5d88cf7f2fafd002f59454af70698200c26648b0
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Félix Malfait
|
5d88cf7f2f |
feat(server): add role management tools for AI chat (#23613)
Adds role management tools to the AI chat so the agent can create and configure roles, including row-level permissions. ## What A `RoleToolProvider` in `tool-provider/providers/`, mirroring `webhook-tool.provider.ts`, registered in `tool-provider.module.ts` and gated behind `PermissionFlagType.ROLES` via `PermissionsService.checkRolesPermissions` (same pattern as the VIEWS/WORKFLOWS gating). Tools: - `list_roles` — global record permissions, settings access, per-object overrides, permission flags, assignability; optionally includes row-level rules - `create_role`, `update_role`, `delete_role` - `assign_role_to_workspace_member` — via `UserRoleService.assignRoleToManyUserWorkspace`, which goes through role-target - `upsert_object_permissions` — per-object overrides, e.g. read-only on a given object - `upsert_row_level_permission_rules` — reuses `RowLevelPermissionPredicateService.upsertRowLevelPermissionPredicates` and the predicate-group service, so the agent can express rules like "members with this role only see records where the owner field matches the current user" (a predicate with `workspaceMemberFieldMetadataId` pointing at the workspaceMember `id` field, resolved to the current user at query time) Everything routes through the existing role services and DTOs (`RoleService`, `ObjectPermissionService`, `UserRoleService`, the row-level predicate services) rather than reimplementing them. A new `ToolCategory.ROLE` is added to `twenty-shared`, along with its label in the exhaustive switch in `build-tool-catalog-section.util.ts`. ## Safeguards - Any mutation on a role with `isEditable: false` is rejected. That covers the Admin role, which is created non-editable, and matches what Settings blocks. - Deleting the role the caller is currently acting under is rejected, since deletion would rebind them to the workspace default role. - Setting `canUpdateAllSettings: false` on the caller's own role is rejected unless that role keeps an explicit ROLES permission flag. - Changing your own role via `assign_role_to_workspace_member` is rejected, checked both by workspace member id and by resolved user workspace id. The tool-layer checks are deliberate pre-checks: the migration validators and services enforce the same rules downstream (`validate-role-is-editable.util.ts`, default-role deletion, last-admin unassignment, write-without-read consistency), but catching them early gives the model a named, actionable message instead of a build failure report. Where the deeper layer does reject, `formatValidationErrors` expands the migration exception so the underlying per-entity errors reach the model rather than a generic summary. Worth flagging for reviewers: the self-lockout protection currently lives only at the tool layer. A human admin can still strip settings access from their own role through Settings/GraphQL. Closing that would mean changing `RoleService`/`UserRoleService` behavior for the human path, which felt like a separate decision than what this change is scoped to. ## Notes `ToolCategory.ROLE` is intentionally left out of `WORKFLOW_AGENT_REGISTRY_TOOL_CATEGORIES`, so workflow agents don't get these tools; only the chat surface and the MCP/tool-index paths that share the registry do. ## Testing - 24 unit tests in `providers/__tests__/role-tool.provider.spec.ts`, covering permission gating, descriptor exposure, each safeguard, the N+1-free list path, and validation-error surfacing - 333 tests pass across the tool-provider, role, object-permission and ai suites - `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` and `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` are clean --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_0131sLKVsRuaDoaKCxFM8g4Z)_ <!-- This is an auto-generated description by cubic. --> <a href="https://cubic.dev/pr/twentyhq/twenty/pull/23613?utm_source=github" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-no-image-dialog="true"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-light.svg"><img alt="Review in cubic" src="https://www.cubic.dev/buttons/review-in-cubic-dark.svg"></picture></a> <!-- End of auto-generated description by cubic. --> |
||
|
Félix Malfait
|
8cb88cabee |
fix(role): rebind API keys + agents before deleting their role (#20935)
## Customer-reported bug
A customer hit this when using the AI chat:
```json
{
"message": "API key 760d4822-da40-4b3f-9031-40563d7ed6c9 has no role assigned",
"extensions": {
"code": "INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR",
"userFriendlyMessage": "This API key has no role assigned."
}
}
```
Their integration authenticates via API key. Somewhere along the way,
the role bound to that API key was deleted, leaving the API key
authenticated but role-less. Any request that hits a permission check
(`getRoleIdForApiKeyId`) blows up.
## Root cause
In `RoleService.deleteManyRoles`, the pre-deletion cleanup
(`assignDefaultRoleToMembersWithRoleToDelete`) only rebinds **user
workspaces** to the workspace default role. API keys and agents pointing
at the role are ignored. Because `RoleTargetEntity.role` declares
`onDelete: 'CASCADE'`, the FK then drops the role_target rows for those
API keys / agents — but the API keys themselves stay in `api_key`, now
orphaned in `apiKeyRoleMap`.
A previous read-side workaround
([2767ddac44](https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/commit/2767ddac44) —
make the `role` ResolveField nullable) handled the API-key-details page,
but did not address the write paths (`getRoleIdForApiKeyId`).
## Fix
- Rename `assignDefaultRoleToMembersWithRoleToDelete` →
`rebindTargetsOfRoleToDeleteToDefaultRole` and extend it to rebind API
keys (via `ApiKeyRoleService.assignRoleToApiKey`) and agents (via
`AiAgentRoleService.assignRoleToAgent`) in the same step, before the
role is deleted.
