7fa136f305
## Summary Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR (#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer. This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future `FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window — every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload. ### Service migrations - **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new `decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for the resolver display path. - **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers — **instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info is `instance`. Updated consumers: - `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap` - `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials` - **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** — workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into `decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at execution time. - **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`** (workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the secret/non-secret toggle. - **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are shared across the JWKS. - **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING config variables. ### Slow instance commands (2.5.0) Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained: | timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint | |---|---|---|---| | `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId | `"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` | | `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance | `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` | | `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance | `"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` | | `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_ — heterogeneous jsonb column | All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2 form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint. Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint — they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback. ### Tests - Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope. - New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts `decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId` (instance scope). - Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`, `ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API and the workspace HKDF context plumbing. - New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the service spec. - Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw legacy CTR. ### Out of scope (future PRs) - `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke `jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key + `encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own migration. - `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc` `iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration. ## Test plan - [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server` - [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier) - [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token | application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var | jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable | encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass. - [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86 tests pass. - [ ] CI green - [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer (each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
245 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript
245 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto';
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import { config } from 'dotenv';
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import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
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import { DataSource } from 'typeorm';
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import { buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv } from 'test/integration/upgrade/utils/build-secret-encryption-service.util';
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import { SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/constants/secret-encryption.constant';
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import { SecretEncryptionService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/secret-encryption.service';
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import { EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand } from 'src/database/commands/upgrade-version-command/2-5/2-5-instance-command-slow-1798000005000-encrypt-application-variable';
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jest.useRealTimers();
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config({
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path: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' ? '.env.test' : '.env',
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override: true,
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});
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const TEST_ROW_KEY_PREFIX = 'ENCRYPT_APP_VAR_TEST_';
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const CHECK_CONSTRAINT_NAME = 'CHK_applicationVariable_value_encrypted';
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const CHECK_CONSTRAINT_EXPR = `"isSecret" = false OR "value" = '' OR "value" LIKE '${SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX}%'`;
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const dropCheckConstraint = (dataSource: DataSource): Promise<unknown> =>
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dataSource.query(
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`ALTER TABLE "core"."applicationVariable"
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DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "${CHECK_CONSTRAINT_NAME}"`,
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);
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const restoreCheckConstraint = async (
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dataSource: DataSource,
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): Promise<void> => {
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await dropCheckConstraint(dataSource);
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await dataSource.query(
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`ALTER TABLE "core"."applicationVariable"
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ADD CONSTRAINT "${CHECK_CONSTRAINT_NAME}"
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CHECK (${CHECK_CONSTRAINT_EXPR})`,
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);
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};
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describe('2-5 slow instance command 1798000005000 - EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand (integration)', () => {
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let dataSource: DataSource;
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let secretEncryptionService: SecretEncryptionService;
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let command: EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand;
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let workspaceId: string;
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let applicationId: string;
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const seededRowIds: string[] = [];
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const seedRow = async ({
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isSecret,
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value,
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}: {
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isSecret: boolean;
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value: string;
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}): Promise<string> => {
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await dropCheckConstraint(dataSource);
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const id = crypto.randomUUID();
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const universalIdentifier = crypto.randomUUID();
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const key = `${TEST_ROW_KEY_PREFIX}${id}`;
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await dataSource.query(
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`INSERT INTO "core"."applicationVariable"
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(id, "universalIdentifier", "applicationId", "workspaceId",
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"key", "value", "isSecret")
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)`,
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[
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id,
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universalIdentifier,
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applicationId,
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workspaceId,
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key,
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value,
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isSecret,
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],
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);
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seededRowIds.push(id);
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return id;
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};
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beforeAll(async () => {
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dataSource = new DataSource({
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type: 'postgres',
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url: process.env.PG_DATABASE_URL,
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schema: 'core',
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entities: [],
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synchronize: false,
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});
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await dataSource.initialize();
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secretEncryptionService = buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv();
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command = new EncryptApplicationVariableSlowInstanceCommand(
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secretEncryptionService,
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);
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const [seedWorkspace] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT id, "workspaceCustomApplicationId"
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FROM "core"."workspace"
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WHERE "workspaceCustomApplicationId" IS NOT NULL
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LIMIT 1`,
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);
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if (!isDefined(seedWorkspace)) {
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throw new Error(
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'No seeded workspace with a custom application found; run database:reset before the integration suite.',
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);
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}
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workspaceId = seedWorkspace.id as string;
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applicationId = seedWorkspace.workspaceCustomApplicationId as string;
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}, 30000);
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afterEach(async () => {
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if (seededRowIds.length > 0) {
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await dataSource.query(
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`DELETE FROM "core"."applicationVariable" WHERE id = ANY($1::uuid[])`,
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[seededRowIds],
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);
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seededRowIds.length = 0;
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}
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await restoreCheckConstraint(dataSource);
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await dataSource?.destroy();
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});
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it('upgrades legacy CTR secret rows to enc:v2 with workspaceId-bound HKDF', async () => {
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const plaintext = 'legacy-ctr-application-variable-secret';
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const id = await seedRow({
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isSecret: true,
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value: secretEncryptionService.encrypt(plaintext),
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});
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await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
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const [row] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT "value" FROM "core"."applicationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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);
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expect(row.value.startsWith(SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX)).toBe(
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true,
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);
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expect(
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secretEncryptionService.decryptVersioned(row.value, { workspaceId }),
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).toBe(plaintext);
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});
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it('leaves non-secret rows untouched', async () => {
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const plaintext = 'https://public.example.com/manifest.json';
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const id = await seedRow({ isSecret: false, value: plaintext });
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await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
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const [row] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT "value" FROM "core"."applicationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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);
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expect(row.value).toBe(plaintext);
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});
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it('leaves enc:v2 rows untouched and is idempotent across re-runs', async () => {
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const plaintext = 'already-v2-secret';
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const preexistingV2 = secretEncryptionService.encryptVersioned(plaintext, {
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workspaceId,
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});
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const id = await seedRow({ isSecret: true, value: preexistingV2 });
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await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
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const [afterFirstRun] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT "value" FROM "core"."applicationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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);
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expect(afterFirstRun.value).toBe(preexistingV2);
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await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
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const [afterSecondRun] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT "value" FROM "core"."applicationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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);
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expect(afterSecondRun.value).toBe(preexistingV2);
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});
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it('up() applies the CHECK constraint that rejects plaintext secret inserts', async () => {
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await dropCheckConstraint(dataSource);
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const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner();
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try {
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await command.up(queryRunner);
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const id = crypto.randomUUID();
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seededRowIds.push(id);
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await expect(
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dataSource.query(
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`INSERT INTO "core"."applicationVariable"
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(id, "universalIdentifier", "applicationId", "workspaceId",
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"key", "value", "isSecret")
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'plaintext-should-be-rejected', true)`,
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[
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id,
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crypto.randomUUID(),
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applicationId,
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workspaceId,
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`${TEST_ROW_KEY_PREFIX}${id}`,
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],
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),
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).rejects.toThrow(/check constraint/i);
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} finally {
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await queryRunner.release();
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}
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});
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it('down() removes the CHECK constraint and lets plaintext through (for rollback safety only)', async () => {
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const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner();
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try {
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await command.down(queryRunner);
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const id = await seedRow({
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isSecret: true,
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value: 'plaintext-allowed-after-down',
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});
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const [row] = await dataSource.query(
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`SELECT "value" FROM "core"."applicationVariable" WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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);
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expect(row.value).toBe('plaintext-allowed-after-down');
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} finally {
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await queryRunner.release();
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}
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});
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});
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