-key-rotation` integration suite passes (new + existing assertions) - [ ] Manually verify: signing in issues an ES256 ACCESS / REFRESH token, generating an API key issues an ES256 token with `kid`, signed file URL JWT is ES256 with `kid` - [ ] Pre-existing HS256 tokens still authenticate (covered by integration test, but worth a manual check with a token from `main`) |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
a159a68e2c |
[twenty-server] no floating promises lint rule (#20499)
## Introduction
That's an audit + RFC
## Fire-and-forget (`void`) -- Intentional, correct
These are telemetry, metrics, and audit logging in hot paths or
non-critical contexts. `void` is the right choice.
| File | What was voided |
|---|---|
| `sign-in-up.service.ts` | `metricsService.incrementCounter` (sign-up
metric) + `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` (workspace created) |
| `use-graphql-error-handler.hook.ts` | 5x
`metricsService.incrementCounter` (GraphQL operation metrics) |
| `bullmq.driver.ts` | 2x `metricsService.incrementCounter` (job
completed/failed metrics) |
| `call-webhook.job.ts` | 2x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` + 1x
`metricsService.incrementCounter` |
| `custom-domain-manager.service.ts` | `analytics.insertWorkspaceEvent`
(domain activation event) |
| `logic-function-executor.service.ts` |
`auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` (function execution) |
| `workflow-runner.workspace-service.ts` |
`metricsService.incrementCounter` (throttle metric) |
| `cleaner.workspace-service.ts` | `metricsService.incrementCounter`
(deleted workspace metric) |
| `stream-agent-chat.job.ts` | Detached IIFE for streaming chunks
(intentional concurrent pipeline) |
| `workspace-auth-context.middleware.ts` |
`withWorkspaceAuthContext(...)` (AsyncLocalStorage, returns void anyway)
|
## Top-level script entry points (`void bootstrap()`)
These are module-level calls where the promise has no consumer. `void`
makes the lint rule happy and documents the intent.
| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `main.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `command.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `queue-worker.ts` | `void bootstrap()` |
| `truncate-db.ts` | `void dropSchemasSequentially()` |
| `codegen/index.ts` | `void generateTests(forceArg)` |
## Now properly awaited -- Real bug fixes
These were floating promises that could silently fail, lose data, or
cause race conditions.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `billing-sync-plans-data.command.ts` | `meters.map(async ...)` wrapped
in `Promise.all` -- was returning before upserts finished |
| `cache-storage.service.ts` | `setAdd` and `setPop` had `.then()`
chains that weren't returned/awaited |
| `create-audit-log-from-internal-event.ts` | 4x
`auditService.createObjectEvent` now awaited inside a job |
| `cleaner.workspace-service.ts` | 2x `emailService.send(...)` now
awaited -- emails could silently fail |
| `agent-async-executor.service.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` +
`billNativeWebSearchUsage` in `finally` block now awaited |
| `repair-tool-call.util.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` now awaited |
| `agent-title-generation.service.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` now
awaited |
| `chat-execution.service.ts` | `billNativeWebSearchUsage` now awaited |
| `ai-generate-text.controller.ts` | `calculateAndBillUsage` in
`finally` block now awaited |
| `agent-turn.resolver.ts` | `messageQueueService.add(...)` now awaited
|
| `command.ts` | `app.close()` now awaited (was exiting before graceful
shutdown) |
| `i18n.service.ts` | `loadTranslations()` in `onModuleInit` now awaited
|
| `workspace-query-hook.explorer.ts` | `explore()` in `onModuleInit` now
awaited |
| `message-queue.explorer.ts` | `handleProcessorGroupCollection` in
`onModuleInit` now awaited |
| `ai-billing.service.spec.ts` | Test now properly `await`s the async
call |
| `messaging-messages-import.service.spec.ts` | `expect(...)` now
properly `await`ed for async assertion |
| `archive.finalize()` (3 files) | Voided -- promise resolution already
handled by `pipeline()` / `on('end')` |
## Impersonation & security audit trail -- Upgraded from `void` to
`await`
These were previously fire-and-forget but are
security/compliance-critical events that must be reliably persisted.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `impersonation.service.ts` | 4x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent`
now awaited (impersonation attempt, token generation
attempt/success/failure) |
| `auth.resolver.ts` | 5x `auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent` now
awaited (impersonation token exchange attempt/success/failure at server
and workspace levels) |
| `auth.service.ts` | 2x `analytics.insertWorkspaceEvent` now awaited
(impersonation attempted/issued) |
## Billing audit -- Upgraded from `void` to `await`
Payment events should be reliably persisted for financial/compliance
reporting.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `billing-webhook-invoice.service.ts` |
`auditService.insertWorkspaceEvent(PAYMENT_RECEIVED_EVENT)` now awaited
inside Stripe webhook handler |
## Fire-and-forget with proper error handling -- Upgraded from bare
`void`
These remain non-blocking but now catch and log errors instead of
risking unhandled rejections.
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `logic-function-executor.service.ts` |
`applicationLogsService.writeLogs` now uses `.catch()` instead of bare
`void` -- user-facing logs should surface errors |
## Systemic infrastructure fixes
| File | What was fixed |
|---|---|
| `metrics.service.ts` | `incrementCounter`: Redis cache write
(`metricsCacheService.updateCounter`) now uses `.catch()` internally
instead of raw `await` -- prevents unhandled rejections across all `void
metricsService.incrementCounter(...)` call sites when Redis is unhealthy
|
| `audit.service.ts` | `preventIfDisabled`: made properly `async` with
`await` and consistent `Promise<{ success: boolean }>` return type.
Removed broken `catch` that returned an `AuditException` as a value
(wrong constructor args, unreachable dead code). Removed unused
`AuditException` import |
## Fixed in this session (beyond original PR)
| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `telemetry.listener.ts` | Removed misleading `Promise.all` + `void`
combo; replaced with simple `for...of` + `void` |
| `message-queue.explorer.ts` | Changed from `void` to `await` so
startup crashes on registration failure |
|
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
9e515afb13 |
feat(server): asymmetric JWT signing with kid + key rotation table (#20467)
## Context Today every JWT issued by Twenty (access, refresh, login, file, etc.) is HMAC-signed with a per-token-type secret derived from the global `APP_SECRET`. Rotating that secret invalidates **every** active token at once and there is no way to scope a leak to a subset of tokens. This PR is the first slice of a broader effort to **decouple stateful encryption (`APP_SECRET`-derived secrets) from stateless encryption (JWTs)**. It introduces an asymmetric (private/public key) signing path for `ACCESS` and `REFRESH` tokens and a signing-key registry to enable **safe rotation**: leaked keys can be revoked by flipping `revokedAt`/`isCurrent` on the matching row without invalidating tokens issued by other keys. > Out of scope (intentionally): swapping stateful encryption for `APP_SECRET`, asymmetric signing for token types other than `ACCESS`/`REFRESH`, an admin-panel rotation UI, and an enterprise re-encryption command. Those will land in follow-up PRs. ## What changes - **New `core.signingKey` table** (instance command `2.5.0` / `1778550000000`) storing both the public key (PEM, in clear) and the private key (PEM, encrypted with `APP_SECRET` via `SecretEncryptionService`). One row is marked `isCurrent = true` (enforced by a partial unique index). The row's UUID `id` is used directly as the JWT `kid`. - When a key is rotated out, its `privateKey` is nulled (we never keep historical private keys) but the `publicKey` row stays so previously issued tokens can still be verified. - **`JwtKeyManagerService`** lazily loads-or-generates the current signing key on first use: - If a row with `isCurrent = true` exists → decrypts and uses it. - Otherwise → generates a fresh EC P-256 keypair, encrypts the private key, inserts the row (UUID id = kid). Handles concurrent insert races via the unique constraint. - **`JwtWrapperService.signAsync()`** signs `ACCESS`/`REFRESH` payloads with `ES256` and a `kid` header. Falls back to `HS256` if no signing key is available (boot-time DB error, transient failure). - **Dual-path verification** in both `JwtWrapperService.verifyJwtToken` and the Passport `JwtAuthStrategy.secretOrKeyProvider`: - JWT with a `kid` header → resolve the public key PEM by id and verify with `ES256`, - otherwise → fall back to the existing `APP_SECRET`-derived `HS256` path (unchanged). - **`AccessTokenService` / `RefreshTokenService`** now sign through `signAsync` (single public surface; the routing detail stays internal to the wrapper). - **Public key cache**: a new `SigningKeyEntityCacheProviderService` plugs into `CoreEntityCacheService` (`signingKeyPublicKey` namespace) and serves PEMs by id, with the standard local-memo + Redis layering. - **PEM strings end-to-end**: `jsonwebtoken` accepts PEM strings directly for both sign and verify, so the manager never converts to a Node `KeyObject` and the cache hands the PEM straight to `jwt.verify`. ## Why ES256 (and not EdDSA / RS256) - `@nestjs/jwt` is backed by `jsonwebtoken`, which does **not** support EdDSA today. - ES256 keys are tiny (~120 bytes vs 1.6 kB for RS256), signatures are short (~64 bytes), and signing/verification is fast — important since JWT verification runs on every authenticated request. - ES256 is widely supported and standardized (RFC 7518), with mature ecosystem support. ## Why store the private key in DB (not env) - No new secret to provision: existing instances already have `APP_SECRET`, which we reuse to encrypt the private key at rest. - Self-healing: a fresh instance auto-generates its first signing key on first boot. Nothing to copy/paste. - Rotation is a SQL operation against `core.signingKey`, not a redeploy + env mutation. ## Backward compatibility - All previously-issued tokens (no `kid`) keep verifying through the legacy HS256 path with their existing `APP_SECRET`-derived secret. No forced re-login. - Token types not in scope (`WORKSPACE_AGNOSTIC`, `API_KEY`, `FILE`, `LOGIN`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, etc.) keep their current HS256 behavior unchanged — they still go through the synchronous `JwtWrapperService.sign(payload, options)` with a caller-supplied secret. - `signWithAppSecret` is kept intentionally as the HS256 fallback path; it will be deprecated in a follow-up PR. - If the DB lookup/generation fails for any reason, the wrapper logs the error and falls back to HS256 — no startup crash, no silent regression. ## Rotation story 1. Bootstrap: first signing call lazily inserts a row in `core.signingKey` with `isCurrent = true`, `privateKey = encrypt(pem_A)`. New tokens carry `kid_A`. 2. Rotate: `UPDATE core."signingKey" SET "isCurrent" = false, "privateKey" = NULL WHERE id = '<kid_A>';` then insert a new row with `isCurrent = true`. New tokens carry `kid_B`. Tokens still in flight with `kid_A` keep verifying because the public-key row for `kid_A` is still there. 3. Revoke: `UPDATE core."signingKey" SET "revokedAt" = now() WHERE id = '<kid_A>';`. All tokens with `kid_A` now fail verification cleanly with `UNAUTHENTICATED` (no 500). 4. Tokens with no `kid` (legacy) are unaffected throughout. ## Test plan - [x] Unit: `JwtWrapperService` dual-path verification (HS256 no-kid vs ES256 with-kid), unknown-kid → `UNAUTHENTICATED`, `signAsync` happy path + `null` when no key, `signAsync` rejection for non-rotatable types. - [x] Unit: `JwtAuthStrategy` `secretOrKeyProvider` dual-path resolution and algorithm validation. - [x] All existing JWT/auth/application unit tests adjusted to the renamed public method. - [x] Integration (`jwt-key-rotation.integration-spec.ts`): - **Happy path**: signed-up user's `ACCESS` token has `alg=ES256` + correct UUID `kid`, the `isCurrent=true` row exists in `core.signingKey`, `getCurrentUser` resolves. - **Legacy fallback**: hand-crafted no-kid HS256 token verifies via the legacy `APP_SECRET`-derived path. - **Previous-key rotation**: token signed by a hardcoded *previous* key whose row is pre-inserted with `privateKey = NULL` (rotated-out) still verifies — proves the leaked-key revocation flow works in both directions. - **Unknown kid**: token signed with an orphan UUID `kid` is cleanly rejected (no 500). - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` - [x] `npx nx test twenty-server` - [x] `npx nx run twenty-server:lint` |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
6c18bacb93 |