- If the workspace default role doesn't satisfy `canBeAssignedToApiKeys`
/ `canBeAssignedToAgents`, the inner `assignRoleTo*` validation throws.
We catch that and rethrow as a `PermissionsException` with a
role-deletion-context message and two new codes —
`ROLE_CANNOT_BE_ASSIGNED_TO_API_KEYS` /
`ROLE_CANNOT_BE_ASSIGNED_TO_AGENTS` — so the admin sees a clear
"reassign these first" prompt rather than a confusing inner error.
## Scope / non-goals
- **Already-orphaned API keys are not auto-healed.** The customer still
needs to reassign a role to their existing orphan API key via the UI
(Settings > API Keys > [the key] > role). A separate cleanup command for
existing orphans is a follow-up.
- I did not investigate *why* the customer's session was authenticated
via API key in the AI chat — that may be their integration setup. Worth
confirming with them separately.
## Test plan
- [ ] Workspace with default role `Admin` (which has
`canBeAssignedToApiKeys: true`): create an API key with a custom role,
delete the custom role → API key is rebound to Admin, requests keep
working.
- [ ] Workspace with default role `Member` (default, has
`canBeAssignedToApiKeys: false`): create an API key with a custom role,
delete the custom role → role deletion fails with the new
`ROLE_CANNOT_BE_ASSIGNED_TO_API_KEYS` error explaining the admin must
reassign first. API key + custom role are both unchanged.
- [ ] Same two scenarios for agents (`canBeAssignedToAgents`).
- [ ] Existing user-workspace rebind behavior is unchanged.
- [ ] Role deletion with no dependent API keys / agents still works.
|
||
|
Weiko
|
6e5e7963b5 |
fix(server): map PermissionsException to proper HTTP status on REST API (#20739)
## Summary `PermissionsException` thrown by `SettingsPermissionGuard` (and other permission code paths) was bubbling up through every typed REST exception filter and landing in the global `UnhandledExceptionFilter`, which falls back to **500** for anything that isn't an `HttpException`. So a forbidden user (e.g. an API key whose role doesn't have `DATA_MODEL`) calling `GET /rest/metadata/objects` got: ``` HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error "Entity performing the request does not have permission" ``` GraphQL already had the right plumbing via `permissionGraphqlApiExceptionHandler` (`ForbiddenError` → 403, `UserInputError` → 400, `NotFoundError` → 404). This PR mirrors it on the REST side. ## What - New util `permissionRestApiExceptionCodeToHttpStatus` mapping every `PermissionsExceptionCode` → HTTP status, with `assertUnreachable` to force explicit handling of future codes. - New filter `PermissionsRestApiExceptionFilter` (`@Catch(PermissionsException)`) that delegates to `HttpExceptionHandlerService.handleError(...)` with the resolved status. - Wired `PermissionsRestApiExceptionFilter` (placed first, so the typed filter wins over any sibling catch-all) into `@UseFilters(...)` of every REST controller that uses `SettingsPermissionGuard` or whose service can throw `PermissionsException`: - `object-metadata`, `field-metadata`, `webhook`, `api-key` - `view`, `view-sort`, `view-group`, `view-filter`, `view-filter-group`, `view-field` - `page-layout`, `page-layout-widget`, `page-layout-tab` - `front-component`, `ai-generate-text` - Unit tests covering 403 / 400 / 404 / 500 mappings. ## Mapping | Code | Status | |------|--------| | `PERMISSION_DENIED`, `NO_AUTHENTICATION_CONTEXT`, `ROLE_LABEL_ALREADY_EXISTS`, `CANNOT_UNASSIGN_LAST_ADMIN`, `CANNOT_UPDATE_SELF_ROLE`, `CANNOT_DELETE_LAST_ADMIN_USER`, `ROLE_NOT_EDITABLE`, `CANNOT_ADD_OBJECT_PERMISSION_ON_SYSTEM_OBJECT`, `CANNOT_ADD_FIELD_PERMISSION_ON_SYSTEM_OBJECT` | **403** | | `INVALID_ARG`, `INVALID_SETTING`, `CANNOT_GIVE_WRITING_PERMISSION_ON_NON_READABLE_OBJECT`, `CANNOT_GIVE_WRITING_PERMISSION_WITHOUT_READING_PERMISSION`, `ONLY_FIELD_RESTRICTION_ALLOWED`, `FIELD_RESTRICTION_ONLY_ALLOWED_ON_READABLE_OBJECT`, `FIELD_RESTRICTION_ON_UPDATE_ONLY_ALLOWED_ON_UPDATABLE_OBJECT`, `EMPTY_FIELD_PERMISSION_NOT_ALLOWED`, `ROLE_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_ONE_TARGET`, `ROLE_CANNOT_BE_ASSIGNED_TO_USERS` | **400** | | `ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, `OBJECT_METADATA_NOT_FOUND`, `FIELD_METADATA_NOT_FOUND`, `FIELD_PERMISSION_NOT_FOUND`, `PERMISSION_NOT_FOUND` | **404** | | All remaining "internal" codes (rethrown as-is in GraphQL) | **500** | ## Before <img width="507" height="216" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-19 at 19 26 07" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/21d633aa-7ee8-4923-94e4-7ad57258a29e" /> ## After <img width="610" height="385" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-19 at 19 26 01" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0103b7ee-7df7-4aef-999a-73c22901afd2" /> |
