feat(twenty-server): migrate remaining at-rest encryption sites to versioned envelope (#20550)

## Summary

Second PR in the encryption key rotation series. The previous PR
(#20528) introduced `ENCRYPTION_KEY` + the versioned
`enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` envelope inside `SecretEncryptionService` and
migrated `ConnectedAccountTokenEncryptionService` as the first consumer.
This PR routes every remaining at-rest encryption site through the
versioned envelope so that `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (and the future
`FALLBACK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) actually covers them. The legacy unprefixed
CTR ciphertext remains readable as a fallback during the rollout window
— every migrated read site uses `decryptVersioned`, which transparently
delegates to the legacy CTR decrypt when it sees an unprefixed payload.

### Service migrations
- **`ApplicationVariableEntityService` (#8)** — workspace-scoped. HKDF
info is bound to each row's `workspaceId`. A new
`decryptAndMaskVersioned` helper lands on `SecretEncryptionService` for
the resolver display path.
- **`ApplicationRegistrationVariableService` (#7)** + consumers —
**instance-scoped**. Registration variables are server-level config
readable by every workspace that installs the application, so HKDF info
is `instance`. Updated consumers:
  - `LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildServerVariableEnvMap`
  - `ConnectionProviderService.getClientCredentials`
- **`LogicFunctionExecutorService.buildEnvVar` (#9)** —
workspace-scoped. Each variable's `workspaceId` is threaded into
`decryptVersioned`, so per-workspace HKDF contexts are honoured at
execution time.
- **`UpdateApplicationVariableActionHandlerService`**
(workspace-migration runner) — threads `workspaceId` through the
secret/non-secret toggle.
- **`JwtKeyManagerService` (#3)** — instance-scoped. Signing keys are
shared across the JWKS.
- **`ConfigStorageService` (#6)** — instance-scoped sensitive STRING
config variables.

### Slow instance commands (2.5.0)

Each migrated site has a paired backfill that re-encrypts existing rows
into the v2 envelope before the column is constrained:

| timestamp | command | scope | CHECK constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| `1798000005000` | encrypt-application-variable | workspaceId |
`"isSecret" = false OR value = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000006000` | encrypt-application-registration-variable | instance
| `"encryptedValue" = '' OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000007000` | encrypt-signing-key-private-keys | instance |
`"privateKey" IS NULL OR value LIKE 'enc:v2:%'` |
| `1798000008000` | encrypt-sensitive-config-storage | instance | _none_
— heterogeneous jsonb column |

All backfills are idempotent (the SELECT filter skips rows already in v2
form) and run before their respective `up()` adds the CHECK constraint.
Every `down()` deliberately stops at dropping the CHECK constraint —
they intentionally do not re-introduce plaintext on rollback.

### Tests

- Unit specs for each new slow command cover the v2 upgrade path, the
idempotency invariant, and the instance vs workspace HKDF scope.
- New `JwtKeyManagerService` spec asserts
`decryptVersioned`/`encryptVersioned` are called without `workspaceId`
(instance scope).
- Updated existing specs for `ApplicationVariableEntityService`,
`ConfigStorageService`, and `buildEnvVar` to assert the versioned API
and the workspace HKDF context plumbing.
- New `SecretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned` cases in the
service spec.
- Updated the `applicationRegistrationVariable` integration spec to
assert the column now stores `enc:v2:<keyId>:<base64>` instead of raw
legacy CTR.

### Out of scope (future PRs)
- `PostgresCredentialsService` — bespoke
`jwtWrapperService.generateAppSecret`–derived key +
`encryptText`/`decryptText` from `auth.util.ts`; deserves its own
migration.
- `SimpleSecretEncryptionUtil` (TOTP) — entirely different `aes-256-cbc`
`iv:enc` format; deserves its own migration.

