997b2c38de
Stacked on #23642. Integration suite for the cookie-session surface, organized as one successful/failing spec pair per stage of the session lifecycle. 14 spec files, ~36 tests, all over real HTTP against the booted app. ## Coverage by stage **1. Session creation on auth exchanges** (`successful-`/`failing-session-creation`) Flag gating (default off: tokens, no cookie, no row); httpOnly cookie snapshot with 180d expiry window; SHA-256 hash-at-rest with the row bound to the apple seed workspace; scripted sign-ins without an Origin header still get the cookie; login-CSRF refuses the cookie for disallowed origins while returning the token pair; sign-in over an existing session revokes it as `SUPERSEDED`; a failed credentials exchange mints nothing. **2. Cookie delivery** (`successful-session-cookie-delivery`, `secure-deployment-session-cookie`) The runtime side door (`AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE=none` forces the secure path) pins the `__Host-`/`Secure`/`SameSite=None` variant in the default CI run. The exact production combination (`__Host-`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Lax`) is covered by a dedicated spec that requires the app to boot with an https `SERVER_URL`: the secure branch is decided by config, never the transport, so no TLS is needed. It skips itself on plain-http boots; CI runs it as an extra step on one shard with `SERVER_URL=https://localhost:3000`, including the `__Host-` round-trip and the plain-cookie-name downgrade refusal. **3. Per-request authentication and the CSRF read gate** (`successful-`/`failing-session-cookie-authentication`) A cookie-only request resolves the seeded user; a `sess_` token presented as Bearer is rejected; cookie-authenticated unsafe requests with a disallowed or missing Origin get 403 `CSRF_ORIGIN_MISMATCH`; an unknown session token is unauthenticated and its dead cookie is cleared. **3b. Workspace binding** (`successful-session-workspace-binding`) Tim signs into both seeded workspaces (apple and yc); each session row is bound to the workspace its exchange selected (`workspaceId` and `userWorkspaceId` pinned to the seed ids), and each cookie resolves to its own workspace context, with no request-side input able to pivot a session across workspaces. **3c. Credentialed CORS** (`cors-credentialed-origins`) Allowlisted origins get the reflected `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` plus `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` and `Vary: Origin`, preflight included; other origins keep the public wildcard. See tooling notes: this surface was previously untestable. **4. Sessions API** (`successful-`/`failing-user-sessions-api`) `currentUserSessions` marks exactly the presented session as current; `revokeUserSession` revokes by id (`USER_REVOKED`) and drops it from the listing; `revokeAllOtherUserSessions` spares the presented session; cross-user revocation and unauthenticated listing are refused. **5. Exits** (`successful-sign-out`, `failing-session-expiration`) `signOut` revokes with `USER_SIGN_OUT`, clears the cookie, and reuse fails immediately (cache invalidated, not TTL-bound); a cookie-less sign-out clears nothing, so a cross-site POST cannot log a visitor out; absolute-lifetime and idle-timeout expiry both reject and clear the cookie. **7. Cleanup cron** (`user-session-cleanup-cron`) Both halves run in-process against fixtures spanning the 30d retention boundary. Sessions: expired/revoked-beyond-retention deleted; active, recently-expired, and idle-expired rows survive (the idle case pins the known predicate gap). Refresh tokens: old-expired and old-revoked deleted, fresh kept, and a long-expired token of another type survives, pinning the `type` filter that keeps the shared `appToken` table safe from the hard-delete. Not covered here by design: the impersonation park/restore sub-funnel (stage 6, follow-up) and the client-side funnel (stage 8, front-end scope). Password-change revocation and the renewal bridge are also left to follow-ups. ## How the flag is flipped `AUTH_COOKIE_SESSIONS_ENABLED` (and `AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE` for the secure side door) are toggled at runtime through the admin panel config API, reusing the `twenty-config` test utils: `DatabaseConfigDriver.set` updates its cache synchronously and `TwentyConfigService` consults the DB driver before the env driver. No `.env.test` change, no app reboot, runs in the default CI environment without the `ci:auth-cookie-sessions` label. `SERVER_URL` is env-only, hence the dedicated CI step for the production secure-deployment spec. ## Shared tooling changes - **`applyCredentialedCors` extraction (src change)**: the integration harness booted with Nest's wildcard `cors: true`, not the credentialed-allowlist setup living in `main.ts`, so the CORS surface was untestable by construction. The setup moved into `applyCredentialedCors`, now called by both the production bootstrap and `createApp`, making the harness's CORS behavior the deployed one. Behavior-neutral for production. - `makeMetadataAPIRequest` accepts an explicit `null` token for unauthenticated requests. Passing `undefined` silently fell back to the default admin token (parameter defaults apply to `undefined`), which made supposedly public requests Bearer-authenticated, bypassing both the cookie auth path and the CSRF middleware. Existing call sites are unaffected. - The `GetLoginTokenFromCredentials` / `GetAuthTokensFromLoginToken` documents moved into shared query factories; the workspace-origin builder is extracted and generalized to any seeded subdomain (`buildWorkspaceOriginForSubdomain`, reused by `getAccessTokenForCredentials`). - Suite-local helpers: `signInWithCookieCapture` (full credentials exchange returning the raw supertest response, with a `workspaceSubdomain` option), `postMetadataOperationWithHeaders` (Origin/Cookie header control), cookie extraction for both cookie names, clearing-cookie detection, snapshot normalization (token and expiry redacted), and shared `ALLOWED_ORIGIN`/`DISALLOWED_ORIGIN` constants derived from `FRONTEND_URL`. Verified locally: full suite green in CI mode on both plain-http and https-`SERVER_URL` boots; oxlint and tsc clean. --------- Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
