security: harden CI against supply-chain attacks (#20476)

- Pin all third-party actions to SHA
- Gate claude.yml triggers to internal authors with Harden-Runner egress
audit
- Ignore fork-PR lifecycle scripts
- Narrow cross-repo dispatch payloads
- Add 7d npm release-age gate
- Add CODEOWNERS on .github/** and .yarnrc.yml

---------

Co-authored-by: prastoin <paul@twenty.com>
This commit is contained in:
neo773
2026-05-12 17:50:29 +05:30
committed by GitHub
parent 79b612ee12
commit 565995e715
47 changed files with 311 additions and 237 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ runs:
run: corepack enable
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version-file: '${{ inputs.app-path }}/.nvmrc'
cache: yarn
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ runs:
run: corepack enable
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version-file: '${{ inputs.app-path }}/.nvmrc'
cache: yarn
+1 -1
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ runs:
run: git fetch origin main --depth=1
- name: Get last successful commit
if: env.NX_BASE == ''
uses: nrwl/nx-set-shas@v4
uses: nrwl/nx-set-shas@3e9ad7370203c1e93d109be57f3b72eb0eb511b1 # v4
- name: Fallback to origin/main if no base found
if: env.NX_BASE == ''
shell: bash
+1 -1
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ runs:
run: |
echo "CACHE_PRIMARY_KEY_PREFIX=v4-${CACHE_KEY}-${REF_NAME}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
- name: Restore cache
uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
uses: actions/cache/restore@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4.3.0 (restore)
id: restore-cache
with:
key: ${{ steps.cache-primary-key-builder.outputs.CACHE_PRIMARY_KEY_PREFIX }}-${{ github.sha }}
+4 -1
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@@ -9,8 +9,11 @@ inputs:
runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
# Fork PRs on pull_request already can't write to the base repo's cache (GitHub built-in).
# The fork guard is defense-in-depth for pull_request_target, which does have write access.
- name: Save cache
uses: actions/cache/save@v4
if: ${{ format('{0}', github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork) != 'true' }}
uses: actions/cache/save@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4.3.0 (save)
with:
key: ${{ inputs.key }}
path: |
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ runs:
fi
- name: Checkout docker compose files
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
with:
repository: ${{ inputs.twenty-repository }}
ref: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.git-ref }}
+7 -4
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@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ runs:
echo "packages/*/node_modules" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo 'EOF' >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Setup Node.js and get yarn cache
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: ${{ inputs.node-version }}
- name: Restore node_modules
id: cache-node-modules
uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
uses: actions/cache/restore@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4.3.0 (restore)
with:
key: v4-${{ steps.globals.outputs.CACHE_KEY_PREFIX }}-${{github.sha}}
restore-keys: v4-${{ steps.globals.outputs.CACHE_KEY_PREFIX }}-
@@ -44,10 +44,13 @@ runs:
shell: ${{ steps.globals.outputs.ACTION_SHELL }}
run: |
yarn config set enableHardenedMode true
yarn config set enableScripts false
yarn --immutable --check-cache
# Fork PRs on pull_request already can't write to the base repo's cache (GitHub built-in).
# The fork guard is defense-in-depth for pull_request_target, which does have write access.
- name: Save cache
if: ${{ steps.cache-node-modules.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && steps.cache-node-modules.outputs.cache-matched-key == '' }}
uses: actions/cache/save@v4
if: ${{ steps.cache-node-modules.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' && steps.cache-node-modules.outputs.cache-matched-key == '' && format('{0}', github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork) != 'true' }}
uses: actions/cache/save@0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830 # v4.3.0 (save)
with:
key: ${{ steps.cache-node-modules.outputs.cache-primary-key }}
path: ${{ steps.globals.outputs.PATH_TO_CACHE }}