997b2c38de
Stacked on #23642. Integration suite for the cookie-session surface, organized as one successful/failing spec pair per stage of the session lifecycle. 14 spec files, ~36 tests, all over real HTTP against the booted app. ## Coverage by stage **1. Session creation on auth exchanges** (`successful-`/`failing-session-creation`) Flag gating (default off: tokens, no cookie, no row); httpOnly cookie snapshot with 180d expiry window; SHA-256 hash-at-rest with the row bound to the apple seed workspace; scripted sign-ins without an Origin header still get the cookie; login-CSRF refuses the cookie for disallowed origins while returning the token pair; sign-in over an existing session revokes it as `SUPERSEDED`; a failed credentials exchange mints nothing. **2. Cookie delivery** (`successful-session-cookie-delivery`, `secure-deployment-session-cookie`) The runtime side door (`AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE=none` forces the secure path) pins the `__Host-`/`Secure`/`SameSite=None` variant in the default CI run. The exact production combination (`__Host-`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Lax`) is covered by a dedicated spec that requires the app to boot with an https `SERVER_URL`: the secure branch is decided by config, never the transport, so no TLS is needed. It skips itself on plain-http boots; CI runs it as an extra step on one shard with `SERVER_URL=https://localhost:3000`, including the `__Host-` round-trip and the plain-cookie-name downgrade refusal. **3. Per-request authentication and the CSRF read gate** (`successful-`/`failing-session-cookie-authentication`) A cookie-only request resolves the seeded user; a `sess_` token presented as Bearer is rejected; cookie-authenticated unsafe requests with a disallowed or missing Origin get 403 `CSRF_ORIGIN_MISMATCH`; an unknown session token is unauthenticated and its dead cookie is cleared. **3b. Workspace binding** (`successful-session-workspace-binding`) Tim signs into both seeded workspaces (apple and yc); each session row is bound to the workspace its exchange selected (`workspaceId` and `userWorkspaceId` pinned to the seed ids), and each cookie resolves to its own workspace context, with no request-side input able to pivot a session across workspaces. **3c. Credentialed CORS** (`cors-credentialed-origins`) Allowlisted origins get the reflected `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` plus `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` and `Vary: Origin`, preflight included; other origins keep the public wildcard. See tooling notes: this surface was previously untestable. **4. Sessions API** (`successful-`/`failing-user-sessions-api`) `currentUserSessions` marks exactly the presented session as current; `revokeUserSession` revokes by id (`USER_REVOKED`) and drops it from the listing; `revokeAllOtherUserSessions` spares the presented session; cross-user revocation and unauthenticated listing are refused. **5. Exits** (`successful-sign-out`, `failing-session-expiration`) `signOut` revokes with `USER_SIGN_OUT`, clears the cookie, and reuse fails immediately (cache invalidated, not TTL-bound); a cookie-less sign-out clears nothing, so a cross-site POST cannot log a visitor out; absolute-lifetime and idle-timeout expiry both reject and clear the cookie. **7. Cleanup cron** (`user-session-cleanup-cron`) Both halves run in-process against fixtures spanning the 30d retention boundary. Sessions: expired/revoked-beyond-retention deleted; active, recently-expired, and idle-expired rows survive (the idle case pins the known predicate gap). Refresh tokens: old-expired and old-revoked deleted, fresh kept, and a long-expired token of another type survives, pinning the `type` filter that keeps the shared `appToken` table safe from the hard-delete. Not covered here by design: the impersonation park/restore sub-funnel (stage 6, follow-up) and the client-side funnel (stage 8, front-end scope). Password-change revocation and the renewal bridge are also left to follow-ups. ## How the flag is flipped `AUTH_COOKIE_SESSIONS_ENABLED` (and `AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE` for the secure side door) are toggled at runtime through the admin panel config API, reusing the `twenty-config` test utils: `DatabaseConfigDriver.set` updates its cache synchronously and `TwentyConfigService` consults the DB driver before the env driver. No `.env.test` change, no app reboot, runs in the default CI environment without the `ci:auth-cookie-sessions` label. `SERVER_URL` is env-only, hence the dedicated CI step for the production secure-deployment spec. ## Shared tooling changes - **`applyCredentialedCors` extraction (src change)**: the integration harness booted with Nest's wildcard `cors: true`, not the credentialed-allowlist setup living in `main.ts`, so the CORS surface was untestable by construction. The setup moved into `applyCredentialedCors`, now called by both the production bootstrap and `createApp`, making the harness's CORS behavior the deployed one. Behavior-neutral for production. - `makeMetadataAPIRequest` accepts an explicit `null` token for unauthenticated requests. Passing `undefined` silently fell back to the default admin token (parameter defaults apply to `undefined`), which made supposedly public requests Bearer-authenticated, bypassing both the cookie auth path and the CSRF middleware. Existing call sites are unaffected. - The `GetLoginTokenFromCredentials` / `GetAuthTokensFromLoginToken` documents moved into shared query factories; the workspace-origin builder is extracted and generalized to any seeded subdomain (`buildWorkspaceOriginForSubdomain`, reused by `getAccessTokenForCredentials`). - Suite-local helpers: `signInWithCookieCapture` (full credentials exchange returning the raw supertest response, with a `workspaceSubdomain` option), `postMetadataOperationWithHeaders` (Origin/Cookie header control), cookie extraction for both cookie names, clearing-cookie detection, snapshot normalization (token and expiry redacted), and shared `ALLOWED_ORIGIN`/`DISALLOWED_ORIGIN` constants derived from `FRONTEND_URL`. Verified locally: full suite green in CI mode on both plain-http and https-`SERVER_URL` boots; oxlint and tsc clean. --------- Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
252 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript
252 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { In } from 'typeorm';
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import { getAppProviderByClassName } from 'test/integration/utils/get-app-provider-by-class-name.util';
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import { getCoreRepository } from 'test/integration/utils/get-core-repository.util';
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import {
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AppTokenEntity,
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AppTokenType,
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} from 'src/engine/core-modules/app-token/app-token.entity';
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import { UserSessionEntity } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/user-session.entity';
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import { UserSessionRevokedReason } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/types/user-session-revoked-reason.type';
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import { generateUserSessionToken } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/utils/generate-user-session-token.util';
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import { hashUserSessionToken } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/utils/hash-user-session-token.util';
