997b2c38de
Stacked on #23642. Integration suite for the cookie-session surface, organized as one successful/failing spec pair per stage of the session lifecycle. 14 spec files, ~36 tests, all over real HTTP against the booted app. ## Coverage by stage **1. Session creation on auth exchanges** (`successful-`/`failing-session-creation`) Flag gating (default off: tokens, no cookie, no row); httpOnly cookie snapshot with 180d expiry window; SHA-256 hash-at-rest with the row bound to the apple seed workspace; scripted sign-ins without an Origin header still get the cookie; login-CSRF refuses the cookie for disallowed origins while returning the token pair; sign-in over an existing session revokes it as `SUPERSEDED`; a failed credentials exchange mints nothing. **2. Cookie delivery** (`successful-session-cookie-delivery`, `secure-deployment-session-cookie`) The runtime side door (`AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE=none` forces the secure path) pins the `__Host-`/`Secure`/`SameSite=None` variant in the default CI run. The exact production combination (`__Host-`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Lax`) is covered by a dedicated spec that requires the app to boot with an https `SERVER_URL`: the secure branch is decided by config, never the transport, so no TLS is needed. It skips itself on plain-http boots; CI runs it as an extra step on one shard with `SERVER_URL=https://localhost:3000`, including the `__Host-` round-trip and the plain-cookie-name downgrade refusal. **3. Per-request authentication and the CSRF read gate** (`successful-`/`failing-session-cookie-authentication`) A cookie-only request resolves the seeded user; a `sess_` token presented as Bearer is rejected; cookie-authenticated unsafe requests with a disallowed or missing Origin get 403 `CSRF_ORIGIN_MISMATCH`; an unknown session token is unauthenticated and its dead cookie is cleared. **3b. Workspace binding** (`successful-session-workspace-binding`) Tim signs into both seeded workspaces (apple and yc); each session row is bound to the workspace its exchange selected (`workspaceId` and `userWorkspaceId` pinned to the seed ids), and each cookie resolves to its own workspace context, with no request-side input able to pivot a session across workspaces. **3c. Credentialed CORS** (`cors-credentialed-origins`) Allowlisted origins get the reflected `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` plus `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` and `Vary: Origin`, preflight included; other origins keep the public wildcard. See tooling notes: this surface was previously untestable. **4. Sessions API** (`successful-`/`failing-user-sessions-api`) `currentUserSessions` marks exactly the presented session as current; `revokeUserSession` revokes by id (`USER_REVOKED`) and drops it from the listing; `revokeAllOtherUserSessions` spares the presented session; cross-user revocation and unauthenticated listing are refused. **5. Exits** (`successful-sign-out`, `failing-session-expiration`) `signOut` revokes with `USER_SIGN_OUT`, clears the cookie, and reuse fails immediately (cache invalidated, not TTL-bound); a cookie-less sign-out clears nothing, so a cross-site POST cannot log a visitor out; absolute-lifetime and idle-timeout expiry both reject and clear the cookie. **7. Cleanup cron** (`user-session-cleanup-cron`) Both halves run in-process against fixtures spanning the 30d retention boundary. Sessions: expired/revoked-beyond-retention deleted; active, recently-expired, and idle-expired rows survive (the idle case pins the known predicate gap). Refresh tokens: old-expired and old-revoked deleted, fresh kept, and a long-expired token of another type survives, pinning the `type` filter that keeps the shared `appToken` table safe from the hard-delete. Not covered here by design: the impersonation park/restore sub-funnel (stage 6, follow-up) and the client-side funnel (stage 8, front-end scope). Password-change revocation and the renewal bridge are also left to follow-ups. ## How the flag is flipped `AUTH_COOKIE_SESSIONS_ENABLED` (and `AUTH_COOKIE_SAME_SITE` for the secure side door) are toggled at runtime through the admin panel config API, reusing the `twenty-config` test utils: `DatabaseConfigDriver.set` updates its cache synchronously and `TwentyConfigService` consults the DB driver before the env driver. No `.env.test` change, no app reboot, runs in the default CI environment without the `ci:auth-cookie-sessions` label. `SERVER_URL` is env-only, hence the dedicated CI step for the production secure-deployment spec. ## Shared tooling changes - **`applyCredentialedCors` extraction (src change)**: the integration harness booted with Nest's wildcard `cors: true`, not the credentialed-allowlist setup living in `main.ts`, so the CORS surface was untestable by construction. The setup moved into `applyCredentialedCors`, now called by both the production bootstrap and `createApp`, making the harness's CORS behavior the deployed one. Behavior-neutral for production. - `makeMetadataAPIRequest` accepts an explicit `null` token for unauthenticated requests. Passing `undefined` silently fell back to the default admin token (parameter defaults apply to `undefined`), which made supposedly public requests Bearer-authenticated, bypassing both the cookie auth path and the CSRF middleware. Existing call sites are unaffected. - The `GetLoginTokenFromCredentials` / `GetAuthTokensFromLoginToken` documents moved into shared query factories; the workspace-origin builder is extracted and generalized to any seeded subdomain (`buildWorkspaceOriginForSubdomain`, reused by `getAccessTokenForCredentials`). - Suite-local helpers: `signInWithCookieCapture` (full credentials exchange returning the raw supertest response, with a `workspaceSubdomain` option), `postMetadataOperationWithHeaders` (Origin/Cookie header control), cookie extraction for both cookie names, clearing-cookie detection, snapshot normalization (token and expiry redacted), and shared `ALLOWED_ORIGIN`/`DISALLOWED_ORIGIN` constants derived from `FRONTEND_URL`. Verified locally: full suite green in CI mode on both plain-http and https-`SERVER_URL` boots; oxlint and tsc clean. --------- Co-authored-by: Félix Malfait <felix.malfait@gmail.com>
138 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
138 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { getCoreRepository } from 'test/integration/utils/get-core-repository.util';
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import {
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extractSessionCookie,
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postMetadataOperationWithHeaders,
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signInWithCookieCapture,
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} from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/utils/sign-in-with-cookie-capture.util';
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import {
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currentUserSessionsQueryFactory,
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revokeAllOtherUserSessionsQueryFactory,
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revokeUserSessionQueryFactory,
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} from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/utils/user-session-operations.util';
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import { UserSessionEntity } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/user-session.entity';
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import { UserSessionRevokedReason } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/types/user-session-revoked-reason.type';
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import { hashUserSessionToken } from 'src/engine/core-modules/user-session/utils/hash-user-session-token.util';
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import { ALLOWED_ORIGIN } from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/constants/session-origins.constants';
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import { setupDatabaseConfigOverrideForSuite } from 'test/integration/graphql/suites/auth/user-sessions/utils/setup-database-config-override.util';
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type UserSessionApiEntry = {
