997b2c38de
Stacked on #23642. Integration suite for the cookie-session surface, organized as one successful/failing spec pair per stage of the session lifecycle. 14 spec files, ~36 tests, all over real HTTP against the booted app. ## Coverage by stage **1. Session creation on auth exchanges** (`successful-`/`failing-session-creation`) Flag gating (default off: tokens, no cookie, no row); httpOnly cookie snapshot with 180d expiry window; SHA-256 hash-at-rest with the row bound to the apple seed workspace; scripted sign-ins without an Origin header still get the cookie; login-CSRF refuses the cookie for disallowed origins while returning the token pair; sign-in over an existing session revokes it as `SUPERSEDED`; a failed credentials exchange mints nothing. **2. Cookie delivery** (`successful-session-cookie-delivery`, `secure-deployment-session-cookie`) The runtime side door (`AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE=none` forces the secure path) pins the `__Host-`/`Secure`/`SameSite=None` variant in the default CI run. The exact production combination (`__Host-`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Lax`) is covered by a dedicated spec that requires the app to boot with an https `SERVER_URL`: the secure branch is decided by config, never the transport, so no TLS is needed. It skips itself on plain-http boots; CI runs it as an extra step on one shard with `SERVER_URL=https://localhost:3000`, including the `__Host-` round-trip and the plain-cookie-name downgrade refusal. **3. Per-request authentication and the CSRF read gate** (`successful-`/`failing-session-cookie-authentication`) A cookie-only request resolves the seeded user; a `sess_` token presented as Bearer is rejected; cookie-authenticated unsafe requests with a disallowed or missing Origin get 403 `CSRF_ORIGIN_MISMATCH`; an unknown session token is unauthenticated and its dead cookie is cleared. **3b. Workspace binding** (`successful-session-workspace-binding`) Tim signs into both seeded workspaces (apple and yc); each session row is bound to the workspace its exchange selected (`workspaceId` and `userWorkspaceId` pinned to the seed ids), and each cookie resolves to its own workspace context, with no request-side input able to pivot a session across workspaces. **3c. Credentialed CORS** (`cors-credentialed-origins`) Allowlisted origins get the reflected `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` plus `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` and `Vary: Origin`, preflight included; other origins keep the public wildcard. See tooling notes: this surface was previously untestable. **4. Sessions API** (`successful-`/`failing-user-sessions-api`) `currentUserSessions` marks exactly the presented session as current; `revokeUserSession` revokes by id (`USER_REVOKED`) and drops it from the listing; `revokeAllOtherUserSessions` spares the presented session; cross-user revocation and unauthenticated listing are refused. **5. Exits** (`successful-sign-out`, `failing-session-expiration`) `signOut` revokes with `USER_SIGN_OUT`, clears the cookie, and reuse fails immediately (cache invalidated, not TTL-bound); a cookie-less sign-out clears nothing, so a cross-site POST cannot log a visitor out; absolute-lifetime and idle-timeout expiry both reject and clear the cookie. **7. Cleanup cron** (`user-session-cleanup-cron`) Both halves run in-process against fixtures spanning the 30d retention boundary. Sessions: expired/revoked-beyond-retention deleted; active, recently-expired, and idle-expired rows survive (the idle case pins the known predicate gap). Refresh tokens: old-expired and old-revoked deleted, fresh kept, and a long-expired token of another type survives, pinning the `type` filter that keeps the shared `appToken` table safe from the hard-delete. Not covered here by design: the impersonation park/restore sub-funnel (stage 6, follow-up) and the client-side funnel (stage 8, front-end scope). Password-change revocation and the renewal bridge are also left to follow-ups. ## How the flag is flipped `AUTH_COOKIE_SESSIONS_ENABLED` (and `AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE` for the secure side door) are toggled at runtime through the admin panel config API, reusing the `twenty-config` test utils: `DatabaseConfigDriver.set` updates its cache synchronously and `TwentyConfigService` consults the DB driver before the env driver. No `.env.test` change, no app reboot, runs in the default CI environment without the `ci:auth-cookie-sessions` label. `SERVER_URL` is env-only, hence the dedicated CI step for the production secure-deployment spec. ## Shared tooling changes - **`applyCredentialedCors` extraction (src change)**: the integration harness booted with Nest's wildcard `cors: true`, not the credentialed-allowlist setup living in `main.ts`, so the CORS surface was untestable by construction. The setup moved into `applyCredentialedCors`, now called by both the production bootstrap and `createApp`, making the harness's CORS behavior the deployed one. Behavior-neutral for production. - `makeMetadataAPIRequest` accepts an explicit `null` token for unauthenticated requests. Passing `undefined` silently fell back to the default admin token (parameter defaults apply to `undefined`), which made supposedly public requests Bearer-authenticated, bypassing both the cookie auth path and the CSRF middleware. Existing call sites are unaffected. - The `GetLoginTokenFromCredentials` / `GetAuthTokensFromLoginToken` documents moved into shared query factories; the workspace-origin builder is extracted and generalized to any seeded subdomain (`buildWorkspaceOriginForSubdomain`, reused by `getAccessTokenForCredentials`). - Suite-local helpers: `signInWithCookieCapture` (full credentials exchange returning the raw supertest response, with a `workspaceSubdomain` option), `postMetadataOperationWithHeaders` (Origin/Cookie header control), cookie extraction for both cookie names, clearing-cookie detection, snapshot normalization (token and expiry redacted), and shared `ALLOWED_ORIGIN`/`DISALLOWED_ORIGIN` constants derived from `FRONTEND_URL`. Verified locally: full suite green in CI mode on both plain-http and https-`SERVER_URL` boots; oxlint and tsc clean. --------- Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
97 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
97 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { type NestExpressApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-express';
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import {
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Test,
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type TestingModule,
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type TestingModuleBuilder,
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} from '@nestjs/testing';
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import bytes from 'bytes';
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import graphqlUploadExpress from 'graphql-upload/graphqlUploadExpress.mjs';