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import { AuthProviderEnum } from 'src/engine/core-modules/workspace/types/workspace.type';
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import { USER_DATA_SEED_IDS } from 'src/engine/workspace-manager/dev-seeder/core/utils/seed-users.util';
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const ONE_DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
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const daysAgo = (days: number): Date => new Date(Date.now() - days * ONE_DAY_MS);
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const daysFromNow = (days: number): Date =>
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new Date(Date.now() + days * ONE_DAY_MS);
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type SeededSessionFixture = {
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label: string;
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tokenHash: string;
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overrides: Partial<UserSessionEntity>;
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};
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// The retention boundary is 30 days after a session ended, where "ended"
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// means absolute expiry or revocation. The cron runs against the same table
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// the suite's other specs write to, so fixtures carry their own token hashes
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// and are matched individually rather than by table counts.
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describe('user session cleanup cron (integration)', () => {
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const fixtures: SeededSessionFixture[] = [
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{
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label: 'expired beyond retention',
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tokenHash: hashUserSessionToken(generateUserSessionToken()),
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysAgo(31), lastActiveAt: daysAgo(31) },
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},
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{
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label: 'revoked beyond retention',
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tokenHash: hashUserSessionToken(generateUserSessionToken()),
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overrides: {
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expiresAt: daysFromNow(90),
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lastActiveAt: daysAgo(31),
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revokedAt: daysAgo(31),
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revokedReason: UserSessionRevokedReason.UserSignOut,
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},
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},
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{
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label: 'active',
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tokenHash: hashUserSessionToken(generateUserSessionToken()),
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysFromNow(90), lastActiveAt: new Date() },
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},
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{
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label: 'expired within retention',
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tokenHash: hashUserSessionToken(generateUserSessionToken()),
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysAgo(1), lastActiveAt: daysAgo(1) },
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},
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{
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// Idle-expired sessions are unusable but carry no ended marker, so the
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// current predicate retains them until absolute expiry. Pinned here as
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// documented behavior; tightening the predicate should flip this case.
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label: 'idle-expired but not absolutely expired',
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tokenHash: hashUserSessionToken(generateUserSessionToken()),
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysFromNow(60), lastActiveAt: daysAgo(120) },
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},
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];
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const allFixtureHashes = fixtures.map((fixture) => fixture.tokenHash);
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const findRemainingFixtureHashes = async (): Promise<string[]> => {
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const rows = await getCoreRepository<UserSessionEntity>(
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UserSessionEntity,
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).findBy({ tokenHash: In(allFixtureHashes) });
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return rows.map((row) => row.tokenHash);
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};
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beforeAll(async () => {
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const userSessionRepository =
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getCoreRepository<UserSessionEntity>(UserSessionEntity);
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for (const fixture of fixtures) {
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await userSessionRepository.save(
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userSessionRepository.create({
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tokenHash: fixture.tokenHash,
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userId: USER_DATA_SEED_IDS.TIM,
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workspaceId: null,
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userWorkspaceId: null,
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authProvider: AuthProviderEnum.Password,
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...fixture.overrides,
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}),
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);
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}
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await getCoreRepository<UserSessionEntity>(UserSessionEntity).delete({
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tokenHash: In(allFixtureHashes),
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});
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});
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it('should delete sessions ended beyond retention and keep the rest', async () => {
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const cleanupJob = getAppProviderByClassName<{
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handle: () => Promise<void>;
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}>('UserSessionCleanupCronJob');
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await cleanupJob.handle();
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const remainingHashes = await findRemainingFixtureHashes();
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// Strict lookup: a mistyped label must fail the test here, not slip
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// through as not.toContain(undefined).
