Files
twenty/packages/twenty-server/test/integration/upgrade/suites/2-5-instance-command-slow-1798000006000-encrypt-application-registration-variable.integration-spec.ts
T
Charles Bochet 7fa136f305 feat(twenty-server): migrate remaining at-rest encryption sites to versioned envelope (#20550)
## Summary

Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR
(#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and
migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer.
This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the
versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed
CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window
— every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently
delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload.

### Service migrations
- **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF
info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new
`decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for
the resolver display path.
- **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers —
**instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config
readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info
is `instance`. Updated consumers:
  - `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap`
  - `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials`
- **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** —
workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into
`decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at
execution time.
- **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`**
(workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the
secret/non-secret toggle.
- **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are
shared across the JWKS.
- **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING
config variables.

### Slow instance commands (2.5.0)

Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows
into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained:

| timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId |
`"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance
| `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance |
`"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_
— heterogeneous jsonb column |

All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2
form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint.
Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint —
they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback.

### Tests

- Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the
idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope.
- New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts
`decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId`
(instance scope).
- Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`,
`ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API
and the workspace HKDF context plumbing.
- New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the
service spec.
- Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to
assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw
legacy CTR.

### Out of scope (future PRs)
- `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke
`jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key +
`encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own
migration.
- `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc`
`iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration.

## Test plan

- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier)
- [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token |
application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var
| jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable |
encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key |
encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass.
- [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86
tests pass.
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer
(each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the
migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
2026-05-14 06:10:52 +00:00