Encrypt connected account accessToken and refreshToken (#20441)
# Introduction Encrypt the `connectedAccount` `accessToken` and `refreshToken` using `APP_SECRET` in order to mitigate potential data leak or `core` table compromise ## Decrypt Temporary allow already plain text stored token to be retrieve without decryption until the slow instance has been passed Will uncomment the invariant check in a patch when the instance slow has fully be run ## Standards - Token are encrypted as quickly as possible - A token cannot be written in database non encrypted by mistake using a custom constraint ( `enc:` prefix ) ## What's next We should standardize not managing secret as is in the the services and layer, they should be encrypted on the flight the earliest and should never be logged Will create a dedicated pattern afterwards for `applicationVariables` secrets too --------- Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charlesBochet@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
9813467cee |
Refactor SAML relayState structure (#20430)
# Introduction Restructure the RelayState and avoid asserting the idp identifier from this opaque blob Inferring the id from the secured validated and signed request params |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
459c64f642 |
Prevent non-admin users from impersonating admin users (#20412)
## Summary - Adds a privilege check to workspace-level impersonation: non-admin users can no longer impersonate users who have `canAccessFullAdminPanel` or `canImpersonate` flags - Adds the same check in JWT token validation as defense-in-depth (invalidates existing impersonation sessions targeting admin users) - Adds 3 unit tests covering: non-admin → admin blocked, non-admin → canImpersonate blocked, admin → admin allowed ## Test plan - [x] Unit tests pass (14/14 in `impersonation.service.spec.ts`) - [x] Typecheck passes - [ ] Verify workspace-level impersonation of regular users still works normally - [ ] Verify server-level impersonation by admins is unaffected 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
4da8878697 |
feat: add email forwarding message channel (#19535)
## Summary - Add email forwarding as a new message channel type, allowing users to forward emails from addresses like `support@mycompany.com` into Twenty - Inbound emails arrive via S3 (SES → S3 bucket), are polled by a cron job, parsed, routed to the correct workspace/channel, and persisted as messages - Dedicated settings page at `/settings/accounts/new-email-forwarding` where users provide their source email handle and receive a unique forwarding address - Forwarding channels bypass the IMAP/mailbox sync state machine — they skip cron-driven sync, relaunch, and message-list-fetch lifecycle stages - Forwarding address section shown at the top of the Emails settings page so users can find/copy their addresses after initial setup - Tab names for forwarding channels display the user-provided handle (e.g. `support@mycompany.com`) instead of the internal routing address - Shared utilities extracted from IMAP driver: `extractThreadId`, `extractParticipants`, `extractAddresses` to avoid code duplication - Uses the existing S3 bucket (STORAGE_S3_*) with `inbound-email/` prefix — no separate bucket needed - Feature gated behind `isEmailForwardingEnabled` client config (requires `INBOUND_EMAIL_DOMAIN` + S3 storage) ## New backend modules - `InboundEmailS3ClientProvider` — lazy-initialized S3 client using existing storage config - `InboundEmailStorageService` — S3 operations (get, move to processed/unmatched/failed) - `InboundEmailParserService` — RFC 822 parsing via `postal-mime`, builds `MessageWithParticipants` - `InboundEmailImportService` — orchestrates download → parse → route → persist → archive - `MessagingInboundEmailPollCronJob` — polls S3 `incoming/` prefix, enqueues import jobs - `CreateEmailForwardingChannelInput` DTO — accepts user-provided `handle` ## New frontend components - `SettingsAccountsNewEmailForwardingChannel` — dedicated page with handle input form + forwarding address result - `SettingsAccountsEmailForwardingSection` — forwarding address list on the Emails settings page - `useConnectedAccountHandleMap` — shared hook for account ID → handle lookup - `useCreateEmailForwardingChannel` — mutation hook accepting handle parameter ## Test plan - [x] 17 unit tests for inbound email import service (all outcomes: imported, unmatched, loop_dropped, unconfigured, parse_failed, persist_failed) - [x] 16 tests for `computeSyncStatus` including EMAIL_FORWARDING cases - [x] 11 tests for `extractEnvelopeRecipient` utility - [x] TypeScript typechecks pass for both twenty-server and twenty-front - [x] Lint passes for both packages - [ ] Manual: create forwarding channel, verify forwarding address generated - [ ] Manual: send email to forwarding address, verify it appears in Twenty https://claude.ai/code/session_01KpyF6p4cUEnuaT4h8DP5Pm --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <62795688+neo773@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com> |
||
|
Thomas Trompette
|
eddd2c979a |
Add Workspace Created and Payment Received ClickHouse events (#20277)
## Summary - Adds two new workspace audit events for the AARRR funnel tracked in ClickHouse - **Workspace Created**: emitted in `signUpOnNewWorkspace` after the transaction commits, capturing every new workspace creation - **Payment Received**: emitted in `processInvoicePaid` on every Stripe `invoice.paid` webhook, with `stripeInvoiceId`, `amountPaid`, and `billingReason` properties. First payment per workspace can be derived at query time via `min(timestamp)` grouped by `workspaceId` ## Test plan - [x] Verify `Workspace Created` event appears in ClickHouse after signing up on a new workspace - [x] Verify `Payment Received` event appears in ClickHouse after a Stripe `invoice.paid` webhook fires - [x] Confirm no event is emitted if the billing customer cannot be resolved from `stripeCustomerId` - [x] Run existing `SignInUpService` unit tests pass with the new `AuditService` mock Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
e3be1f4971 |
Make ConnectionProvider a true SyncableEntity (#20232)
## Summary PR #20181 left `ConnectionProvider` in the `SyncableEntity` enum but bypassing the standard sync pipeline — manifest sync called the bespoke `ApplicationOAuthProviderService.upsertManyFromManifest()` instead of going through the workspace-migration orchestrator like every other SyncableEntity. Anything that assumed *"all SyncableEntity values flow through the same pipeline"* (dev UI sync tracking, verification tooling) was wrong about ConnectionProvider — that's the inconsistency this PR closes. This PR follows the `.cursor/skills/syncable-entity-*` guides religiously, all six steps. ## What changes **Step 1 — Types & Constants** (`@syncable-entity-types-and-constants`) - Add `connectionProvider` to `ALL_METADATA_NAME` (twenty-shared) - Make `ApplicationOAuthProviderEntity` extend `SyncableEntity` (drops the ad-hoc columns since the base class provides them, adds `deletedAt`, drops the old `(applicationId, universalIdentifier)` unique in favour of SyncableEntity's `(workspaceId, universalIdentifier)`) - `FlatConnectionProvider`, `FlatConnectionProviderMaps`, `FLAT_CONNECTION_PROVIDER_EDITABLE_PROPERTIES`, `UniversalFlatConnectionProvider`, six action types - Register in **all** the central registries: `AllFlatEntityTypesByMetadataName`, `ALL_METADATA_ENTITY_BY_METADATA_NAME`, `ALL_ENTITY_PROPERTIES_CONFIGURATION`, `ALL_MANY_TO_ONE_*`, `ALL_ONE_TO_MANY_*`, `ALL_METADATA_REQUIRED_METADATA_FOR_VALIDATION`, `ALL_METADATA_SERIALIZED_RELATION`, `ALL_JSONB_PROPERTIES_WITH_SERIALIZED_RELATION`, `WORKSPACE_CACHE_KEYS_V2` (`flatConnectionProviderMaps`), `METADATA_EVENTS_TO_EMIT` - `case 'connectionProvider':` in seven discriminated-union switches (`derive-metadata-events-*`, `optimistically-apply-*`, `enrich-create-*`) **Step 2 — Cache & Transform** (`@syncable-entity-cache-and-transform`) - `WorkspaceFlatConnectionProviderMapCacheService` (extends `WorkspaceCacheProvider`, decorated with `@WorkspaceCache`, soft-delete-aware) - `fromConnectionProviderEntityToFlatConnectionProvider` util - `fromConnectionProviderManifestToUniversalFlatConnectionProvider` util - `FlatConnectionProviderModule` wires the cache service - Wired the manifest converter into `compute-application-manifest-all-universal-flat-entity-maps` **Step 3 — Builder & Validation** (`@syncable-entity-builder-and-validation`) - `FlatConnectionProviderValidatorService` — never throws, returns error arrays; uses indexed `byUniversalIdentifier` for the (name, applicationUniversalIdentifier) uniqueness check (no `Object.values().find()` on the hot path) - `WorkspaceMigrationConnectionProviderActionsBuilderService` - Registered in both validators-module + builder-module - **Wired into the orchestrator** (the most-commonly-forgotten step per the rule) — constructor inject, destructure `flatConnectionProviderMaps`, `validateAndBuild`, append actions to the final migration **Step 4 — Runner & Actions** (`@syncable-entity-runner-and-actions`) - Three handlers (create / update / delete) using the canonical `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerActionHandler` mixin - Registered in `WorkspaceSchemaMigrationRunnerActionHandlersModule` **Step 5 — Integration** (`@syncable-entity-integration`) - Delete the `upsertManyFromManifest` bypass on `ApplicationOAuthProviderService` - Remove the bypass call from `ApplicationSyncService` — manifest sync now flows through the standard pipeline - Drop `ApplicationOAuthProviderModule` from `ApplicationManifestModule` (no longer needed) - Import `FlatConnectionProviderModule` from `ApplicationOAuthProviderModule` to keep the