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const getFixtureTokenHash = (label: string): string => {
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const fixture = fixtures.find((candidate) => candidate.label === label);
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if (!fixture) {
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throw new Error(`Unknown user session fixture: ${label}`);
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}
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return fixture.tokenHash;
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};
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const expectDeleted = (label: string) => {
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expect(remainingHashes).not.toContain(getFixtureTokenHash(label));
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};
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const expectKept = (label: string) => {
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expect(remainingHashes).toContain(getFixtureTokenHash(label));
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};
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expectDeleted('expired beyond retention');
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expectDeleted('revoked beyond retention');
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expectKept('active');
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expectKept('expired within retention');
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expectKept('idle-expired but not absolutely expired');
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});
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describe('refresh-token half', () => {
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type SeededAppTokenFixture = {
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label: string;
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type: AppTokenType;
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overrides: Partial<Pick<AppTokenEntity, 'expiresAt' | 'revokedAt'>>;
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};
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const appTokenFixtures: SeededAppTokenFixture[] = [
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{
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label: 'refresh token expired beyond retention',
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type: AppTokenType.RefreshToken,
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysAgo(31) },
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},
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{
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label: 'refresh token revoked beyond retention',
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type: AppTokenType.RefreshToken,
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysFromNow(30), revokedAt: daysAgo(31) },
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},
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{
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label: 'active refresh token',
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type: AppTokenType.RefreshToken,
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysFromNow(30) },
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},
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// The retention boundary itself: without these two, a regression that
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// deleted every ended refresh token rather than only those past
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// retention would still pass the assertions above.
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{
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label: 'refresh token expired within retention',
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type: AppTokenType.RefreshToken,
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysAgo(1) },
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},
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{
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label: 'refresh token revoked within retention',
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type: AppTokenType.RefreshToken,
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysFromNow(30), revokedAt: daysAgo(1) },
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},
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{
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// The type filter is the safety predicate: appToken is a shared table
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// and other token types are routinely long-expired. Losing the filter
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// would silently hard-delete password-reset or invitation history.
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label: 'long-expired token of another type',
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type: AppTokenType.PasswordResetToken,
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overrides: { expiresAt: daysAgo(31) },
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},
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];
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const seededAppTokenIds = new Map<string, string>();
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beforeAll(async () => {
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const appTokenRepository =
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getCoreRepository<AppTokenEntity>(AppTokenEntity);
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for (const fixture of appTokenFixtures) {
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const saved = await appTokenRepository.save(
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appTokenRepository.create({
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userId: USER_DATA_SEED_IDS.TIM,
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type: fixture.type,
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value: '',
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...fixture.overrides,
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}),
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);
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seededAppTokenIds.set(fixture.label, saved.id);
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}
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await getCoreRepository<AppTokenEntity>(AppTokenEntity).delete({
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id: In([...seededAppTokenIds.values()]),
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});
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});
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it('should delete only refresh tokens ended beyond retention', async () => {
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const cleanupJob = getAppProviderByClassName<{
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handle: () => Promise<void>;
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}>('UserSessionCleanupCronJob');
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await cleanupJob.handle();
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const remainingRows = await getCoreRepository<AppTokenEntity>(
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AppTokenEntity,
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).findBy({ id: In([...seededAppTokenIds.values()]) });
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const remainingIds = remainingRows.map((row) => row.id);
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const getSeededAppTokenId = (label: string): string => {
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const id = seededAppTokenIds.get(label);
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if (id === undefined) {
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throw new Error(`Unknown app token fixture: ${label}`);
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}
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return id;
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};
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expect(remainingIds).not.toContain(
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getSeededAppTokenId('refresh token expired beyond retention'),
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);
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expect(remainingIds).not.toContain(
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getSeededAppTokenId('refresh token revoked beyond retention'),
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);
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expect(remainingIds).toContain(getSeededAppTokenId('active refresh token'));
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expect(remainingIds).toContain(
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getSeededAppTokenId('refresh token expired within retention'),
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);
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expect(remainingIds).toContain(
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getSeededAppTokenId('refresh token revoked within retention'),
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);
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expect(remainingIds).toContain(
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getSeededAppTokenId('long-expired token of another type'),
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);
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});
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});
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});
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