Files
twenty/packages/twenty-front-component-renderer/src/__stories__/utils/runFrontComponentSandboxIsolationProbe.ts
T
Raphaël Bosi 60f5964c64 Run front components in a sandboxed opaque-origin iframe (#22588)
Front components run untrusted third-party React in a Web Worker. That
worker previously shared the host origin, so it could reach
origin-scoped storage (the metadata-store IndexedDB, the
`twenty-sign-out` BroadcastChannel), cookies, and same-origin resources.

This runs the worker inside a `sandbox="allow-scripts"` (no
`allow-same-origin`) iframe, giving it an opaque origin where the
browser denies localStorage, cookies, IndexedDB, and BroadcastChannel
outright. The worker is kept inside the iframe (rather than a bare
iframe) so untrusted code always runs off the main thread; the
remote-dom render path is unchanged.

- **Transport:** host ↔ iframe ↔ worker over a re-transferred
`MessagePort` (`ThreadMessagePort`); a small bootstrap script is inlined
into the iframe via `srcdoc` (bundled at build time by a prebuild step)
and relays the port to the worker it spawns. Messages across the
boundary use a typed discriminated union with a single parse/guard.
- **Network:** under the opaque origin, direct fetches to the Twenty API
would be `Origin: null`, so the component source and SDK modules are
fetched through an allowlisted, credential-omitting `hostFetch` bridge
and blobbed inside the worker. The allowlist is single-sourced on the
host (http(s) origins only) and carried in the render context. The
bridge is mandatory (rendering fails closed if it is missing), refuses
redirects except for GET/HEAD to the known file-storage URLs, and caps
response body size.
- **SDK loading:** SDK client modules now load inside the worker through
the bridge, replacing the host-side SDK-blob state/effect/provider with
a pure `getSdkClientUrls` URL builder.
- **Isolation tests:** a unit test locks the sandbox attribute
(`allow-scripts`, never `allow-same-origin`); a browser test asserts the
worker actually gets an opaque origin with storage denied, probing
cookies by writing one rather than reading an empty jar.

Also adds a "List Companies" seed front component that queries workspace
data via the SDK client (exercising the bridge end-to-end),
single-sources the command-menu confirmation-modal result event name and
detail type in `twenty-shared` (previously a hand-synced duplicate), and
decomposes the renderer (bridge, sandbox, worker orchestration) into
small single-purpose utils with unit tests.

## How it works

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant Host as Host window (twenty-front · host origin)
    participant Frame as Sandboxed iframe (allow-scripts · opaque origin)
    participant Worker as Worker (untrusted component · opaque origin)
    participant API as Twenty API (host origin)

    rect rgb(238,242,248)
    Note over Host,Worker: 1 — Boot handshake
    Host->>Frame: create iframe sandbox="allow-scripts", srcdoc = inlined bootstrap script
    Host->>Host: MessageChannel + ThreadMessagePort(port1)<br/>exports = host API + hostFetch
    Frame-->>Host: READY
    Host->>Frame: INIT + transfer port2
    Frame->>Worker: spawn inlined Worker + re-transfer port2
    Worker->>Worker: ThreadMessagePort(port)<br/>exports = render / updateContext
    Note over Host,Worker: Port now entangles Host ↔ Worker directly
    end

    rect rgb(246,240,248)
    Note over Host,Worker: 2 — Render
    Host->>Worker: render(connection, { componentUrl, sdkClientUrls, hostFetchOrigins, token })
    Worker->>Worker: override globalThis.fetch<br/>(Twenty origins → hostFetch)
    end

    rect rgb(248,244,238)
    Note over Worker,API: 3 — Network via hostFetch bridge (opaque Origin:null cannot reach the API directly)
    Worker->>Host: hostFetch(componentUrl, Bearer)
    Host->>Host: origin allowlist + credentials:'omit'
    Host->>API: fetch(componentUrl)
    API-->>Host: source
    Host-->>Worker: { status, headers, body }
    Worker->>Host: hostFetch(sdkClientUrls.core / .metadata)
    Host-->>Worker: SDK module sources
    Worker->>Worker: blob each source in its own opaque origin → import() → run untrusted React
    end

    rect rgb(238,248,242)
    Note over Worker,Host: 4 — Render mirror
    Worker->>Host: remote-dom mutations (RemoteConnection)
    Host->>Host: RemoteReceiver → RemoteRootRenderer → host DOM
    end