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import { AppModule } from 'src/app.module';
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import { settings } from 'src/engine/constants/settings';
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import { TwentyConfigService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/twenty-config/twenty-config.service';
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import { applyCredentialedCors } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/utils/apply-credentialed-cors.util';
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import { StripeSDKMockService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/billing/stripe/stripe-sdk/mocks/stripe-sdk-mock.service';
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import { StripeSDKService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/billing/stripe/stripe-sdk/services/stripe-sdk.service';
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import { CaptchaDriverFactory } from 'src/engine/core-modules/captcha/captcha-driver.factory';
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import { ExceptionHandlerService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/exception-handler/exception-handler.service';
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import { ExceptionHandlerMockService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/exception-handler/mocks/exception-handler-mock.service';
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import { JobsModule } from 'src/engine/core-modules/message-queue/jobs.module';
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import { MessageQueueModule } from 'src/engine/core-modules/message-queue/message-queue.module';
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interface TestingModuleCreatePreHook {
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(moduleBuilder: TestingModuleBuilder): TestingModuleBuilder;
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}
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/**
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* Hook for adding items to nest application
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*/
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export type TestingAppCreatePreHook = (
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app: NestExpressApplication,
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) => Promise<void>;
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/**
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* Sets basic integration testing module of app
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*/
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export const createApp = async (
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config: {
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moduleBuilderHook?: TestingModuleCreatePreHook;
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appInitHook?: TestingAppCreatePreHook;
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} = {},
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): Promise<NestExpressApplication> => {
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const stripeSDKMockService = new StripeSDKMockService();
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const mockExceptionHandlerService = new ExceptionHandlerMockService();
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let moduleBuilder: TestingModuleBuilder = Test.createTestingModule({
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imports: [AppModule, JobsModule, MessageQueueModule.registerExplorer()],
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})
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.overrideProvider(StripeSDKService)
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.useValue(stripeSDKMockService)
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.overrideProvider(ExceptionHandlerService)
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.useValue(mockExceptionHandlerService)
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.overrideProvider(CaptchaDriverFactory)
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.useValue({
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getCurrentDriver: () => ({
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validate: async () => ({ success: true }),
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}),
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});
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if (config.moduleBuilderHook) {
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moduleBuilder = config.moduleBuilderHook(moduleBuilder);
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}
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const moduleFixture: TestingModule = await moduleBuilder.compile();
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const app = moduleFixture.createNestApplication<NestExpressApplication>({
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rawBody: true,
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});
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// The production CORS setup, not the Nest wildcard default, so integration
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// tests exercise the credentialed-origin allowlist the deployment runs.
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applyCredentialedCors(app, app.get(TwentyConfigService));
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app.use(
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'/graphql',
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graphqlUploadExpress({
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maxFieldSize: bytes(settings.storage.maxFileSize)!,
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maxFiles: 10,
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}),
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);
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app.use(
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'/metadata',
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graphqlUploadExpress({
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maxFieldSize: bytes(settings.storage.maxFileSize)!,
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maxFiles: 10,
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}),
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);
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if (config.appInitHook) {
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await config.appInitHook(app);
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}
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await app.init();
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return app;
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};
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