254 lines
7.7 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'crypto';
import { config } from 'dotenv';
import { isDefined } from 'twenty-shared/utils';
import { DataSource } from 'typeorm';
import { buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv } from 'test/integration/upgrade/utils/build-secret-encryption-service.util';
import { SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/constants/secret-encryption.constant';
import { SecretEncryptionService } from 'src/engine/core-modules/secret-encryption/secret-encryption.service';
import { EncryptApplicationRegistrationVariableSlowInstanceCommand } from 'src/database/commands/upgrade-version-command/2-5/2-5-instance-command-slow-1798000006000-encrypt-application-registration-variable';
jest.useRealTimers();
config({
path: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' ? '.env.test' : '.env',
override: true,
});
const TEST_REGISTRATION_NAME_PREFIX = 'encrypt-app-reg-var-test-';
const CHECK_CONSTRAINT_NAME =
'CHK_applicationRegistrationVariable_encryptedValue_encrypted';
const CHECK_CONSTRAINT_EXPR = `"encryptedValue" = '' OR "encryptedValue" LIKE '${SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX}%'`;
const dropCheckConstraint = (dataSource: DataSource): Promise<unknown> =>
dataSource.query(
`ALTER TABLE "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "${CHECK_CONSTRAINT_NAME}"`,
);
const restoreCheckConstraint = async (
dataSource: DataSource,
): Promise<void> => {
await dropCheckConstraint(dataSource);
await dataSource.query(
`ALTER TABLE "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
ADD CONSTRAINT "${CHECK_CONSTRAINT_NAME}"
CHECK (${CHECK_CONSTRAINT_EXPR})`,
);
};
describe('2-5 slow instance command 1798000006000 - EncryptApplicationRegistrationVariableSlowInstanceCommand (integration)', () => {
let dataSource: DataSource;
let secretEncryptionService: SecretEncryptionService;
let command: EncryptApplicationRegistrationVariableSlowInstanceCommand;
let workspaceId: string;
let registrationId: string;
const seededVariableIds: string[] = [];
const seedVariable = async ({
encryptedValue,
isSecret = true,
}: {
encryptedValue: string;
isSecret?: boolean;
}): Promise<string> => {
await dropCheckConstraint(dataSource);
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
await dataSource.query(
`INSERT INTO "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
(id, "applicationRegistrationId", "key", "encryptedValue",
"isSecret", "isRequired")
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, false)`,
[id, registrationId, `KEY_${id}`, encryptedValue, isSecret],
);
seededVariableIds.push(id);
return id;
};
beforeAll(async () => {
dataSource = new DataSource({
type: 'postgres',
url: process.env.PG_DATABASE_URL,
schema: 'core',
entities: [],
synchronize: false,
});
await dataSource.initialize();
secretEncryptionService = buildSecretEncryptionServiceFromEnv();
command = new EncryptApplicationRegistrationVariableSlowInstanceCommand(
secretEncryptionService,
);
const [seedWorkspace] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT id FROM "core"."workspace" LIMIT 1`,
);
if (!isDefined(seedWorkspace)) {
throw new Error(
'No seeded workspace found; run database:reset before the integration suite.',
);
}
workspaceId = seedWorkspace.id as string;
registrationId = crypto.randomUUID();
await dataSource.query(
`INSERT INTO "core"."applicationRegistration"
(id, "universalIdentifier", name, "oAuthClientId",
"oAuthRedirectUris", "oAuthScopes", "workspaceId", "sourceType")
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, 'local')`,
[
registrationId,
crypto.randomUUID(),
`${TEST_REGISTRATION_NAME_PREFIX}${registrationId}`,
crypto.randomUUID(),
['http://localhost:3000/callback'],
['read'],
workspaceId,
],
);
}, 30000);
afterEach(async () => {
if (seededVariableIds.length > 0) {
await dataSource.query(
`DELETE FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
WHERE id = ANY($1::uuid[])`,
[seededVariableIds],
);
seededVariableIds.length = 0;
}
await restoreCheckConstraint(dataSource);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await dataSource.query(
`DELETE FROM "core"."applicationRegistration" WHERE id = $1`,
[registrationId],
);
await dataSource?.destroy();
});
it('upgrades legacy CTR rows to enc:v2 with instance-scoped HKDF', async () => {
const plaintext = 'legacy-ctr-registration-variable-secret';
const id = await seedVariable({
encryptedValue: secretEncryptionService.encrypt(plaintext),
});
await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
const [row] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue"
FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
WHERE id = $1`,
[id],
);
expect(
row.encryptedValue.startsWith(SECRET_ENCRYPTION_ENVELOPE_V2_PREFIX),
).toBe(true);
expect(secretEncryptionService.decryptVersioned(row.encryptedValue)).toBe(
plaintext,
);
});
it('leaves unfilled rows (encryptedValue = "") untouched', async () => {
const id = await seedVariable({ encryptedValue: '' });
await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
const [row] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue"
FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
WHERE id = $1`,
[id],
);
expect(row.encryptedValue).toBe('');
});
it('leaves enc:v2 rows untouched and is idempotent across re-runs', async () => {
const plaintext = 'already-v2-registration-secret';
const preexistingV2 = secretEncryptionService.encryptVersioned(plaintext);
const id = await seedVariable({ encryptedValue: preexistingV2 });
await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
const [afterFirstRun] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue"
FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
WHERE id = $1`,
[id],
);
expect(afterFirstRun.encryptedValue).toBe(preexistingV2);
await command.runDataMigration(dataSource);
const [afterSecondRun] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue"
FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
WHERE id = $1`,
[id],
);
expect(afterSecondRun.encryptedValue).toBe(preexistingV2);
});
it('up() applies the CHECK constraint that rejects plaintext inserts', async () => {
await dropCheckConstraint(dataSource);
const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner();
try {
await command.up(queryRunner);
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
seededVariableIds.push(id);
await expect(
dataSource.query(
`INSERT INTO "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
(id, "applicationRegistrationId", "key", "encryptedValue",
"isSecret", "isRequired")
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'plaintext-should-be-rejected', true, false)`,
[id, registrationId, `KEY_${id}`],
),
).rejects.toThrow(/check constraint/i);
} finally {
await queryRunner.release();
}
});
it('down() removes the CHECK constraint and lets plaintext through (for rollback safety only)', async () => {
const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner();
try {
await command.down(queryRunner);
const id = await seedVariable({
encryptedValue: 'plaintext-allowed-after-down',
});
const [row] = await dataSource.query(
`SELECT "encryptedValue"
FROM "core"."applicationRegistrationVariable"
WHERE id = $1`,
[id],
);
expect(row.encryptedValue).toBe('plaintext-allowed-after-down');
} finally {
await queryRunner.release();
}
});
});