cache discoverable - 3 new exception codes: `INVALID_CONNECTION_PROVIDER_INPUT`, `CONNECTION_PROVIDER_NOT_FOUND`, `CONNECTION_PROVIDER_NAME_ALREADY_EXISTS` **Migration** - Generated via `database:migrate:generate` (instance command `1777896012579`): drops the old `(applicationId, universalIdentifier)` unique constraint, adds `deletedAt` column, adds the `(workspaceId, universalIdentifier)` unique index that `SyncableEntity` requires. - Verified clean — a second `migrate:generate` pass produces zero drift. **Step 6 — Tests** (`@syncable-entity-testing`) - 3 new specs for the manifest converter (defaults, optional fields, all-fields) - All 32 existing OAuth-provider tests still pass - ConnectionProvider has no end-user GraphQL CRUD (it's manifest-driven only), so the GraphQL integration suite that other SyncableEntities ship doesn't apply here **Codegen** - Regenerated GraphQL artifacts (twenty-front + twenty-client-sdk) against the live schema ## Why this matters Before: - `ConnectionProvider` claimed to be a `SyncableEntity` (in the enum) - But the entity didn't extend `SyncableEntity` - And the manifest sync bypassed the standard pipeline - → Verification tooling, dev UI sync tracking, anything iterating over `ALL_METADATA_NAME` got inconsistent behaviour After: - `ConnectionProvider` is a `SyncableEntity` end-to-end - Single sync path through the workspace-migration orchestrator (same as `agent`, `skill`, `frontComponent`, `webhook`, …) - One mental model ## Out of scope (deliberate) - **Renaming the table** from `applicationOAuthProvider` to `connectionProvider` — the `metadataName` is `connectionProvider` (what consumers see in code); the table name is internal. A rename would balloon this PR with mechanical churn unrelated to the sync-pipeline wiring. Worth doing as a follow-up. - **`applicationVariable` SyncableEntity conversion** — the other manifest-sync holdout. Tracked in #20215. ## Test plan - [ ] Migration up/down clean against fresh DB - [ ] Install an app whose manifest declares connection providers — providers appear in the workspace - [ ] Re-deploy the app with one provider added, one removed, one renamed → all reconciled correctly via the sync pipeline - [ ] Verify the dev-UI sync-tracking page shows ConnectionProvider entries the same way it shows agents/skills/etc - [ ] OAuth flow still works (existing connections, new connections, reconnect, list/get from SDK) — should be unchanged since the runtime code path didn't move 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Kartik Pant
|
e6399b180e |
Fix/workspace member avatars 20193 (#20200)
Fixes #20193 **Bug Description:** Previously, workspace member avatars failed to render correctly in table views and relation chips (such as the Account Owner field). While the avatar picker dropdown correctly fetched fresh GraphQL data, table views and chips relied on the cached defaultAvatarUrl or avatarUrl fields, which were frequently resolving to empty strings or failing to parse external OAuth URLs correctly. **Root Cause:** - Empty String Defaults: Deleting an avatar or failing to retrieve one defaulted the database state to an empty string ("") instead of null, which caused frontend image components to break rather than render their fallback states. - Missing Permanent URLs: The WorkspaceMemberTranspiler was strictly expecting internal signed URLs. If an avatar was an external OAuth URL, it incorrectly returned an empty string, breaking SSO profile pictures. - Missing Fallbacks: New users lacked a proper Gravatar fallback assignment upon workspace creation. **Changes Made:** - user-workspace.service.ts: Updated the avatar computation logic during user creation to implement a reliable Gravatar fallback and correctly set missing avatars to null instead of empty strings. Updated the storage to use permanent file URLs. - file-url.service.ts: Implemented a getRawFileUrl method to support rendering permanent, non-expiring file URLs for avatars. - workspace-member-transpiler.service.ts: Refactored the URL transpilation logic to gracefully pass through external OAuth URLs (e.g., Google/Microsoft profile pictures) instead of stripping them. - WorkspaceMemberPictureUploader.tsx: Fixed the frontend removal logic so that deleting a profile picture sets the avatarUrl to null (consistent with the backend) rather than an empty string. **Testing:** - Verified that avatars correctly display in relation chips and table views. - Verified that external OAuth avatars load properly. - Verified that deleting an avatar correctly resets the UI to the fallback initials component. Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
3c7c62c79f |
fix(server): deduplicate @opentelemetry/api to fix NoopMeterProvider (#20231)
## Summary **All OTel metrics in twenty-server have been silently dropped since April 30.** ### Root cause PR #20149 (`bump @sentry/profiling-node 10.27→10.51`) pulled in `@sentry/node@10.51.0`, which declares `@opentelemetry/api: ^1.9.1` as a **dependency** (not peer). Yarn installed it as a **nested** copy at `1.9.1`, while the hoisted copy stayed at `1.9.0`. At startup in `instrument.ts`: 1. `Sentry.init()` uses the **nested `1.9.1`** to register `trace`, `propagation`, `context` on the OTel global → global version becomes **`1.9.1`** 2. `setGlobalMeterProvider()` uses the **hoisted `1.9.0`** → `registerGlobal` sees version mismatch (`1.9.1` ≠ `1.9.0`) → **silently returns `false`** 3. Global stays `NoopMeterProvider` → every counter, gauge, and histogram in the server is a no-op ### What this PR does 1. **Reverts three troubleshooting PRs** that are no longer needed now that the root cause is identified: - #20230 — heartbeat gauge - #20228 — OTLP export lifecycle logs - #20221 — Sentry revert to 10.27 (which never actually downgraded in `yarn.lock` since `^10.27.0` resolved to `10.51.0`) 2. **Fixes the root cause**: - Root Yarn resolution pinning `@opentelemetry/api` to `1.9.1` → single copy in the entire tree, Sentry and Twenty share the same instance - Named import in `instrument.ts` (`import { metrics as otelMetrics }` instead of default import) as defense-in-depth against CJS interop issues ### Verified on dev cluster Exec'd into the running pod and confirmed: - `@sentry/node` nests `@opentelemetry/api@1.9.1`, hoisted is `1.9.0` - `Sentry.init()` → global version `1.9.1` → `setGlobalMeterProvider` with VERSION `1.9.0` → returns `false` → `NoopMeterProvider` - Same-version registration returns `true` → `MeterProvider` ✓ ## Test plan - [ ] CI passes (lint, typecheck, build) - [ ] Deploy to dev cluster and verify metrics flow to collector - [ ] Confirm `node_modules/@opentelemetry/api/package.json` shows `1.9.1` with no nested copy under `@sentry/` --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
9e94045fa5 |
feat(apps): generic OAuth provider support for app SDK (#20181)
## Summary
App developers can now declare third-party OAuth integrations (GitHub,
Linear, Slack, etc.) in their manifest and the platform handles the full
authorize → callback → token-exchange → refresh → injection lifecycle.
The dev writes ~10 lines of config and reads tokens via
`useOAuth('linear')` inside any logic function.
```ts
// app/src/oauth-providers/linear.ts
export default defineOAuthProvider({
universalIdentifier: '...',
name: 'linear',
displayName: 'Linear',
authorizationEndpoint: 'https://linear.app/oauth/authorize',
tokenEndpoint: 'https://api.linear.app/oauth/token',
scopes: ['read', 'write'],
connectionMode: 'per-user',
clientIdVariable: 'LINEAR_CLIENT_ID',
clientSecretVariable: 'LINEAR_CLIENT_SECRET',
tokenRequestContentType: 'form-urlencoded',
});
// app/src/logic-functions/handlers/...
const { accessToken } = useOAuth('linear'); // throws OAuthNotConnectedError if missing
```
## Architecture
- **Storage**: extends the existing `connectedAccount` table — new
nullable `applicationOAuthProviderId` FK + new `app` value on the
`ConnectedAccountProvider` enum. Existing Google/Microsoft flows are
untouched.
- **OAuth flow**: a single `/apps/oauth/authorize` +
`/apps/oauth/callback` controller pair handles every app provider. State
travels in a JWT signed via the existing `JwtWrapperService` (new
`APP_OAUTH_STATE` token type).
- **Token exchange**: goes through
`SecureHttpClientService.createSsrfSafeFetch()` (so an installed app
can't point `tokenEndpoint` at internal hosts).
- **Refresh**: piggybacks on the existing
`ConnectedAccountRefreshTokensService` dispatch — Google/Microsoft
drivers untouched, new app driver lives engine-side under
`application-oauth-provider/refresh/`.
- **Injection**: the executor injects refreshed tokens as env vars
(`OAUTH_<NAME>_ACCESS_TOKEN`, `_HANDLE`, `_SCOPES`, `_CONNECTED`); the
SDK helpers `useOAuth` / `useOptionalOAuth` read them.
- **Frontend**: auto-rendered "OAuth Connections" section under each
app's settings tab (no custom front component needed). App-managed
connections are filtered out of `/settings/accounts` so the
email/calendar page stays focused.
- **Disconnect**: best-effort revoke against the manifest's
`revokeEndpoint` before deleting the row.
## Reference app
`packages/twenty-apps/internal/twenty-linear/` exercises the full
pipeline:
- `defineOAuthProvider` for Linear
- `POST /linear/create-issue` and `GET /linear/teams` HTTP-route logic
functions
- Vitest tests for the handlers
## Tests
- 14 server-side Jest tests: token-exchange util (form-urlencoded vs
JSON, PKCE, error paths), flow service (authorize URL shape, state
binding, ConnectedAccount upsert on first/reconnect, per-workspace mode,
invalid state)
- 8 app-level Vitest tests: handler error paths, GraphQL request shape,
Linear error propagation
- All 4 packages clean: `npx nx lint:diff-with-main` and `npx tsc
--noEmit`
## Test plan
- [ ] Apply migration on a dev DB: `npx nx run
twenty-server:database:migrate:prod`
- [ ] Regenerate frontend types: `npx nx run
twenty-front:graphql:generate --configuration=metadata`
- [ ] Create a Linear OAuth app at
https://linear.app/settings/api/applications/new with redirect URI
`<SERVER_URL>/apps/oauth/callback`
- [ ] Deploy + install `twenty-linear` on a workspace, paste the Linear
client id/secret into the app's variables
- [ ] Click "Connect Linear" in the app's settings tab → complete OAuth
→ verify `connectedAccount` row created with `provider = 'app'`
- [ ] Trigger `POST /linear/create-issue` with a valid teamId → verify
issue lands in Linear
- [ ] Disconnect → verify the row is deleted and (if Linear's revoke
endpoint is configured in the manifest) the revoke call fires
- [ ] Verify `/settings/accounts` does NOT show the Linear connection —
it appears only under the Linear app's settings tab
## Out of scope (deliberately)
- **Cron + per-user providers**: a cron-triggered function with a
per-user OAuth provider currently returns `CONNECTED=false` (no user
context). The follow-up design is `useOAuthForUser(name,
userWorkspaceId)` paired with a `POST /apps/oauth/connection-token`
endpoint, deferred to keep this PR focused.
- **Token encryption at rest**: tokens stored as plain `varchar`
matching the existing Google/Microsoft pattern. Worth a separate
cross-cutting PR.
- **Manifest endpoint pinning**: a malicious app upgrade could change
`tokenEndpoint` silently. Same trust model as logic-function source code
(which already runs arbitrary server-side); worth tightening across the
whole upgrade pipeline rather than just OAuth.
