Files
twenty/packages/twenty-server/test/integration/secret-encryption/application-registration-variable-encryption.integration-spec.ts
T
Charles Bochet e0b4c9918b feat(twenty-server): introduce ENCRYPTION_KEY env var with versioned envelope (#20528)
## Summary

- Adds `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (primary) and `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
(decrypt-only fallback for rotation) env vars to twenty-server, with
backward-compatible fallback to `APP_SECRET` when `ENCRYPTION_KEY` is
unset.
- Introduces a versioned ciphertext envelope `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`
using AES-256-GCM with HKDF-SHA256 derived per-context keys. The 8-hex
`keyId` fingerprint lets every row identify which physical key encrypted
it, so rotation routes directly to primary or fallback without trial
decryption; GCM's auth tag gives true integrity (legacy CTR has none).
- Migrates `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` to the new envelope
and plumbs `workspaceId` through every caller, so per-workspace HKDF
context binds each row to its tenant.

The remaining encryption sites (`jwt-key-manager`, `config-storage`,
`postgres-credentials`, `application-variable`, TOTP) stay on the legacy
unprefixed CTR path and will be migrated in follow-up PRs. The
operator-facing rotation runbook is out of scope here.

### Format details

`enc:v{N}:{keyId}:{base64}` — `N=2` is the only version produced by new
writes (`v1` exists for backward-compatible decryption of existing
connected-account rows). `keyId =
sha256(rawKey).slice(0,4).toString('hex')`. The CHECK constraint on
`core.connectedAccount.{accessToken,refreshToken}` is relaxed from `LIKE
'enc:v1:%'` to `LIKE 'enc:v_:%'` so both versions pass.

### Key resolution

| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `APP_SECRET` | Encrypt
with | Decrypt try order |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| set | set | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary →
fallback |
| set | unset | (any) | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | match `keyId` → primary |
| unset | set | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` →
fallback |
| unset | unset | set | `APP_SECRET` | match `keyId` → `APP_SECRET` |
| unset | unset | unset | startup error | n/a |

## Test plan

- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` — clean
- [x] `npx jest
'secret-encryption|connected-account-token-encryption|connected-account-refresh-tokens|encrypt-connected-account-tokens|connection-provider-oauth-flow'`
— 87 tests pass
- [x] New `secret-encryption.service.versioned.spec.ts` covers: key
resolution table (no-key error, APP_SECRET fallback, ENCRYPTION_KEY
precedence), v2 round-trip with/without workspaceId, GCM tamper
rejection, workspaceId-mismatch rejection, keyId-based primary→fallback
routing, missing-key error names the fingerprint, v1 legacy decryption,
no-prefix legacy decryption, malformed envelope rejection.
- [x] Updated `connected-account-token-encryption.service.spec.ts`
covers workspaceId binding and HKDF context isolation.
- [x] Updated slow instance command spec verifies workspaceId is
threaded through encryption and the relaxed `enc:v_:%` LIKE pattern
matches both v1 and v2.
- [ ] Manual E2E: connect a Gmail account on a freshly deployed instance
with `APP_SECRET` only → confirm `core.connectedAccount.accessToken` is
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: rotate — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` and
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<old APP_SECRET>`, restart, confirm
pre-rotation rows still decrypt and new rows carry the new `keyId`.
- [ ] Manual E2E: missing key — set `ENCRYPTION_KEY=<new>` without the
fallback, confirm decrypt error names the old `keyId` so the operator
can identify the missing key.
2026-05-13 16:15:54 +00:00

135 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript

import gql from 'graphql-tag';
import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
import { type DataSource } from 'typeorm';
import { makeMetadataAPIRequest } from 'test/integration/metadata/suites/utils/make-metadata-api-request.util';
// Real integration test for the legacy CTR encryption path: drive the
// full create/read/delete lifecycle through the GraphQL API and peek
// into Postgres mid-test to verify the stored value is ciphertext.
// applicationRegistrationVariable uses SecretEncryptionService.encrypt
// (unprefixed CTR), the same legacy path as applicationVariable and
// every other non-connected-account encrypted column.
describe('ApplicationRegistrationVariable encryption (integration)', () => {
let dataSource: DataSource;
let applicationRegistrationId: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
dataSource = global.testDataSource;
const createRegistrationResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation CreateRegistrationForEncryptionTest(
$input: CreateApplicationRegistrationInput!
) {
createApplicationRegistration(input: $input) {
applicationRegistration {
id
}
}
}
`,
variables: {
input: { name: 'enc-integration-test-registration' },
},
});
const registrationId =
createRegistrationResponse.body?.data?.createApplicationRegistration
?.applicationRegistration?.id;
if (!isDefined(registrationId)) {
throw new Error(
`createApplicationRegistration failed: ${JSON.stringify(
createRegistrationResponse.body,
)}`,
);
}
applicationRegistrationId = registrationId;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation DeleteRegistrationForEncryptionTest($id: String!) {
deleteApplicationRegistration(id: $id)
}
`,
variables: { id: applicationRegistrationId },
});
});
it('encrypts the value on the API write path, persists ciphertext in Postgres, and decrypts back via the API read path', async () => {
const plaintext = 'this-is-a-legacy-ctr-secret-value';
const createVariableResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
mutation CreateVariableForEncryptionTest(
$input: CreateApplicationRegistrationVariableInput!
) {
createApplicationRegistrationVariable(input: $input) {
id
}
}
`,
variables: {
input: {
applicationRegistrationId,
key: 'TEST_LEGACY_PLAIN',
value: plaintext,
isSecret: false,
},
},
});
expect(createVariableResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variableId =
createVariableResponse.body.data.createApplicationRegistrationVariable.id;
const [dbRow] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue" FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
[variableId],
);
// The legacy CTR envelope is base64(IV || ciphertext) — no enc: prefix.
// Two invariants: the column does NOT contain the plaintext, and the
// value looks like a base64 blob (proving encryption actually ran).
expect(dbRow.encryptedValue).not.toContain(plaintext);
expect(dbRow.encryptedValue).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/);
const findResponse = await makeMetadataAPIRequest({
query: gql`
query FindVariablesForEncryptionTest(
$applicationRegistrationId: String!
) {
findApplicationRegistrationVariables(
applicationRegistrationId: $applicationRegistrationId
) {
id
key
value
isSecret
}
}
`,
variables: { applicationRegistrationId },
});
expect(findResponse.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
const variable =
findResponse.body.data.findApplicationRegistrationVariables.find(
(v: { id: string }) => v.id === variableId,
);
expect(variable).toBeDefined();
expect(variable.isSecret).toBe(false);
// For non-secret variables the resolver decrypts and returns the
// plaintext directly — proves the legacy CTR encrypt + decrypt
// round-trip works end-to-end via the live API.
expect(variable.value).toBe(plaintext);
});
});