## Test plan

- [x] `npx nx typecheck twenty-server`
- [x] `npx nx lint:diff-with-main twenty-server` (oxlint + prettier)
- [x] Local jest run for `secret-encryption | connected-account-token |
application-variable | application-registration-variable | build-env-var
| jwt-key-manager | config-storage | encrypt-application-variable |
encrypt-application-registration-variable | encrypt-signing-key |
encrypt-sensitive-config-storage` — 17 suites, 106 tests pass.
- [x] Local jest run for `upgrade | instance-command` — 12 suites, 86
tests pass.
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Manual review of CHECK constraint shapes by a server reviewer
(each one matches `enc:v2:%` rather than `enc:v_:%` since none of the
migrated columns can legitimately hold `enc:v1:` ciphertext).
This commit is contained in:
Charles Bochet
2026-05-14 08:10:52 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 04eb913551
commit 7fa136f305
30 changed files with 1815 additions and 63 deletions
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Field, ObjectType } from '@nestjs/graphql';
import { IDField } from '@ptc-org/nestjs-query-graphql';
import {
Check,
Column,
CreateDateColumn,
Entity,
@@ -24,6 +25,13 @@ import { ApplicationRegistrationEntity } from 'src/engine/core-modules/applicati
'applicationRegistrationId',
])
@Index('IDX_APP_REG_VAR_APP_REGISTRATION_ID', ['applicationRegistrationId'])
// Constrains `encryptedValue` to the unfilled default ('') or to the
// versioned envelope. Registration variables are instance-scoped so the
// envelope's HKDF info does not include a workspaceId.
@Check(
'CHK_applicationRegistrationVariable_encryptedValue_encrypted',
`"encryptedValue" = '' OR "encryptedValue" LIKE 'enc:v2:%'`,
)
export class ApplicationRegistrationVariableEntity {
@IDField(() => UUIDScalarType)
@PrimaryGeneratedColumn('uuid')
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ export class ApplicationRegistrationVariableService {
value: variable.isFilled
? variable.isSecret
? '•••••••••••••'
: this.encryptionService.decrypt(variable.encryptedValue)
: this.encryptionService.decryptVersioned(variable.encryptedValue)
: null,
}));
}
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export class ApplicationRegistrationVariableService {
workspaceId,
);
const encryptedValue = this.encryptionService.encrypt(input.value);
const encryptedValue = this.encryptionService.encryptVersioned(input.value);
const variable = this.variableRepository.create({
applicationRegistrationId: input.applicationRegistrationId,
@@ -98,7 +98,9 @@ export class ApplicationRegistrationVariableService {
const updateData: Record<string, unknown> = {};
if (isDefined(update.value)) {
updateData.encryptedValue = this.encryptionService.encrypt(update.value);
updateData.encryptedValue = this.encryptionService.encryptVersioned(
update.value,
);
}
if (isDefined(update.resetValue) && update.resetValue) {
@@ -39,17 +39,23 @@ describe('ApplicationVariableEntityService', () => {
{
provide: SecretEncryptionService,
useValue: {
encrypt: jest.fn((value: string) => `encrypted_${value}`),
decrypt: jest.fn((value: string) =>
value.replace('encrypted_', ''),
encryptVersioned: jest.fn(
(value: string, opts?: { workspaceId?: string }) =>
`enc:v2:deadbeef:${value}|${opts?.workspaceId ?? 'instance'}`,
),
decryptAndMask: jest.fn(
decryptVersioned: jest.fn(
(value: string, _opts?: { workspaceId?: string }) =>
value.replace(/^enc:v2:[0-9a-f]+:/, '').replace(/\|.*$/, ''),
),
decryptAndMaskVersioned: jest.fn(
({
value: _value,
mask: _mask,
workspaceId: _workspaceId,
}: {
value: string;
mask: string;
workspaceId?: string;
}) => '********',
),
},
@@ -76,7 +82,7 @@ describe('ApplicationVariableEntityService', () => {
});
describe('update', () => {
it('should encrypt value when variable is secret', async () => {
it('should encrypt value with workspaceId-scoped envelope when variable is secret', async () => {
const existingVariable = {
id: '1',
key: 'API_KEY',
@@ -95,12 +101,13 @@ describe('ApplicationVariableEntityService', () => {
workspaceId: mockWorkspaceId,
});