- **CLI helpers** (`twenty oauth show-callback-url`, `twenty oauth
connect`): manual setup for v1.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
Charles Bochet
|
ff22988caf |
revert: Sentry #20064 + @sentry 10.27 (prod bisect) (#20221)
## Summary Reverts **#20064** (`feat(sentry): propagate workspace context to all spans`) and downgrades **@sentry** packages from **10.51** back to **10.27** (reversing **#20149**), to validate in production whether recent Sentry/instrumentation changes correlate with OTLP/metrics issues. ## Changes 1. **Revert #20064** — removes `beforeSendSpan` from `instrument.ts`, restores `WorkspaceAuthContextMiddleware` / `BullMQDriver` behavior, and deletes the three `apply-workspace-sentry-*` utils added in that PR. 2. **Sentry versions** — `packages/twenty-server` (`@sentry/nestjs`, `@sentry/node`, `@sentry/profiling-node`) and `packages/twenty-front` (`@sentry/react`) set to `^10.27.0`; `yarn.lock` regenerated via `yarn install`. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
875795cc30 |
feat(sentry): propagate workspace context to all spans (#20064)
## Summary After the 2026-04-26 token-usage incident, identifying the responsible workspace from a Sentry trace required a Postgres scavenger hunt — Vercel AI SDK auto-instrumentation captures token counts and model name but no twenty-specific identifiers, and that same gap exists for every other auto-instrumented span (HTTP outbound, Postgres queries, GraphQL resolvers, Redis, etc.). This PR plugs that gap globally, not just for AI: - A small utility (`packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/sentry/utils/sentry-workspace-context.util.ts`) that writes workspace identifiers onto Sentry's active isolation scope as a `twenty` context block plus filterable tags and a `Sentry.setUser` call. - Two hook points covering all server traffic: - **`WorkspaceAuthContextMiddleware`** — already runs after token hydration on the GraphQL, metadata, admin-panel, and REST routes. It now calls the utility once per authenticated request, before delegating to `withWorkspaceAuthContext`. - **`BullMQDriver.work` and `SyncDriver.processJob`** — every queue job now runs inside `Sentry.withIsolationScope` and applies workspace context from `job.data.workspaceId` (skipping silently for system jobs that don't carry one). - A `beforeSendSpan` hook in `instrument.ts` that reads the scope's `twenty` context block back and projects it onto every span as `twenty.workspace.id` and (when available) `twenty.user_workspace.id` — dotted-namespace naming consistent with OTel/Sentry conventions like `user.id` and `http.response.status_code`. Spans without a workspace context (unauthenticated traffic) pass through untouched. ## Why this shape Sentry's docs position `beforeSendSpan` as a per-span hook. The previous iteration set context only at AI-specific call sites, which left non-AI spans (DB queries, outbound HTTP, regular GraphQL queries, workflow steps not touching AI) entirely unenriched. Hooking the two existing global boundaries — auth middleware for HTTP/GraphQL/REST, and the queue driver `work()` callback for background jobs — covers every authenticated span across the app with no per-handler instrumentation. ## What's not in this PR AI-specific identifiers (`twenty.agent.id`, `twenty.thread.id`, `twenty.turn.id`, `twenty.workflow_run.id`) are out of scope here. They're useful additions but require either propagating the IDs through the call stack or a more fine-grained scope (per-step, per-turn) than the request/job boundary, which is best handled in follow-up PRs that target those specific call sites. ## Test plan - [ ] Make any authenticated GraphQL request locally and confirm the resulting span(s) in Sentry carry `twenty.workspace.id` and (for user-authenticated routes) `twenty.user_workspace.id`. - [ ] Make any authenticated REST request and confirm the same. - [ ] Trigger a queue job (chat stream, agent turn evaluation, workflow run, etc.) and confirm spans produced inside the worker carry `twenty.workspace.id`. - [ ] Confirm that DB and outbound HTTP spans produced under the request/job also carry the workspace tag — these previously had no twenty-specific identifiers. - [ ] In the Sentry UI, filter events by the `twenty.workspace.id` tag and confirm matching events appear. ## Notes for review - Sentry init lives in `instrument.ts`, loaded before Nest bootstraps, so `beforeSendSpan` runs outside Nest DI and reads context off the isolation scope rather than holding a service reference. - The middleware change is three lines; the BullMQ wrap is a single `Sentry.withIsolationScope` around the existing job handler body; the SyncDriver wrap mirrors it for the dev/test path. No new modules or DI providers. - The previous iteration's `AiCallContextService` and per-handler `setContext` / `withContext` calls have been removed in favor of these two hooks. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Avasis AI
|
1e27c3b621 |
fix: correct sSOService → ssoService camelCase typo (#19845)
## Summary Fixes the pre-existing camelCase typo mentioned in #19839. The injected `SSOService` property was named `sSOService` instead of the correct camelCase `ssoService` across the auth module. This is a straightforward mechanical rename of the property/variable name — no logic changes. > **Bonus: pre-existing typo to fix** — `private sSOService: SSOService` — The variable name is a camelCase typo (`sSOService` instead of `ssoService`). — #19839 ## Changes Renamed `sSOService` → `ssoService` in 7 files: - `auth/guards/oidc-auth.guard.ts` - `auth/guards/saml-auth.guard.ts` - `auth/guards/oidc-auth.spec.ts` - `auth/auth.resolver.ts` - `auth/controllers/sso-auth.controller.ts` - `auth/strategies/saml.auth.strategy.ts` - `sso/sso.resolver.ts` Note: The type `SSOService` (PascalCase class name) is intentionally left unchanged — it will be addressed in the broader SSO acronym PR from #19839. ## Test plan - [ ] Verify `typecheck twenty-server` passes - [ ] Verify existing auth/SSO tests pass Co-authored-by: Abhay <abhayjnayakpro@gmail.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
53d22a3b70 |
fix(server): require PKCE code_challenge for public OAuth clients (#19840)
## Summary
OAuth 2.1 and the MCP authorization spec mandate PKCE (S256) for public
clients — clients registered with \`token_endpoint_auth_method=none\`
(no client secret). We advertise \`code_challenge_methods_supported:
[\"S256\"]\` in \`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\` but our
\`/authorize\` flow accepted requests from public clients without
\`code_challenge\`.
## Why this was a soft failure today
\`oauth.service.ts:178\` already rejects token exchange when a client
presents neither \`client_secret\` nor \`code_verifier\`:
\`\`\`ts
if (!clientSecret && !storedCodeChallenge) {
return this.errorResponse('invalid_request', 'Either client_secret or
code_verifier (PKCE) is required');
}
\`\`\`
So a public client attempting to bypass PKCE would **eventually** fail —
but only after:
1. Getting a valid authorization code issued at \`/authorize\`
2. Round-tripping the user through consent
3. Trying to exchange the code at \`/token\` and finally getting
rejected
That's a wasted user interaction and a fuzzy spec boundary. This PR
rejects at \`/authorize\` instead, matching the spec's \"MUST require
PKCE for public clients\" expectation.
## Fix
Single check in \`AuthService.generateAuthorizationCode\`:
\`\`\`ts
const isPublicClient = !applicationRegistration.oAuthClientSecretHash;
if (isPublicClient && !codeChallenge) {
throw new AuthException(
\`code_challenge is required for public clients (PKCE S256, per OAuth
2.1)\`,
AuthExceptionCode.FORBIDDEN_EXCEPTION,
);
}
\`\`\`
### Why \`!oAuthClientSecretHash\` is the right \"public\" predicate
- Dynamic registration (\`POST /oauth/register\`) hardcodes
\`oAuthClientSecretHash: null\` and rejects any
\`token_endpoint_auth_method != \"none\"\`
(oauth-registration.controller.ts:120-130).
- Confidential clients registered via the workspace settings UI have a
non-null bcrypt hash.
- The same field is already used as the public/confidential gate in
\`validateClient\` and \`validateClientSecret\`.
## Scope
- ✅ Dynamic-registration clients (Claude, other MCP connectors) — MUST
now supply code_challenge. They already do; no behavior change for
conformant clients.
- ✅ The seeded twenty-cli registration — public client, already uses
PKCE. No change.
- ➖ Confidential clients (workspace-admin-registered OAuth apps with a
client_secret) — unaffected, they authenticate at the token endpoint.
## Related
- #19836 — CORS exposes \`WWW-Authenticate\` / \`MCP-Protocol-Version\`
- #19838 — RFC 9728 PRM split + RFC 9207 iss param + \`scope\` in
WWW-Authenticate challenge
## Test plan
- [x] \`tsc --noEmit\` clean on modified file (pre-existing
\`twenty-shared\` dist errors unrelated)
- [ ] Integration-level smoke test after deploy:
\`\`\`bash
# Register a dynamic client (public)
CLIENT_ID=$(curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\
-d
'{\"client_name\":\"pkce-test\",\"redirect_uris\":[\"http://localhost/cb\"]}'
\\
https://<host>/oauth/register | jq -r .client_id)
# Without code_challenge → should now 4xx at /authorize (cannot easily
test outside the React UI,
# but the GraphQL authorizeApp mutation will throw AuthException)
\`\`\`
- [ ] Claude MCP connector still completes OAuth end-to-end (it always
sends code_challenge, so no-op)
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
neo773
|
be9616db60 | chore: remove draft email feature flag (#19842) | ||
|
neo773
|
1d575f0496 |
fix oauth permission check (#19829)
was regressed due to https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/pull/19441 |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
f6423f5925 |
Remove DataSourceService and clean up datasource migration logic (#19532)
## Summary - **Drop the `objectMetadata.dataSourceId` foreign key and index** via a 1-22 fast instance command — column kept nullable for data preservation - **Delete `DataSourceService`, `DataSourceModule`, and `DataSourceException`** — all code now uses `workspace.databaseSchema` directly - **Remove `IS_DATASOURCE_MIGRATED` feature flag** from default flags and all branching logic - **Simplify workspace/object creation pipelines** — `WorkspaceManagerService`, `DevSeederService`, and the object creation action handler no longer route through `DataSourceService` - **Keep `DataSourceEntity` and the `dataSource` table** for historical data — entity stripped of all ORM relations |
||
|
neo773
|
d3f0162cf5 |
Remove connected account feature flag (#19286)
Co-authored-by: martmull <martmull@hotmail.fr> Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: github-actions <github-actions@twenty.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
2ebff5f4d7 |
fix: harden token renewal and soften refresh token revocation (#19175)
## Summary - **Apollo factory** (`apollo.factory.ts`): Bail early with `EMPTY` when no token pair exists so no request is forwarded without credentials. Propagate renewal success/failure as a boolean so failed renewals stop the operation chain instead of forwarding with stale tokens. - **Refresh token service** (`refresh-token.service.ts`): When a revoked refresh token is reused past the grace period, reject only that token instead of mass-revoking all user tokens. The most common cause is a lost renewal response (e.g. navigation during refresh), not actual token theft. This eliminates the "Suspicious activity detected" errors users were seeing. Also switches to `findOneBy` since the `appTokens` relation is no longer needed. ## Test plan - [x] `refresh-token.service.spec.ts` — all 7 tests pass - [ ] Verify login flow: sign in from `app.localhost`, get redirected to workspace subdomain without "Suspicious activity" errors - [ ] Verify token renewal: let access token expire, confirm silent renewal works and operations resume - [ ] Verify concurrent tabs: open multiple tabs, let tokens expire, confirm no mass revocation cascade Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) --------- Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Weiko
|
e0630b8653 |
Fix TransactionNotStartedError (#19155)
## Context
Checked in the codebase where we are trying to rollback a non-active
transaction.
packages/twenty-server/src/engine/core-modules/auth/services/sign-in-up.service.ts
seemed to be the only place where it happens.