    Note over Worker: Opaque origin ⇒ browser denies localStorage,<br/>cookies, IndexedDB, BroadcastChannel
```
2026-07-10 13:10:30 +00:00

166 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
import { createFrontComponentSandboxIframe } from '@/remote/sandbox/utils/createFrontComponentSandboxIframe';
type FrontComponentSandboxIsolationReport = {
iframeOrigin: string;
workerOrigin: string;
localStorageDenied: boolean;
cookiesDenied: boolean;
indexedDbDenied: boolean;
workerIndexedDbDenied: boolean;
};
const SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_REPORT_MESSAGE_TYPE =
'front-component-sandbox-isolation-report';
const SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
const SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_DATABASE_NAME =
'front-component-sandbox-isolation-probe';
type WorkerProbeReport = {
workerOrigin: string;
workerIndexedDbDenied: boolean;
};
const runWorkerStorageIsolationProbe = (databaseName: string): void => {
const report = { workerOrigin: self.origin, workerIndexedDbDenied: false };
try {
indexedDB.open(databaseName);
} catch {
report.workerIndexedDbDenied = true;
}
self.postMessage(report);
};
const runSandboxIframeIsolationProbe = (
workerProbeSource: string,
reportMessageType: string,
databaseName: string,
): void => {
const report = {
iframeOrigin: self.origin,
workerOrigin: '',
localStorageDenied: false,
cookiesDenied: false,
indexedDbDenied: false,
workerIndexedDbDenied: false,
};
try {
window.localStorage.getItem('probe');
} catch {
report.localStorageDenied = true;
}
try {
document.cookie = 'front_component_sandbox_isolation_probe=1';
report.cookiesDenied = !document.cookie.includes(
'front_component_sandbox_isolation_probe=1',
);
document.cookie = 'front_component_sandbox_isolation_probe=1;max-age=0';
} catch {
report.cookiesDenied = true;
}
try {
indexedDB.open(databaseName);
} catch {
report.indexedDbDenied = true;
}
const workerUrl = URL.createObjectURL(
new Blob([workerProbeSource], { type: 'application/javascript' }),
);
const worker = new Worker(workerUrl);
worker.onmessage = (event: MessageEvent<WorkerProbeReport>) => {
report.workerOrigin = event.data.workerOrigin;
report.workerIndexedDbDenied = event.data.workerIndexedDbDenied;
parent.postMessage({ type: reportMessageType, report }, '*');
};
};
const serializeProbeFunctionInvocation = (
probeFunction: (...probeArguments: string[]) => void,
...probeArguments: string[]
): string => {
const serializedArguments = probeArguments
.map((probeArgument) => JSON.stringify(probeArgument))
.join(', ');
return `(${probeFunction.toString()})(${serializedArguments});`;
};
const buildSandboxIsolationProbeDocument = (): string => {
const workerProbeSource = serializeProbeFunctionInvocation(
runWorkerStorageIsolationProbe,
SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_DATABASE_NAME,
);
const sandboxProbeScript = serializeProbeFunctionInvocation(
runSandboxIframeIsolationProbe,
workerProbeSource,
SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_REPORT_MESSAGE_TYPE,
SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_DATABASE_NAME,
);
return `<!doctype html><html><body><script>${sandboxProbeScript}</script></body></html>`;
};
export const runFrontComponentSandboxIsolationProbe =
(): Promise<FrontComponentSandboxIsolationReport> => {
const sandboxIframe = createFrontComponentSandboxIframe(
buildSandboxIsolationProbeDocument(),
);
return new Promise<FrontComponentSandboxIsolationReport>(
(resolve, reject) => {
const abortController = new AbortController();
const removeSandbox = () => {
abortController.abort();
sandboxIframe.remove();
};
const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
removeSandbox();
reject(
new Error('Front component sandbox isolation probe timed out'),
);
}, SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS);
window.addEventListener(
'message',
(event: MessageEvent) => {
if (event.source !== sandboxIframe.contentWindow) {
return;
}
const data = event.data as {
type?: string;
report?: FrontComponentSandboxIsolationReport;
} | null;
if (
data?.type !== SANDBOX_ISOLATION_PROBE_REPORT_MESSAGE_TYPE ||
!isDefined(data.report)
) {
return;
}
clearTimeout(timeoutId);
removeSandbox();
resolve(data.report);
},
{ signal: abortController.signal },
);
document.body.append(sandboxIframe);
},
);
};