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id: string;
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isCurrent: boolean;
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isImpersonating: boolean;
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authProvider: string;
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};
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describe('successful user sessions API (integration)', () => {
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setupDatabaseConfigOverrideForSuite('AUTH_COOKIE_SESSIONS_ENABLED', true);
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let currentSessionCookieHeader: string;
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let otherSessionToken: string;
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const fetchSessions = async (): Promise<UserSessionApiEntry[]> => {
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const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
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currentUserSessionsQueryFactory(),
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{
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originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
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cookieHeader: currentSessionCookieHeader,
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},
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);
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expect(response.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
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return response.body.data.currentUserSessions;
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};
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beforeAll(async () => {
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// Two devices: the "other" one signs in first so the second sign-in does
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// not supersede it (no cookie presented on either exchange).
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const otherDeviceResponse = await signInWithCookieCapture({
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originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
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});
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const currentDeviceResponse = await signInWithCookieCapture({
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originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
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});
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const otherCookie = extractSessionCookie(otherDeviceResponse);
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const currentCookie = extractSessionCookie(currentDeviceResponse);
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if (!otherCookie || !currentCookie) {
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throw new Error('Expected session cookies from both sign-ins');
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}
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otherSessionToken = otherCookie.sessionToken;
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currentSessionCookieHeader = currentCookie.cookieHeader;
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});
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it('should list active sessions and mark only the presented one as current', async () => {
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const sessions = await fetchSessions();
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expect(sessions.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
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const currentSessions = sessions.filter((session) => session.isCurrent);
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expect(currentSessions).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(currentSessions[0].authProvider).toBe('password');
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expect(currentSessions[0].isImpersonating).toBe(false);
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});
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it('should revoke a targeted session by id', async () => {
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const otherSessionRow = await getCoreRepository<UserSessionEntity>(
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UserSessionEntity,
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).findOneBy({ tokenHash: hashUserSessionToken(otherSessionToken) });
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if (!otherSessionRow) {
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throw new Error('Expected the other session row');
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}
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const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
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revokeUserSessionQueryFactory({ userSessionId: otherSessionRow.id }),
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{
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originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
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cookieHeader: currentSessionCookieHeader,
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},
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);
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expect(response.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
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expect(response.body.data.revokeUserSession).toBe(true);
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const revokedRow = await getCoreRepository<UserSessionEntity>(
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UserSessionEntity,
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).findOneBy({ id: otherSessionRow.id });
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expect(revokedRow?.revokedAt).not.toBeNull();
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expect(revokedRow?.revokedReason).toBe(UserSessionRevokedReason.UserRevoked);
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const sessions = await fetchSessions();
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expect(
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sessions.find((session) => session.id === otherSessionRow.id),
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).toBeUndefined();
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});
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it('should revoke every other session but keep the presented one alive', async () => {
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// A fresh sign-in guarantees at least one other active session to revoke.
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await signInWithCookieCapture({ originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN });
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const response = await postMetadataOperationWithHeaders(
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revokeAllOtherUserSessionsQueryFactory(),
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{
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originHeader: ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
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cookieHeader: currentSessionCookieHeader,
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},
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);
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expect(response.body.errors).toBeUndefined();
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expect(response.body.data.revokeAllOtherUserSessions).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(
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1,
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);
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const sessions = await fetchSessions();
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expect(sessions).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(sessions[0].isCurrent).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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