We could enforce this with a lint rule in the future 🤔
|
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
c407341912 |
feat: optimize hot database queries with multi-layer caching (#19068)
## Summary Introduces multi-layer caching for the 5 most frequent database queries identified in production (Sentry data), targeting the JWT authentication hot path and cron job logic. ### Problem Our database is under heavy load from uncached queries on the auth hot path: - `WorkspaceEntity` lookups: **638 queries/min** - `ApiKeyEntity` lookups: **491 queries/min** - `UserEntity` lookups: **147 queries/min** - `UserWorkspaceEntity` lookups: **143 queries/min** - `LogicFunctionEntity` lookups: **1800 queries/min** (cron job) ### Solution **1. New `CoreEntityCacheService`** for non-workspace-scoped entities (Workspace, User, UserWorkspace): - Mirrors `WorkspaceCacheService` architecture (in-process Map + Redis with hash validation) - Provider pattern with `@CoreEntityCache` decorator - Keyed by entity primary key (not workspaceId) - 100ms local TTL, Redis-backed hash validation for cross-instance consistency - Three providers: `WorkspaceEntityCacheProviderService`, `UserEntityCacheProviderService`, `UserWorkspaceEntityCacheProviderService` **2. New `apiKeyMap` WorkspaceCache** for workspace-scoped API key lookups: - `WorkspaceApiKeyMapCacheService` loads all API keys for a workspace into a map by ID - Leverages existing `WorkspaceCacheService` infrastructure - Cache invalidation on API key create/update/revoke **3. `CronTriggerCronJob` refactored** to use existing `flatLogicFunctionMaps` workspace cache: - Eliminates per-workspace `LogicFunctionEntity` repository queries (~1800/min) - Filters cached data in-memory instead **4. `JwtAuthStrategy` refactored** to use caches for all entity lookups: - Workspace, User, UserWorkspace → `CoreEntityCacheService` - ApiKey → `WorkspaceCacheService` (`apiKeyMap`) - Impersonation queries kept as direct DB queries (rare path, requires relations) **5. Cache invalidation** wired into mutation paths: - `WorkspaceService` → invalidates `workspaceEntity` on save/update/delete - `ApiKeyService` → invalidates `apiKeyMap` on create/update/revoke ### Architecture ``` Request → JwtAuthStrategy ├── Workspace lookup → CoreEntityCacheService (in-process → Redis → DB) ├── User lookup → CoreEntityCacheService (in-process → Redis → DB) ├── UserWorkspace lookup → CoreEntityCacheService (in-process → Redis → DB) └── ApiKey lookup → WorkspaceCacheService (in-process → Redis → DB) CronTriggerCronJob └── LogicFunction lookup → WorkspaceCacheService (flatLogicFunctionMaps) ``` ### Expected Impact | Query | Before | After | |-------|--------|-------| | WorkspaceEntity | 638/min | ~0 (cached) | | ApiKeyEntity | 491/min | ~0 (cached) | | UserEntity | 147/min | ~0 (cached) | | UserWorkspaceEntity | 143/min | ~0 (cached) | | LogicFunctionEntity | 1800/min | ~0 (cached) | ### Not included (ongoing separately) - DataSourceEntity query optimization (IS_DATASOURCE_MIGRATED migration) - ObjectMetadataEntity query optimization (already partially cached) |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
cd2e08b912 |
Enforce workspace count limit for multi-workspace setups (#19036)
## Summary - Limits workspace creation to 5 workspaces per server when no valid enterprise key is configured - Enterprise key validity is checked first (synchronous, in-memory cached) to avoid unnecessary DB queries on enterprise deployments - Adds 4 unit tests covering: limit enforcement, enterprise key bypass, below-limit creation, and performance (no enterprise check when workspace count is zero) ## Test plan - [x] All 11 unit tests pass (8 existing + 3 new behavioral + 1 performance assertion) - [ ] Manual: verify workspace creation blocked at limit=5 without enterprise key - [ ] Manual: verify workspace creation allowed beyond limit with valid enterprise key - [ ] Manual: verify first workspace (bootstrap) creation is unaffected Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) |
||
|
Marie
|
bf22373315 |
Fix: use user role for OAuth tokens bearing user context (#18954)
see [discord discussion](https://discord.com/channels/1130383047699738754/1486299347091198054/1486299351520383116) ## Summary When an OAuth application token carries both `applicationId` and `userId`/`userWorkspaceId`, the auth context now uses the **user's role** for permissions instead of the application's `defaultRoleId`. This fixes the case where external clients authenticating via OAuth (e.g. a client's external AI chat) were getting the app's permissions instead of the authenticated user's. ### What changed - **`jwt.auth.strategy.ts`** (`validateApplicationToken`): when an application token includes user info, also resolve `workspaceMemberId` and `workspaceMember` from the workspace cache (same pattern as `validateAccessToken`) - **`workspace-auth-context.middleware.ts`** (`buildAuthContext`): when both `application` and `user` (with `workspaceMemberId`/`workspaceMember`) are present on the request, build a `UserWorkspaceAuthContext` instead of `ApplicationWorkspaceAuthContext`. Falls back to application context if workspace member cannot be resolved. ### Places impacted by this change (no code changes, behavior changes) These places check `isApplicationAuthContext` or resolve roles from auth context. Since hybrid tokens (OAuth with user) now produce a `UserWorkspaceAuthContext`, they naturally flow into the `isUserAuthContext` branches: | File | Impact | |------|--------| | `permissions.service.ts` — `resolveRolePermissionConfigFromAuthContext` | OAuth+user now uses user's role via `isUserAuthContext` branch instead of `application.defaultRoleId` | | `common-api-context-builder.service.ts` — `getObjectsPermissions` | Same — OAuth+user falls into `isUserAuthContext` branch | | `common-base-query-runner.service.ts` — `getRoleIdOrThrow` | Same — OAuth+user falls into `isUserAuthContext` branch | | `actor-from-auth-context.service.ts` — `buildActorMetadata` | Records created via OAuth+user will show the **user's name** as actor instead of the application's name | | `message-find-one.post-query.hook.ts` | OAuth+user now passes the `isUserAuthContext` check (previously would fail unless it was the Twenty standard application) | | `front-component.resolver.ts` | Front component tokens include `userId` — they will now correctly use the user's role, fixing a pre-existing permission escalation where a user could access data through a front component's app role that exceeded their own | | `logic-function-executor.service.ts` | **Not impacted** — only generates tokens with `applicationId` (no `userId`) | |
||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
4ea2e32366 |
Refactor twenty client sdk provisioning for logic function and front-component (#18544)
## 1. The `twenty-client-sdk` Package (Source of Truth)
The monorepo package at `packages/twenty-client-sdk` ships with:
- A **pre-built metadata client** (static, generated from a fixed
schema)
- A **stub core client** that throws at runtime (`CoreApiClient was not
generated...`)
- Both ESM (`.mjs`) and CJS (`.cjs`) bundles in `dist/`
- A `package.json` with proper `exports` map for
`twenty-client-sdk/core`, `twenty-client-sdk/metadata`, and
`twenty-client-sdk/generate`
## 2. Generation & Upload (Server-Side, at Migration Time)
**When**: `WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.run()` executes after a
metadata schema change.
**What happens in `SdkClientGenerationService.generateAndStore()`**:
1. Copies the stub `twenty-client-sdk` package from the server's assets
(resolved via `SDK_CLIENT_PACKAGE_DIRNAME` — from
`dist/assets/twenty-client-sdk/` in production, or from `node_modules`
in dev)
2. Filters out `node_modules/` and `src/` during copy — only
`package.json` + `dist/` are kept (like an npm publish)
3. Calls `replaceCoreClient()` which uses `@genql/cli` to introspect the
**application-scoped** GraphQL schema and generates a real
`CoreApiClient`, then compiles it to ESM+CJS and overwrites
`dist/core.mjs` and `dist/core.cjs`
4. Archives the **entire package** (with `package.json` + `dist/`) into
`twenty-client-sdk.zip`
5. Uploads the single archive to S3 under
`FileFolder.GeneratedSdkClient`
6. Sets `isSdkLayerStale = true` on the `ApplicationEntity` in the
database
## 3. Invalidation Signal
The `isSdkLayerStale` boolean column on `ApplicationEntity` is the
invalidation mechanism:
- **Set to `true`** by `generateAndStore()` after uploading a new client
archive
- **Checked** by both logic function drivers before execution — if
`true`, they rebuild their local layer
- **Set back to `false`** by `markSdkLayerFresh()` after the driver has
successfully consumed the new archive
Default is `false` so existing applications without a generated client
aren't affected.
## 4a. Logic Functions — Local Driver
**`ensureSdkLayer()`** is called before every execution:
1. Checks if the local SDK layer directory exists AND `isSdkLayerStale`
is `false` → early return
2. Otherwise, cleans the local layer directory
3. Calls `downloadAndExtractToPackage()` which streams the zip from S3
directly to disk and extracts the full package into
`<tmpdir>/sdk/<workspaceId>-<appId>/node_modules/twenty-client-sdk/`
4. Calls `markSdkLayerFresh()` to set `isSdkLayerStale = false`
**At execution time**, `assembleNodeModules()` symlinks everything from
the deps layer's `node_modules/` **except** `twenty-client-sdk`, which
is symlinked from the SDK layer instead. This ensures the logic
function's `import ... from 'twenty-client-sdk/core'` resolves to the
generated client.
## 4b. Logic Functions — Lambda Driver
**`ensureSdkLayer()`** is called during `build()`:
1. Checks if `isSdkLayerStale` is `false` and an existing Lambda layer
ARN exists → early return
2. Otherwise, deletes all existing layer versions for this SDK layer
name
3. Calls `downloadArchiveBuffer()` to get the raw zip from S3 (no disk
extraction)
4. Calls `reprefixZipEntries()` which streams the zip entries into a
**new zip** with the path prefix
`nodejs/node_modules/twenty-client-sdk/` — this is the Lambda layer
convention path. All done in memory, no disk round-trip
5. Publishes the re-prefixed zip as a new Lambda layer via
`publishLayer()`
6. Calls `markSdkLayerFresh()`
**At function creation**, the Lambda is created with **two layers**:
`[depsLayerArn, sdkLayerArn]`. The SDK layer is listed last so it
overwrites the stub `twenty-client-sdk` from the deps layer (later
layers take precedence in Lambda's `/opt` merge).
## 5. Front Components
Front components are built by `app:build` with `twenty-client-sdk/core`
and `twenty-client-sdk/metadata` as **esbuild externals**. The stored
`.mjs` in S3 has unresolved bare import specifiers like `import {
CoreApiClient } from 'twenty-client-sdk/core'`.
SDK import resolution is split between the **frontend host** (fetching &
caching SDK modules) and the **Web Worker** (rewriting imports):
**Server endpoints**:
- `GET /rest/front-components/:id` —
`FrontComponentService.getBuiltComponentStream()` returns the **raw
`.mjs`** directly from file storage. No bundling, no SDK injection.
- `GET /rest/sdk-client/:applicationId/:moduleName` —
`SdkClientController` reads a single file (e.g. `dist/core.mjs`) from
the generated SDK archive via
`SdkClientGenerationService.readFileFromArchive()` and serves it as
JavaScript.