126 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
126 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
import {
|
|
extractSessionCookie,
|
|
hasClearingCookie,
|
|
normalizeSessionCookieForSnapshot,
|
|
postMetadataOperationWithHeaders,
|
|
signInWithCookieCapture,
|
|
} from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/utils/sign-in-with-cookie-capture.util';
|
|
import {
|
|
currentUserIdentityQueryFactory,
|
|
signOutQueryFactory,
|
|
} from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/utils/user-session-operations.util';
|
|
|
|
import {
|
|
ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
DISALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
} from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/constants/session-origins.constants';
|
|
import { IS_SECURE_DEPLOYMENT } from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/constants/is-secure-deployment.constant';
|
|
import { setupDatabaseConfigOverrideForSuite } from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/utils/setup-database-config-override.util';
|
|
|
|
import { USER_SESSION_COOKIE_NAME } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/constants/user-session-cookie-name.constant';
|
|
import { USER_SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE_NAME } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/constants/user-session-secure-cookie-name.constant';
|
|
|
|
// The secure/insecure cookie branch is decided by configuration, never by the
|
|
// transport: isSecureDeployment() reads SERVER_URL, which is env-only. This
|
|
// suite therefore needs the app booted with an https SERVER_URL, which
|
|
// jest-integration-secure.config.ts guarantees; run it through
|
|
// `nx run twenty-server:test:integration:secure`. It exercises the exact
|
|
// production combination: __Host- name, Secure, and the SameSite=Lax default.
|
|
describe('session cookie on a production-like secure deployment (integration)', () => {
|
|
setupDatabaseConfigOverrideForSuite('AUTH_COOKIE_SESSIONS_ENABLED', true);
|
|
|
|
let sessionToken: string;
|
|
|
|
beforeAll(() => {
|
|
if (!IS_SECURE_DEPLOYMENT) {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
'This suite requires an https SERVER_URL; run it via nx run twenty-server:test:integration:secure',
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should deliver the production cookie: __Host- name, Secure, SameSite=Lax', async () => {
|
|
const response = await signInWithCookieCapture({
|
|
originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
extractSessionCookie(response, USER_SESSION_COOKIE_NAME),
|
|
).toBeUndefined();
|
|
|
|
const secureSessionCookie = extractSessionCookie(
|
|
response,
|
|
USER_SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE_NAME,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(secureSessionCookie).toBeDefined();
|
|
|
|
if (!secureSessionCookie) {
|
|
throw new Error('Expected the secure session cookie');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sessionToken = secureSessionCookie.sessionToken;
|
|
|
|
// A literal rather than a snapshot: snapshots written by this dedicated
|
|
// run would count as obsolete in the plain-http run.
|
|
expect(
|
|
normalizeSessionCookieForSnapshot(secureSessionCookie.rawCookie),
|
|
).toBe(
|
|
'__Host-twenty-session=sess_<redacted>; Path=/; Expires=<redacted>; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax',
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should authenticate a request presenting the __Host- cookie', async () => {
|
|
const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
|
|
currentUserIdentityQueryFactory(),
|
|
{
|
|
originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
cookieHeader: `${USER_SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE_NAME}=${sessionToken}`,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(response.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
|
|
expect(response.body.data.currentUser.email).toBe('tim@apple.dev');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should ignore the plain cookie name, refusing a downgrade', async () => {
|
|
const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
|
|
currentUserIdentityQueryFactory(),
|
|
{
|
|
originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
cookieHeader: `${USER_SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${sessionToken}`,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(response.body.errors).toBeDefined();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should enforce the CSRF origin gate on __Host- cookie requests', async () => {
|
|
const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
|
|
currentUserIdentityQueryFactory(),
|
|
{
|
|
originHeader: DISALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
cookieHeader: `${USER_SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE_NAME}=${sessionToken}`,
|
|
},
|
|
403,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(response.body.error).toBe('CSRF_ORIGIN_MISMATCH');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should clear the __Host- cookie on sign-out', async () => {
|
|
const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
|
|
signOutQueryFactory(),
|
|
{
|
|
originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
|
|
cookieHeader: `${USER_SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE_NAME}=${sessionToken}`,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(response.body.data.signOut).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(hasClearingCookie(response, USER_SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE_NAME)).toBe(
|
|
true,
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|