expect(secretEncryptionService.encrypt).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect(secretEncryptionService.encryptVersioned).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'new-secret-value',
{ workspaceId: mockWorkspaceId },
);
expect(repository.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ key: 'API_KEY', applicationId: mockApplicationId },
{ value: 'encrypted_new-secret-value' },
{ value: `enc:v2:deadbeef:new-secret-value|${mockWorkspaceId}` },
);
expect(workspaceCacheService.invalidateAndRecompute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
mockWorkspaceId,
@@ -127,7 +134,7 @@ describe('ApplicationVariableEntityService', () => {
workspaceId: mockWorkspaceId,
});
expect(secretEncryptionService.encrypt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(secretEncryptionService.encryptVersioned).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(repository.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ key: 'PUBLIC_URL', applicationId: mockApplicationId },
{ value: 'https://new-url.com' },
@@ -167,28 +174,35 @@ describe('ApplicationVariableEntityService', () => {
value: 'https://example.com',
isSecret: false,
applicationId: mockApplicationId,
workspaceId: mockWorkspaceId,
} as ApplicationVariableEntity;
const result = service.getDisplayValue(variable);
expect(result).toBe('https://example.com');
expect(secretEncryptionService.decryptAndMask).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(
secretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned,
).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should call decryptAndMask for secret variables', () => {
it('should call decryptAndMaskVersioned with the row workspaceId for secret variables', () => {
const variable = {
id: '1',
key: 'SECRET_KEY',
value: 'encrypted_value',
value: 'enc:v2:deadbeef:secret|workspace-123',
isSecret: true,
applicationId: mockApplicationId,
workspaceId: mockWorkspaceId,
} as ApplicationVariableEntity;
service.getDisplayValue(variable);
expect(secretEncryptionService.decryptAndMask).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
value: 'encrypted_value',
expect(
secretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned,
).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
value: 'enc:v2:deadbeef:secret|workspace-123',
mask: SECRET_APPLICATION_VARIABLE_MASK,
workspaceId: mockWorkspaceId,
});
});
});
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { ObjectType } from '@nestjs/graphql';
import { IDField } from '@ptc-org/nestjs-query-graphql';
import {
Check,
Column,
CreateDateColumn,
Entity,
@@ -17,6 +18,14 @@ import { SyncableEntity } from 'src/engine/workspace-manager/types/syncable-enti
schema: 'core',
})
@ObjectType('ApplicationVariable')
// Constrains `value` for secret rows to the versioned envelope, while
// leaving plaintext non-secret values untouched. The keyId portion is
// not constrained so future ENCRYPTION_KEY rotations do not need a DDL
// migration.
@Check(
'CHK_applicationVariable_value_encrypted',
`"isSecret" = false OR "value" = '' OR "value" LIKE 'enc:v2:%'`,
)
export class ApplicationVariableEntity extends SyncableEntity {
@IDField(() => UUIDScalarType)
@PrimaryGeneratedColumn('uuid')
@@ -32,9 +32,10 @@ export class ApplicationVariableEntityService {
return '';
}
return this.secretEncryptionService.decryptAndMask({
return this.secretEncryptionService.decryptAndMaskVersioned({
value: applicationVariable.value,
mask: SECRET_APPLICATION_VARIABLE_MASK,
workspaceId: applicationVariable.workspaceId,
});
}
@@ -60,7 +61,9 @@ export class ApplicationVariableEntityService {
}
const encryptedValue = existingVariable.isSecret
? this.secretEncryptionService.encrypt(plainTextValue)
? this.secretEncryptionService.encryptVersioned(plainTextValue, {
workspaceId,
})
: plainTextValue;
await this.applicationVariableRepository.update(
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ export class ConnectionProviderService {
variables.map((v) => [
v.key,
v.encryptedValue
? this.secretEncryptionService.decrypt(v.encryptedValue)
? this.secretEncryptionService.decryptVersioned(v.encryptedValue)
: '',
]),
);