**Frontend host** (`FrontComponentRenderer` in `twenty-front`):
1. Queries `FindOneFrontComponent` which returns `applicationId`,
`builtComponentChecksum`, `usesSdkClient`, and `applicationTokenPair`
2. If `usesSdkClient` is `true`, renders
`FrontComponentRendererWithSdkClient` which calls the
`useApplicationSdkClient` hook
3. `useApplicationSdkClient({ applicationId, accessToken })` checks the
Jotai atom family cache for existing blob URLs. On cache miss, fetches
both SDK modules from `GET /rest/sdk-client/:applicationId/core` and
`/metadata`, creates **blob URLs** for each, and stores them in the atom
family
4. Once the blob URLs are cached, passes them as `sdkClientUrls`
(already blob URLs, not server URLs) to `SharedFrontComponentRenderer` →
`FrontComponentWorkerEffect` → worker's `render()` call via
`HostToWorkerRenderContext`
**Worker** (`remote-worker.ts` in `twenty-sdk`):
1. Fetches the raw component `.mjs` source as text
2. If `sdkClientUrls` are provided and the source contains SDK import
specifiers (`twenty-client-sdk/core`, `twenty-client-sdk/metadata`),
**rewrites** the bare specifiers to the blob URLs received from the host
(e.g. `'twenty-client-sdk/core'` → `'blob:...'`)
3. Creates a blob URL for the rewritten source and `import()`s it
4. Revokes only the component blob URL after the module is loaded — the
SDK blob URLs are owned and managed by the host's Jotai cache
This approach eliminates server-side esbuild bundling on every request,
caches SDK modules per application in the frontend, and keeps the
worker's job to a simple string rewrite.
## Summary Diagram
```
app:build (SDK)
└─ twenty-client-sdk stub (metadata=real, core=stub)
│
▼
WorkspaceMigrationRunnerService.run()
└─ SdkClientGenerationService.generateAndStore()
├─ Copy stub package (package.json + dist/)
├─ replaceCoreClient() → regenerate core.mjs/core.cjs
├─ Zip entire package → upload to S3
└─ Set isSdkLayerStale = true
│
┌────────┴────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
Logic Functions Front Components
│ │
├─ Local Driver ├─ GET /rest/sdk-client/:appId/core
│ └─ downloadAndExtract │ → core.mjs from archive
│ → symlink into │
│ node_modules ├─ Host (useApplicationSdkClient)
│ │ ├─ Fetch SDK modules
└─ Lambda Driver │ ├─ Create blob URLs
└─ downloadArchiveBuffer │ └─ Cache in Jotai atom family
→ reprefixZipEntries │
→ publish as Lambda ├─ GET /rest/front-components/:id
layer │ → raw .mjs (no bundling)
│
└─ Worker (browser)
├─ Fetch component .mjs
├─ Rewrite imports → blob URLs
└─ import() rewritten source
```
## Next PR
- Estimate perf improvement by implementing a redis caching for front
component client storage ( we don't even cache front comp initially )
- Implem frontent blob invalidation sse event from server
---------
Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charlesBochet@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
|
lasagna
|
1a0588d233 |
fix: auto-retry Microsoft OAuth on AADSTS650051 race condition (#18405)
## Summary Fixes #13008 Azure AD has a [known bug](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/5570899/our-adminconsent-url-always-fails-with-aadsts65005) where the first consent attempt for a multi-tenant app fails with `AADSTS650051` because the service principal is mid-provisioning in the target tenant. Microsoft's own engineers have acknowledged the issue with no fix ETA. This PR adds a transparent retry to the `MicrosoftOAuthGuard`: 1. When the OAuth redirect returns `AADSTS650051`, the guard parses the `state` parameter to recover the original query params (workspaceId, invite hash, locale, etc.) 2. Redirects the user back to `/auth/microsoft` with a `msRetry=1` counter 3. The full OAuth flow restarts — by this point the service principal has finished provisioning, so consent succeeds 4. Capped at 1 retry (`MAX_MICROSOFT_AUTH_RETRIES`) to prevent infinite loops. If it still fails, falls through to the normal error page From the user's perspective, they just see a brief extra redirect instead of a cryptic error page. ### Context - `AADSTS650051` is a race condition in Azure AD's service principal provisioning during multi-tenant app consent - It's distinct from missing consent (`AADSTS65001`) or admin consent required (`AADSTS90094`) - The error is transient — retrying the same flow immediately succeeds - Microsoft Q&A threads confirm this affects many multi-tenant apps, not just Twenty ### References - [Microsoft Q&A: adminconsent always fails with AADSTS650051 on first attempt](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/5570899/our-adminconsent-url-always-fails-with-aadsts65005) - [Microsoft Q&A: AADSTS650051 for multiple applications](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/5571098/when-customers-attempt-to-sign-in-and-grant-consen) ## Test plan - [ ] Deploy to a staging environment with Microsoft OAuth enabled - [ ] Have a user from a new Azure AD tenant attempt Microsoft sign-in for the first time - [ ] If AADSTS650051 occurs, verify the user is transparently retried and signs in successfully - [ ] Verify `msRetry` counter prevents infinite redirect loops (check server logs for the warn message) - [ ] Verify normal Microsoft sign-in flow (no error) is unaffected 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <62795688+neo773@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: neo773 <neo773@protonmail.com> |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
9a306ddb9a |
feat: store SSO connections as connected accounts during sign-in (#18825)
## Summary - Store SSO connections (Google, Microsoft, OIDC, SAML) as connected accounts in the core schema during sign-in/sign-up, gated behind the `IS_CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_MIGRATED` feature flag - Add `OIDC` and `SAML` to `ConnectedAccountProvider` enum with exhaustive switch handling across frontend and backend - Add `IS_CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_MIGRATED` to `DEFAULT_FEATURE_FLAGS` for new workspaces, with a fallback check so SSO accounts are created even before workspace activation - Always upsert connected accounts to both workspace and core schemas during messaging OAuth flow, fixing FK constraint violations when SSO-only accounts exist only in core - Create message/calendar channels when they don't exist regardless of new vs reconnect flow - Filter settings accounts list to only show accounts that have message or calendar channels ## Test plan - [ ] Sign up with Google SSO → verify connected account is created in core schema - [ ] Connect messaging (Google APIs) after SSO sign-up → verify no FK errors, channels created, configuration page renders correctly - [ ] Reconnect an existing messaging account → verify tokens updated, sync resets triggered - [ ] Sign in with OIDC/SAML SSO → verify connected account created with oidcTokenClaims - [ ] Verify settings accounts page only shows accounts with channels (SSO-only accounts hidden) - [ ] Verify typecheck, lint, and unit tests pass |
||
|
Charles Bochet
|
cee4cf6452 |
feat: migrate ConnectedAccount infrastructure entities to metadata schema (#18784)
## Summary - Migrates 4 entities (`connectedAccount`, `messageChannel`, `calendarChannel`, `messageFolder`) from per-workspace schemas to the shared `core` metadata schema - Introduces a `IS_CONNECTED_ACCOUNT_MIGRATED` feature flag to control the migration: when enabled, reads come from core metadata and all writes are dual-written to both workspace and core - Extracts 12 enums from workspace entity files to `twenty-shared` for reuse across frontend and backend - Creates new TypeORM entities, metadata services, GraphQL resolvers/DTOs, and exception interceptors per entity - Each entity owns its own data access module (`ConnectedAccountDataAccessModule`, `MessageChannelDataAccessModule`, `CalendarChannelDataAccessModule`, `MessageFolderDataAccessModule`) — no umbrella infrastructure module - Adds a 1.20 upgrade command that backfills data from workspace schemas to core (preserving UUIDs) and enables the feature flag - Replaces direct repository access with data access service calls across ~50 files in messaging, calendar, and connected-account modules - Adds `lastSignedInAt` and `oidcTokenClaims` fields to the new `ConnectedAccountEntity` - Drops unused `lastSyncHistoryId` field from the migrated connected account entity ## Test plan - [x] Lint passes (`npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server`) - [x] Typecheck passes (`npx nx typecheck twenty-server`) - [x] All unit tests pass (477 suites, 4267 tests, 0 failures) - [ ] Manual test: verify messaging sync works with feature flag disabled (existing behavior) - [ ] Manual test: run upgrade command on a workspace, verify data backfilled to core tables - [ ] Manual test: verify messaging/calendar sync works with feature flag enabled (dual-write path) - [ ] Manual test: verify GraphQL metadata resolvers return correct data when flag enabled |
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|
martmull
|
731e297147 |
Twenty sdk cli oauth (#18638)
<img width="1418" height="804" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/de6c8222-6496-4a71-bc21-7e5e1269d5cb" /> --------- Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix@twenty.com> |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
95a35f8a1d |
Implement OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591) (#18608)
## Summary This PR implements OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591) and OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728) support, enabling third-party applications to dynamically register as OAuth clients without manual configuration. ## Key Changes ### OAuth Dynamic Client Registration - **New Controller**: `OAuthRegistrationController` at `POST /oauth/register` endpoint - Validates client metadata according to RFC 7591 specifications - Enforces PKCE-only public client model (no client secrets) - Supports only `authorization_code` grant type and `code` response type - Rate limits registrations to 10 per hour per IP address - Returns `client_id` and registration metadata in response - **Input Validation**: `OAuthRegisterInput` DTO with constraints on: - Client name (max 256 chars) - Redirect URIs (max 20, validated for security) - Grant types, response types, scopes, and auth methods - Logo and client URIs (max 2048 chars) - **Discovery Endpoint Update**: Added `registration_endpoint` to OAuth discovery metadata ### Stale Registration Cleanup - **Cleanup Service**: Automatically removes OAuth-only registrations older than 30 days that have no active installations - **Cron Job**: Runs daily at 02:30 AM UTC with batch processing (100 records per batch) - **CLI Command**: `cron:stale-registration-cleanup` to manually trigger cleanup ### MCP (Model Context Protocol) Authentication - **New Guard**: `McpAuthGuard` implements RFC 9728 compliance - Wraps JWT authentication with proper error responses - Returns `WWW-Authenticate` header with protected resource metadata URL on 401 - Enables OAuth-protected MCP endpoints ### Protected Resource Metadata - **New Endpoint**: `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` (RFC 9728) - Advertises MCP resource as OAuth-protected - Lists supported scopes and bearer token methods - Enables OAuth clients to discover authorization requirements ### Application Registration Updates - **New Source Type**: `OAUTH_ONLY` enum value for OAuth-only registrations - **Install Service**: Skips artifact installation for OAuth-only apps (no code artifacts) ### Frontend Updates - **Authorization Page**: Support both snake_case (standard OAuth) and camelCase (legacy) query parameters - `client_id` / `clientId` - `code_challenge` / `codeChallenge` - `redirect_uri` / `redirectUrl` ## Implementation Details - **Rate Limiting**: Uses token bucket algorithm with 10 registrations per 3,600,000ms window per IP - **Scope Validation**: Requested scopes are capped to allowed OAuth scopes; defaults to all scopes if not specified - **Redirect URI Validation**: Uses existing `validateRedirectUri` utility for security - **Cache Headers**: Registration responses include `Cache-Control: no-store` and `Pragma: no-cache` - **Batch Processing**: Cleanup operations process 100 records at a time to avoid memory issues - **Grace Period**: 30-day grace period before cleanup to allow time for client activation https://claude.ai/code/session_01PxcuWFFRuXMASMaMGTLYk2 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: github-actions <github-actions@twenty.com> Co-authored-by: cubic-dev-ai[bot] <191113872+cubic-dev-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Thomas Trompette
|
6a3281a18d |
Bug fix batches (#18588)
- clear sse state on logout - fix no record not selectable through keyboard - fix book a call design - fix error notif design |
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|
Marie
|
c1da7be6d7 |
Billing for self-hosts (#18075)
## Summary Implements enterprise licensing and per-seat billing for self-hosted environments, with Stripe as the single source of truth for subscription data. ### Components - **twenty-website** hosts the private key to sign `ENTERPRISE_KEY` and `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN`. It communicates with Stripe to emit the daily `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` if the subscription is active, based on the user's Stripe subscription ID stored in `ENTERPRISE_KEY`. - **Stripe** is the single source of truth for subscription data (status, seats, billing). - **The client** (twenty-server + DB + workers) saves `ENTERPRISE_KEY` in the `keyValuePair` table (or `.env` if `IS_CONFIG_VARIABLES_IN_DB_ENABLED` is false) and the daily-renewed `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` in the `appToken` table. `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` is verified client-side using a public key to grant access to enterprise features (RLS, SSO, audit logs, etc.). ### Flow 1. When requesting an upgrade to an enterprise plan (from **Enterprise** in settings), the user is shown a modal to choose monthly/yearly billing, then redirected to Stripe to enter payment details. After checkout, they land on twenty-website where they are exposed to their `ENTERPRISE_KEY`, which they paste in the UI. It is saved in the `keyValuePair` table. On activation, a first `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` with 30-day validity is stored in the `appToken` table. 2. **Every day**, a cron job runs and does two things: - **Refreshes the validity token**: communicates with twenty-website to get a new `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` with 30-day validity if the Stripe subscription is still active. If the subscription is in cancellation, the emitted token has a validity equal to the cancellation date. If it's no longer valid, the token is not replaced. The cron only needs to run every 30 days in practice, but runs daily so it's resilient to occasional failures. - **Reports seat count**: counts active (non-soft-deleted) `UserWorkspace` entries and sends the count to twenty-website, which updates the Stripe subscription quantity with proration. Seats are also reported on first activation. If the subscription is canceled or scheduled for cancellation, the seat update is skipped. 3. `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` is verified server-side via a public key to grant access to enterprise features. ### Key concepts Three distinct checks are exposed as GraphQL fields on `Workspace`: | Field | Meaning | |---|---| | `hasValidEnterpriseKey` | Has any valid enterprise key (signed JWT **or** legacy plain string) | | `hasValidSignedEnterpriseKey` | `ENTERPRISE_KEY` is a properly signed JWT (billing portal makes sense) | | `hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken` | `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` is present and not expired (expiration depends on signed token payload, not on "expiresAt" on appToken table which is only indicative) | Feature access is gated by `isValid()` = `hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken || hasValidEnterpriseKey` (to support both new and legacy keys during transition). After transition isValid() = hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken ### Frontend states The Enterprise settings page handles multiple states: - **No key**: show "Get Enterprise" with checkout modal - **Orphaned validity token** (token valid but no signed key): prompt user to set a valid enterprise key - **Active/trialing but no validity token**: show subscription status with a "Reload validity token" action - **Active/trialing**: show full subscription info, billing portal access, cancel option - **Cancellation scheduled**: show cancellation date, billing portal - **Canceled**: show billing history link and option to start a new subscription - **Past due / Incomplete**: prompt to update payment or restart ### Temporary retro-compatibility: legacy plain-text keys Previously, enterprise features were gated by a simple check: any non-empty string in `ENTERPRISE_KEY` granted access. With this PR, we transition to a controlled system relying on signed JWTs. To avoid breaking existing self-hosted users: - **Legacy plain-text keys still grant access** to enterprise features. `hasValidEnterpriseKey` returns `true` for both signed JWTs and plain strings, and `isValid()` checks `hasValidEnterpriseKey` as a fallback when no validity token is present. - **A deprecation banner** is shown at the top of the app when `hasValidEnterpriseKey` is `true` but `hasValidSignedEnterpriseKey` is `false`, informing the user that their key format is deprecated and they should activate a new signed key. - **No billing portal or subscription management** is available for legacy keys since there is no Stripe subscription to manage. This retro-compatibility will be removed in a future version. At that point, `isValid()` will only check `hasValidEnterpriseValidityToken`. ### Edge cases - **Air-gapped / production environments**: for self-hosted clients that block external traffic (or for our own production), provide a long-lived `ENTERPRISE_VALIDITY_TOKEN` (e.g. 99 years) directly in the `appToken` table, with no `ENTERPRISE_KEY`. The daily cron will skip the refresh (no enterprise key to authenticate with), but the pre-seeded validity token will be used to grant feature access. No billing or seat reporting occurs in this mode. - **`IS_CONFIG_VARIABLES_IN_DB_ENABLED` is false**: if the user tries to activate an enterprise key but DB config writes are disabled, the backend returns a clear error asking them to add `ENTERPRISE_KEY` to their `.env` file manually. - **Canceled subscriptions**: the `/seats` endpoint skips Stripe updates for canceled or cancellation-scheduled subscriptions to avoid Stripe API errors. ### How to test - launch twenty-website on a different url (eg localhost:1002) - add ENTERPRISE_API_URL=http://localhost:3002/api/enterprise (or else) in your server .env - ask me for twenty-website's .env file content (STRIPE_SECRET_KEY; STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_MONTHLY_PRICE_ID;STRIPE_ENTERPRISE_YEARLY_PRICE_ID; ENTERPRISE_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY; ENTERPRISE_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY; NEXT_PUBLIC_WEBSITE_URL) - visit Admin panel / enterprise |
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|
Charles Bochet
|
9d57bc39e5 |
Migrate from ESLint to OxLint (#18443)
## Summary Fully replaces ESLint with OxLint across the entire monorepo: - **Replaced all ESLint configs** (`eslint.config.mjs`) with OxLint configs (`.oxlintrc.json`) for every package: `twenty-front`, `twenty-server`, `twenty-emails`, `twenty-ui`, `twenty-shared`, `twenty-sdk`, `twenty-zapier`, `twenty-docs`, `twenty-website`, `twenty-apps/*`, `create-twenty-app` - **Migrated custom lint rules** from ESLint plugin format to OxLint JS plugin system (`@oxlint/plugins`), including `styled-components-prefixed-with-styled`, `no-hardcoded-colors`, `sort-css-properties-alphabetically`, `graphql-resolvers-should-be-guarded`, `rest-api-methods-should-be-guarded`, `max-consts-per-file`, and Jotai-related rules - **Migrated custom rule tests** from ESLint `RuleTester` + Jest to `oxlint/plugins-dev` `RuleTester` + Vitest - **Removed all ESLint dependencies** from `package.json` files and regenerated lockfiles - **Updated Nx targets** (`lint`, `lint:diff-with-main`, `fmt`) in `nx.json` and per-project `project.json` to use `oxlint` commands with proper `dependsOn` for plugin builds - **Updated CI workflows** (`.github/workflows/ci-*.yaml`) — no more ESLint executor - **Updated IDE setup**: replaced `dbaeumer.vscode-eslint` with `oxc.oxc-vscode` extension, configured `source.fixAll.oxc` and format-on-save with Prettier - **Replaced all `eslint-disable` comments** with `oxlint-disable` equivalents across the codebase - **Updated docs** (`twenty-docs`) to reference OxLint instead of ESLint - **Renamed** `twenty-eslint-rules` package to `twenty-oxlint-rules` ### Temporarily disabled rules (tracked in `OXLINT_MIGRATION_TODO.md`) | Rule | Package | Violations | Auto-fixable | |------|---------|-----------|-------------| | `twenty/sort-css-properties-alphabetically` | twenty-front | 578 | Yes | | `typescript/consistent-type-imports` | twenty-server | 3814 | Yes | | `twenty/max-consts-per-file` | twenty-server | 94 | No | ### Dropped plugins (no OxLint equivalent) `eslint-plugin-project-structure`, `lingui/*`, `@stylistic/*`, `import/order`, `prefer-arrow/prefer-arrow-functions`, `eslint-plugin-mdx`, `@next/eslint-plugin-next`, `eslint-plugin-storybook`, `eslint-plugin-react-refresh`. Partial coverage for `jsx-a11y` and `unused-imports`. ### Additional fixes (pre-existing issues exposed by merge) - Fixed `EmailThreadPreview.tsx` broken import from main rename (`useOpenEmailThreadInSidePanel`) - Restored truthiness guard in `getActivityTargetObjectRecords.ts` - Fixed `AgentTurnResolver` return types to match entity (virtual `fileMediaType`/`fileUrl` are resolved via `@ResolveField()`) ## Test plan - [x] `npx nx lint twenty-front` passes - [x] `npx nx lint twenty-server` passes - [x] `npx nx lint twenty-docs` passes - [x] Custom oxlint rules validated with Vitest: `npx nx test twenty-oxlint-rules` - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-front` passes - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` passes - [x] CI workflows trigger correctly with `dependsOn: ["twenty-oxlint-rules:build"]` - [x] IDE linting works with `oxc.oxc-vscode` extension |
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|
Weiko
|
cfeea43eaf | Improve workspace auth context surface (#18164) | ||
|
Paul Rastoin
|
38ad0820c0 |
Fix server logs leak (#18423)
# Introduction Previously the auth jwt stragegy would lod the whole user entity in the auth user context On an exception it would completely get logged on the pods ## Security layer - 0/ Updating the type system ( devxp only though ) - 1/ The jwt auth stragegy only load a specific sub set of the user entity - 2/ Sanitizing at the exception log level directly in case of a user context - 3/ Sanitizing at the console driver The last two sanitization could sound a bit redundant though they're still good fallback to keep in case new path occurs in the cb |
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|
Félix Malfait
|
0e89c96170 |
feat: add npm and tarball app distribution with upgrade mechanism (#18358)
## Summary - **npm + tarball app distribution**: Apps can be installed from the npm registry (public or private) or uploaded as `.tar.gz` tarballs, with `AppRegistrationSourceType` tracking the origin - **Upgrade mechanism**: `AppUpgradeService` checks for newer versions, supports rollback for npm-sourced apps, and a cron job runs every 6 hours to update `latestAvailableVersion` on registrations - **Security hardening**: Tarball extraction uses path traversal protection, and `enableScripts: false` in `.yarnrc.yml` disables all lifecycle scripts during `yarn install` to prevent RCE - **Frontend**: "Install from npm" and "Upload tarball" modals, upgrade button on app detail page, blue "Update" badge on installed apps table when a newer version is available - **Marketplace catalog sync**: Hourly cron job syncs a hardcoded catalog index into `ApplicationRegistration` entities - **Integration tests**: Coverage for install, upgrade, tarball upload, and catalog sync flows ## Backend changes | Area | Files | |------|-------| | Entity & migration | `ApplicationRegistrationEntity` (sourceType, sourcePackage, latestAvailableVersion), `ApplicationEntity` (applicationRegistrationId), migration | | Services | `AppPackageResolverService`, `ApplicationInstallService`, `AppUpgradeService`, `MarketplaceCatalogSyncService` | | Cron jobs | `MarketplaceCatalogSyncCronJob` (hourly), `AppVersionCheckCronJob` (every 6h) | | REST endpoint | `AppRegistrationUploadController` — tarball upload with secure extraction | | Resolver | `MarketplaceResolver` — simplified `installMarketplaceApp` (removed redundant `sourcePackage` arg) | | Security | `.yarnrc.yml` — `enableScripts: false` to block postinstall RCE | ## Frontend changes | Area | Files | |------|-------| | Modals | `SettingsInstallNpmAppModal`, `SettingsUploadTarballModal`, `SettingsAppModalLayout` | | Hooks | `useUploadAppTarball`, `useInstallMarketplaceApp` (cleaned up) | | Upgrade UI | `SettingsApplicationVersionContainer`, `SettingsApplicationDetailAboutTab` | | Badge | `SettingsApplicationTableRow` — blue "Update" tag, `SettingsApplicationsInstalledTab` — fetches registrations for version comparison | | Styling | Migrated to Linaria (matching main) | ## Test plan - [ ] Install an app from npm via the "Install from npm" modal - [ ] Upload a `.tar.gz` tarball via the "Upload tarball" modal - [ ] Verify upgrade badge appears when `latestAvailableVersion > version` - [ ] Verify upgrade flow from app detail page - [ ] Run integration tests: `app-distribution.integration-spec.ts`, `marketplace-catalog-sync.integration-spec.ts` - [ ] Verify `enableScripts: false` blocks postinstall scripts during yarn install Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) |
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|
Etienne
|
26f0a416a1 |
File storage cleaning (#18381)
- Remove feature flag - Remove legacy methods in file-upload and file-service - Migrate AI Chat to new file management --------- Co-authored-by: Charles Bochet <charles@twenty.com> |
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|
Thomas des Francs
|
aeedcf3353 |
Enable password reset from app.twenty.com with workspace fallback (#18271)
## Summary - add a working `Forgot your password?` flow on `app.twenty.com` sign-in - keep existing workspace-domain reset behavior - when triggered without workspace context, resolve a workspace from the user when possible, otherwise fallback to `app.twenty.com` reset URL ## Backend - make `workspaceId` optional in `emailPasswordResetLink` input - allow nullable `workspaceId` in password reset token DTO - update reset token generation to accept optional `workspaceId` - when missing, resolve first workspace by user membership - if no workspace is found, persist token with `workspaceId = null` - send reset links via: - workspace URL when `workspaceId` exists - app front URL + reset path when `workspaceId` is null ## Frontend - make reset-link mutation `workspaceId` variable optional - regenerate/patched generated metadata types accordingly - add `Forgot your password?` in global password step - allow reset request without workspace context in `useHandleResetPassword` - make reset page auto sign-in domain-aware (`workspace` vs `app`) - apply design-system spacing above the global forgot-password link (`theme.spacing(4)`) ## Tests - extend reset-password service tests for: - explicit workspace id - inferred workspace when workspace id is missing - app-domain fallback when no workspace is found - extend reset-password hook tests for with/without workspace context - add focused global form test for forgot-password link rendering/click behavior ## Product behavior for users with multiple workspaces - no workspace chooser is shown in this flow - backend uses the first resolvable workspace membership for the reset-link domain - password change remains account-level and works across all workspaces Feature has been tested and is working <img width="3268" height="2106" alt="CleanShot 2026-02-26 at 14 09 14@2x" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b5db3bed-f3aa-4d35-b54e-66e4d99141f9" /> --------- Co-authored-by: Etienne <45695613+etiennejouan@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Raphaël Bosi
|
b11f77df2a |
[FRONT COMPONENTS] Introduce conditionalAvailabilityExpression to command menu items (#18319)
## PR Description - Uses `expr-eval` to enable front components (SDK plugins) to define conditional availability as declarative expressions. - Moves shared types and constants to `twenty-shared` - Introduces a `conditionalAvailabilityExpression` field on `CommandMenuItemEntity`, allowing command menu items to store an `expr-eval` compatible expression string that is evaluated against a CommandMenuContext to determine if the item should be shown. - Creates an esbuild transform plugin `conditional-availability-transform-plugin` in `twenty-sdk` that converts TypeScript conditional availability expressions into `expr-eval` compatible syntax at build time, so SDK developers can write natural TS expressions that get transformed to evaluable strings. - Removes deprecated `forceRegisteredActionsByKey` state and its usage. - Creates `useCommandMenuContext` hook that builds the full `CommandMenuContext` object from React state, which is then passed to `useCommandMenuItemFrontComponentActions` for evaluating conditional availability expressions. |
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|
neo773
|
083df3e7ca |
OAuth Edge case crash + cleanup (#18326)
Fixes Sentry issue https://twenty-v7.sentry.io/issues/6603377117/ Also cleaned up the code with proper types removing `// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any` |
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|
Abdullah.
|
20a2c3836e |
feat: introduce role selector when inviting members to a workspace (#18085)
This PR adds an explicit role selector to the "Invite by email" flow,
requires a role choice before sending, and stores the selected role with
each invitation. The backend now accepts and persists `roleId` on
invitations and applies it when the invite is accepted, while keeping it
optional to avoid breaking existing clients and legacy invites.
---
### Frontend
- **Settings → Members → Invite by email**
- New **Role** dropdown (same `Select` pattern as member/API key role
selectors) between the email input and Invite button.
- Roles are loaded via `SettingsRolesQueryEffect` and
`settingsAllRolesSelector`; only roles with `canBeAssignedToUsers` are
shown.
- Role is **required**: form validates `roleId` (e.g.
`z.string().min(1)`) and the Invite button is disabled until a role is
selected and emails are valid.
- `WorkspaceInviteTeam` receives `roles` as a prop from the parent;
layout is responsive (e.g. stacked on small viewports).
- **Pending invitations table**
- New **Role** column showing the invitation’s role label (or "Unknown
role" for legacy invites without `roleId`), using the same roles source
for lookup.
- **Onboarding invite step**
- When sending invites during onboarding, the workspace **default role**
is used when available (`currentWorkspace?.defaultRole?.id`), so no role
selector is added there.
- **GraphQL**
- `sendInvitations` mutation accepts optional `roleId`;
`findWorkspaceInvitations` and resend mutation responses include
`roleId` on `WorkspaceInvitation`. Frontend types (e.g.
`WorkspaceInvitation`, hook variables) updated accordingly.
---
### Backend
- **API**
- `SendInvitationsInput` has an **optional** `roleId` (UUID, nullable).
The resolver normalises `null` to `undefined` so existing callers and
legacy flows are not broken.
- **Validation (when `roleId` is provided)**
- Role checks are centralised in **RoleValidationService**
(`RoleValidationModule`, in `metadata-modules/role-validation/`). It
validates that the role exists in the workspace and has
`canBeAssignedToUsers`, and throws a permissions-style error otherwise.
This avoids circular dependencies (e.g. `RoleModule` imports
`UserWorkspaceModule`, so invite/accept flows cannot depend on
`RoleModule`).
- **Send flow:** `WorkspaceInvitationResolver` and
`WorkspaceInvitationService.sendInvitations` both call
`RoleValidationService.validateRoleAssignableToUsersOrThrow` when
`roleId` is present (resolver before calling the service; service again
before creating tokens so that **resend** also validates the stored role
and fails fast if the role was deleted or made unassignable).
- **Accept flow:**
`UserWorkspaceService.addUserToWorkspaceIfUserNotInWorkspace` uses the
same service in `resolveRoleIdForNewMember` when an invitation provides
a `roleId`, then falls back to `workspace.defaultRoleId` when not.
Role/default is resolved and validated before any user/workspace/member
creation.
- **Persistence**
- Invitation app tokens store `roleId` in `context` next to `email`
(`context: { email, roleId? }`). `generateInvitationToken` and
`createWorkspaceInvitation` accept an optional `roleId` and only add it
to `context` when defined.
- **Resend**
- Resend passes the existing invitation’s `context.roleId` into
`sendInvitations`. The service validates that role (when present) before
creating the new token, so if the role was deleted or made unassignable,
resend fails with a clear error instead of sending a broken link.
- **Response shape**
- `SendInvitationsOutput.result` remains `WorkspaceInvitation[]`. When
`usePersonalInvitation` is false we only push full invitation records
(from `castAppTokenToWorkspaceInvitationUtil`), so the result always
matches the GraphQL type (`id`, `email`, `roleId`, `expiresAt`).
- **Modules**
- `WorkspaceInvitationModule` and `UserWorkspaceModule` import
**RoleValidationModule** (not `RoleModule`) and inject
**RoleValidationService** for validation. `RoleModule` imports
`RoleValidationModule` and `RoleService` delegates to
`RoleValidationService` for the same validation where the module graph
allows.
---
### Backward compatibility
- **Optional `roleId`**: Clients that don’t send `roleId` (or send
`null`) are unchanged; invitations are created without a role and the
accept flow uses the workspace default role.
- **Legacy invitations**: App tokens with only `context.email` still
work; `context.roleId` is optional and the UI can show e.g. "Unknown
role" for those in the pending-invitations table.
|
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
1a8be234de |
OAuth security hardening: RFC compliance, PKCE binding, rate limiting (#18305)
## Summary Follow-up to #18267. Hardens the OAuth implementation with security fixes identified during audit: **P0 — Critical:** - Bind authorization codes to `client_id` in context to prevent auth code injection (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) - Store PKCE `code_challenge` directly in auth code context instead of a separate `CodeChallenge` token — cryptographically binds the challenge to its code - Enforce `code_verifier` when `code_challenge` was used during authorization - Hash authorization codes (SHA-256) before storage to prevent exposure if DB is compromised - Add `Cache-Control: no-store` + `Pragma: no-cache` headers on token responses (RFC 6749 §5.1) - Add rate limiting on `/oauth/token` endpoint (20 req/min per client via existing `ThrottlerService`) **P1 — High:** - Return HTTP 401 for `invalid_client` errors instead of 400 (RFC 6749 §5.2) - Verify refresh tokens belong to the presenting client (cross-client token theft prevention) - Limit fields exposed by public `findApplicationRegistrationByClientId` query to only what the frontend needs (`id`, `name`, `logoUrl`, `websiteUrl`, `oAuthScopes`) - Require `API_KEYS_AND_WEBHOOKS` permission for `createApplicationRegistration` mutation **P2/P3 — Medium/Low:** - Add error handling and loading states to frontend Authorize page - Rename redirect URL param from `authorizationCode` to `code` (RFC standard) - Add unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` utility (8 test cases) ## Test plan - [ ] Existing OAuth integration tests updated for all changes (hashed codes, context-based PKCE, client binding, 401 status codes, cache headers) - [ ] New test: auth code rejected when presented by a different client - [ ] New test: refresh token rejected when presented by a different client - [ ] New test: `code_verifier` required when PKCE was used in authorization - [ ] New test: `Cache-Control: no-store` header present on responses - [ ] New unit tests for `validateRedirectUri` (HTTPS, localhost, fragments, invalid URIs) - [ ] Verify frontend authorize page shows errors gracefully Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com) |